

RESEARCH NOTE

From ‘Wokeism’ to ‘Le Wokeisme’: Diffusion of Anti-Wokeness as a Far-Right Master Frame From the United States to France

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ABSTRACT

The transnationalization of the far right is a noteworthy and evolving phenomenon, characterized by extensive networks of actors, their collaborative activities and the exchange of novel ideas and frames. The emergence and cross-national spread of ‘anti-wokeness’ is a recent trend in the ongoing transnationalization process. As a concept to criticize the *woke* ideas while promoting the illiberal and conservative ones, anti-wokeness emerged in the United States during the 2010s, yet it has also been rapidly adopted by the political, social and intellectual actors in many European countries—among which France represents a paradigmatic case. This research note, which is a pilot study under a broader research project, investigates this cross-national spread of anti-wokeness and addresses the questions of why and how anti-wokeness as a popular frame of far-right politics has diffused from the United States to France recently. Drawing on the analysis of social media content and in-depth interviews with far-right/conservative figures, we propose an analytical framework that frames the spread of anti-wokeness as a phenomenon of the transnationalization of the far right through the cross-national diffusion of a master frame.

1 | Introduction

The recent social, political and economic developments in Europe and the United States, including the 2008 financial crisis, the refugee crisis during the 2010s and the COVID-19 pandemic during the 2020s, created favourable conditions for the transnationalization of far-right politics.¹ The far-right forces, including political parties, movements and civil society organizations, increasingly feel the need to establish transnational contacts and coordination to expand their impact while they co-organize their political contention often beyond borders and exchange ideas to discuss similar issues with both conventional and innovative perspectives (Fangen and Weisskircher 2024; Froio and Ganesh 2019; Törnberg and Nissen 2023). In this ‘fourth wave of far-right politics’ (Mudde 2019), we witness the widening of the far-right’s

ideological core beyond the key issues of race, ethnicity, nationalism and immigration, now also including climate change denialism (Küppers 2022), COVID-19 scepticism (Kaltwasser and Taggart 2024) and anti-gender and antitrans campaigns (Köttig et al. 2017). Among these trends, one of the latest and most popular ones, although still unexplored, is *anti-wokeness*. As a concept to criticize the *woke* ideas while promoting the illiberal and conservative ones, anti-wokeness emerged in the United States and became prominent since the first Trump administration starting from 2016, yet it has also been rapidly adopted by the political, social and intellectual actors in many European countries. The case of France is one of the noteworthy examples of this phenomenon: As ‘le wokisme’ (‘wokeism’ in French) has evolved into a heated topic in France to discuss various issues such as education and minority rights, anti-wokeness became popular among the far-right groups,

ranging from the local identitarian movements such as *Furie Francese* to national-level far-right political figures including Marine Le Pen, despite remaining understudied scholarly.

This research note is an initial assessment of the cross-national spread of anti-wokeness, providing some insights on the questions of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ anti-wokeness as a popular frame of far-right politics diffuses across countries/regions. Theoretically, we approach this phenomenon as a case of transnationalization of far-right politics through the cross-national diffusion of frames and ideas. Adopting a similar perspective to Fangen and Weisskircher (2024), we use transnationalization to denote the progression of far-right politics towards a more transnational orientation in their objectives and activities. Within this framework, the case of diffusion of the anti-wokeness frame in the far-right discourse from the United States to France can be understood as a ‘critical case’ for the intensity and saliency of the phenomenon in the recipient country (see Section 3). We believe that our research can contribute to the debates on the literature on far-right politics by empirically analysing this novel and mostly unexplored trend of anti-wokeness.

This pilot study is conducted under an ongoing and broader research project;² however, the preliminary data analysis, which employed a triangulation of methods including dictionary-based content analysis and qualitative analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews, has already revealed various patterns and insights (see Appendix A for data details). Based on these findings, we firstly argue that anti-wokeness can be considered as a *master frame* adopted by far-right actors to discuss various social and political issues. Also, we believe that it is analytically fruitful to approach the spread of anti-wokeness as a *cross-national diffusion of a master frame* to explore mechanisms, conditions and actors of this phenomenon. Furthermore, we argue that anti-wokeness in France exhibits a distinctly nativist characteristic, deeply entrenched in French and European identities, and characterized by an antagonistic stance towards both American and Islamic cultural influences. We also posit that the success of the anti-woke master frame can be particularly seen in its use along with the anti-gender and anti-immigrant frames in France. Presenting these initial findings and theoretical proposals, we hope to provoke some further debates regarding this popular yet understudied phenomenon of wokeism and the recent trends of the transnationalization of far-right politics.

2 | Wokeness Versus Anti-Wokeness

Anti-wokeness is a rapidly growing political trend in the United States and Europe among conservative and far-right actors, yet this connection between wokeness, anti-wokeness and far-right politics has received relatively limited scholarly attention. The term ‘staying woke’ originates in the early 20th century in the United States as a term used in African–American Vernacular English to describe the political consciousness of racism and social injustices towards the African–American community (Cammaerts 2022; Richardson and Ragland 2018). Especially after its first popular use in the folksong ‘Scottsboro Boys’ in 1938 to criticize the racist legal practices towards African–Americans, the term woke became a reference word to highlight ‘the need for Afro-Americans to be acutely aware and conscious of the

dangers and threats that were inherent to a white-dominated racist America’ (Cammaerts 2022, 734). Despite its long history, the term has reached its peak popularity very recently, following the Black Lives Matter movement, including Ferguson protests during the 2010s and George Floyd protests during the 2020s (Cammaerts 2022; Richardson and Ragland 2018). In this contentious period, the popular use of woke ‘represented a shift from being a verb to an adjective and was expanded to include other injustices and forms of discrimination and oppression to do with gender and sexuality’, as it started to be used by various progressive and liberal groups challenging social and racial injustices (Cammaerts 2022, 735).

In this context, anti-wokeness was adopted rapidly by various conservative and far-right social and political actors. As Davies and MacRae (2023) emphasize, a branch of early criticism of the woke during the 2010s focused on ‘the cynical commercialisation of woke messaging, particularly in corporate marketing to young progressive audiences’ (p. 5), through strategies which Romano (2020) describes as ‘superficial trappings of progressive idealism’. While the critics concentrating on the impact of ‘woke capitalism’ on culture and the entertainment industry included intellectuals and scholars from both right and left political spectrums, the predominant branch of anti-wokeness has been strongly embedded in the conservative political position against the liberal values of what wokeness represents since the first Trump administration starting from 2016. The term started to be used ‘pejoratively to target progressive politics and public figures’ who are vocal about social justice-related issues, including minority rights and diversity (Davies and MacRae 2023, 5). The rise of Trumpism and ‘fossil fascism’, which combines a white supremacist worldview with climate change denialism that serves the interests of fossil-fuelled capitalism, has also led to environmental movements being framed as ‘woke’ or ‘extreme’ (Cammaerts 2022; Conversi 2024; Daggett 2018; Jacques and Dunlap 2025; Malm and Zetkin Collective 2021). Being criticized along with ‘political correctness’, ‘cancel culture’ and ‘critical race theory’, the wokeness has been targeted also on federal and state levels through actions such as the ‘Stop WOKE Act’ released in Florida in 2022 to limit trainings on gender and gender in public schools, or President Trump’s executive order in 2025 preventing ‘woke’ artificial intelligence models in the federal government (Executive Order No. 14319 2025; Hutchens and Miller 2023). Similar to the phrases ‘gender ideology’, ‘LGBT propaganda’ and ‘Great Replacement’, the ‘woke ideology’ has also been added to the common phrases of illiberal discourse and politics (Segers 2024). Cammaerts (2022) explains this evolution of anti-wokeness as the ‘abnormalization of social justice’ as follows:

“Woke” and “wokeness” was also weaponised by the right, (...) Social justice struggles such as anti-fascism, anti-racism and anti-sexism or pro LGBTQ rights, are also conveniently labelled, stigmatised and bedevilled as an extremist, authoritarian, intolerant and above all an ideological and thus contestable position.

(p. 735)

After its emergence in the United States, anti-wokeness became popular among the conservative and illiberal political

and social spheres in Europe. There has been a growing, albeit slowly, literature on this spread of anti-wokeness to various countries such as the United Kingdom (Cammaerts 2022; Davies and MacRae 2023; Fekete 2022), Benelux region (Dhoest and Paulussen 2024; Segers 2024), Spain (Ivan 2023) and France (Campagne 2023; Johnson 2024). While these works describe the use of anti-wokeness discourse as an umbrella term constructed by illiberal actors, they also show how wokeness is framed as a ‘foreign’, ‘imperialist’ and ‘dangerous’ ideology that is ‘imported’ from the United States to ‘infect’ the local cultures in Europe. Thus, unlike the US-based debates around the wokeness, a nativist dimension is also strongly present in the discourses of European actors. The next section further explores this evolution of anti-wokeness and its spread in France.

3 | Transnational Spread of Anti-Wokeness to France

Compared to many European countries, the debates around wokeness in France have been highly mainstreamed with the participation of major political actors and intellectuals (both on the left and the right spectrums), expanding the discursive opportunities for this issue to become visible, legitimate and salient. The use of woke dates to 2015 in social media platforms in France; however, the concept dramatically popularized during the 2020s as it became a contentious issue in intellectual and political spheres. Led by French Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer in Macron’s cabinet, a think tank ‘Laboratoire de la République’ was founded in 2021 in order to combat ‘U.S. imported wokesim’ that ‘fragments and divides’ the French society and to promote ‘republican idea’ to build a ‘democratic, social, indivisible, secular’ society (Battaglia et al. 2021; John 2022). As Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements diffused to France during the 2020s, the politicians also actively engaged in discussions with discourses mostly against ‘woke ideology’. President Macron positioned himself against ‘woke nonsense’ both in national politics and also the European Commission, criticizing it as a ‘radicalizing’ threat that divides society and harms local culture and languages (Jewers 2021; Sharma 2021).

In this political context, the French far-right parties were among the most ‘obsessed with fighting wokeness’ (Dolan and Tower 2022). Far-right parties’ leading figures, including Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, Marion Maréchal and Éric Zemmour, heavily engaged in ‘anti-woke’ discourses to combat ‘the promotion of woke ideology’, which is considered to be in alignment with the Islamification and left-wing destruction of French culture (Brunet 2024). As political party Reconquête’s leader Zemmour mentioned in an interview, the French far-right’s general attitude is to describe ‘wokeness’ as ‘a kind of Trojan horse for the Islamification of formerly Christian nations’, which aims at ‘destroying our cultures, our history’ to ‘make a clean sweep of all that and allow a foreign culture, history and civilisation to come and replace it’ (Gray 2021). As can be clearly seen following the Paris 2024 Olympics ceremony, which was framed as woke by various far-right actors, wokeness was targeted as a ‘shameful’ ideology to erase French values and ‘insult to nation’ (Zion 2024).

Campagne (2023) describes the controversy around wokeness as a ‘quarrel opposing those who embrace an increasingly multicultural and globalized France to those who do not believe the “archipelago” is a viable political and cultural model for the Gallic nation’ (p. 97). In the heated debates about the ethnic, religious and gender diversity and rights in France, wokeness became particularly central as a contentious and foreign concept that has been widely addressed by different ideological positions. As Campagne (2023) mentions,

Those on the right accused their opponents of giving in to a dangerous ideology imported from the United States. Those on the left expressed discomfort with a concept that could stigmatize them as enemies of the nation’s constitutionally enshrined values to be “an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic [that] shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.”

(p. 95)

In these debates, the far-right political actors are the ones that particularly demonized—also weaponized—wokeness. Apart from being framed as an imported concept from Anglosphere that is both a threat and insult to French culture and language, wokeness were framed aligned with the ‘Islamist-leftist invasion’ of France as well as the ‘imposing of an oppressive, totalitarian, ideological agenda’ (Johnson 2024, 13). Gradually embedded into a nativist stance with a strong emphasis on French identity, wokeness has been particularly used as an umbrella frame to criticize and abnormalize the struggles for the liberal and progressive movements in France.³

4 | An Analytical Framework: Cross-National Diffusion of a Master Frame

In this research, we elaborate on the scope of the abovementioned debates by proposing a preliminary analysis of the empirical material within a theoretical framework of diffusion of anti-wokeness from the United States to Europe among far-right actors through the analysis of the France case. Inspired by Snow and Benford’s (1992) research on collective action frames, we argue that anti-wokeness functions as a ‘collective action master frame’ that is used to raise several issues together by far-right actors. Compared to the collective action frames used by social movement actors to define a context-specific problem and activate people to act against it, ‘a master frame’s articulations and attributions are sufficiently elastic, flexible, and inclusive enough so that any number of other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their campaigns’ (Benford 2013). As Aslanidis (2018) argues, master frames are ‘amenable to customization and adaptation to particular needs and objective’ (p. 455). Regarding these features of master frames, anti-wokeness can be considered a master frame that is adoptable and customizable for the different types of far right and conservative actors to raise various illiberal ideas and claims, ranging from anti-gender positions to climate change denialism with an antagonistic attitude towards progressive and liberal actors and ideas. In the

discourses of far-right actors as a master frame, anti-wokeness functions as an umbrella term to resonate with and mobilize their audience—both locally and transnationally—against the wide range of core liberal ideas such as social justice and equality. This phenomenon can be regarded as an illustration of the transnationalization of far-right politics, which is the complex and multifaceted interactions among diverse national actors who are interconnected in a multitude of ways and engage in a range of collaborative and competitive relationships with each other as they interact with national and international institutions (or public spheres) (Caiani and Eren 2025; Fangen and Weisskircher 2024; Froio and Ganesh 2019). Through various mechanisms of transnationalization such as diffusion, the actors exchange and adopt ideas, frames or strategies against their opponents in order to challenge them and increase their own influence, reputation or visibility both in national and international contexts.

Within this analytical framework, the adoption of wokeism can be considered as diffusion, which refers to the spread of the ideational and behavioural components of collective action ranging from the tactics to the frames through the relational, nonrelational or mediated channels from a transmitter group to an adopter group (della Porta and Diani 2020; Kolins Givan et al. 2010; McAdam and Rucht 1993). A diffusion process generally has four major elements: (1) diffused object ('innovation'), (2) transmitter/stimulant group, (3) adopter/recipient group and (4) channel of diffusion. Due to the *modular* features of the objects of diffusion that can be customized according to the needs of the local actors, and the geographical, cultural and organizational connections as well as the shared emotional and cognitive schemas and experiences between transmitters and adopters, diffusion can happen across different countries (Kolins Givan et al. 2010; Eren 2023).

Employing this framework, we analyse the emergence of anti-wokeism in France as an empirical case of diffusion in which abovementioned elements can be visibly detected: (1) The 'innovation' is the 'anti-woke master frame' that can be empirically tracked in the frames, slogans, symbols, speeches, etc. of the far right and conservative actors in France; (2) the transmitter group is the conservative/Republican and far-right groups including Trump supporters in the United States; (3) the adopter group is the conservative and far-right actors in France; and (4) the channel of diffusion can be speculated as both media channels and organizational networks between the United States and French actors (though it is not empirically proven). While further empirical research is required to strengthen this framework, our approach, similar to the previous works analysing the transnationalization of far-right politics through the diffusion of frames (Van Hauwaert 2019; Ramos and Torres 2020; França 2024), provides an analytical framework to track this spreading process systematically and to discover the conditions and reasons for the emergence and popularization of the anti-wokeness in France.

5 | Preliminary Findings

In order to test our framework and explore the reasons and conditions of the adoption of anti-wokeness rhetoric by French

far-right actors, we employ a mixed methodological approach combining quantitative content analysis and qualitative in-depth interview analysis. The preliminary findings of our research on the investigation of shared frames used by 138 far-right actors in seven countries (Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary) on their publicly available Facebook pages between 2008 and 2023 reveal some key findings and recurring topics.⁴ Using a dictionary-based content analysis to track the most common frames used by 36 French far-right actors to address five policy issues (education and culture, environment and climate change, gender, immigration and citizenship and social policy), we observed that the 'wokeism' is the most common illiberal frame to discuss 'education and culture' (see Figure 1). The data also show that France is the only country where 'wokeism' is the most referred frame in this policy issue compared to other countries where 'indoctrination' is the most popular one among the illiberal frames used by far-right actors (with the exception of Hungary) (see Figure 2). Even these preliminary findings demonstrate that France is a particular case to explore the spread of anti-wokeness across Europe.

The preliminary analysis of 11 semi-structured in-depth interviews with various figures from different types of far-right actors, such as political parties, civil society organizations and social movements, on the other hand, reveals some key themes and recurring topics of the dynamics of the France case of diffusion. The first pattern is that the anti-woke stance is adopted by many French conservative and far-right actors of different types, having the potential to link ballot and barricades (or the protest far-right milieu and the institutional side). In this sense, an ex-Reconquête party member, an organizer in Furie Francaise or a sympathizer of Rassemblement National can share similar antagonistic sentiments towards the 'woke ideology', explicitly 'taking a stance against woke movement' (Fr9) and calling it 'dangerous' (Fr7) or even 'crazy' ideology (Fr1). Such an attitude is often embedded in a nativist stance that brings a particular characteristic to the French anti-woke position. As presented also in previous sections, wokeness is framed as a foreign 'threat' that harms French society and 'European civilization' (Fr8). 'Feeling deeply attached to the country' requires a stance against the woke threat to French values and freedoms (Fr7).




FIGURE 1 | Occurrences of 'wokeism' in the recent posts of French far-right actors (Top 3 frames). [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.nana.70045)]

	Country						
	Italy	France	Austria	United Kingdom	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic
Frame	Indottrramento	Wokisme	Indoktrination	Indoctrination	Mathias Corvinus Collegium	Indoktrynacja	Indoktrinace

FIGURE 2 | Most used frames about ‘Education and Culture’ in seven countries.

Secondly, wokeism seems able to connect various spheres of far-right mobilization, from local to transnational, potentially networking also actors beyond the national borders. According to many interviewees, wokeism is not considered only a local problem for France but a ‘universal’ one that ‘transcend national boundaries’ and require ‘to join forces, exchange solutions, and learn from others’ approaches’ (Fr11). Highlighting the importance of collaboration to deal with this problem, one of the members of the Parents Vigilants, a conservative parents’ network initiated by Éric Zemmour, similarly mentioned that ‘publicly collaborating could perhaps lend us European credibility and allow us to address wokeism at a broader European level’ (Fr3). The emphasis on the United States is also noteworthy in these discussions. As expected, the US counterparts and particularly President Trump are often mentioned as an inspirational benchmark for the combat against wokeness. ‘Trump’s anti-woke stance from his 2016 campaign’ or ‘Musk’s significant role in the recent campaigns’ are marked as important examples of anti-woke struggle which ‘evolved significantly, impacting broader discussions’ that ‘resonates universally’ (Fr11). As we suspected, these points resemble the transmitter–adopter relationship in a diffusion process.

Third pattern is the visible function of anti-wokeness as a narrative aligning with various social and political positions sympathized with by conservative and far-right actors. In the interviews, two political trends were particularly associated with wokeness: ‘Islamization of Europe’ and ‘gender/trans ideology’. While wokeness is described as related to the perceived rise of these two trends, its connection with the former is more subtle, while it is much more explicit with the latter. Wokeness is referred to as a problem along with mass immigration and Islamism (e.g., Fr8), yet its connection to Islamic values (and Muslim communities) is often framed as the forced alliance between these two ‘fundamentally incompatible’ ideologies. As one of the interviewees mentioned, ‘even Islamists oppose wokeism’ (Fr11); another one highlighted that wokeism is doomed to be vanished because ‘the left finds itself caught between defending an increasingly Islamized society—which will never accept woke ideas, as these countries throw such individuals off rooftops—and advocating for the woke agenda’ (Fr9). Such findings align with the major arguments raised by the scholars reviewed in the previous section discussing the particular condition of France: Wokeism is highly affiliated with the ‘Islamism’ and ‘Cultural Marxism’ by the far-right groups, which consider wokeism as a threat to divide society and cause political and religious radicalization. Yet, our findings so far reveal another dimension in this debate by demonstrating such groups’ perception of Muslim communities not being able to (or willing to) adopt the progressive and liberal ideas around wokeism. In this view, ‘Islamism’ and other pro-Islam/pro-immigrant movements support and benefit from wokeism, yet their position and ‘woke ideology’ cannot exist together due to

their fundamental incompatibility. Such findings, which should be further investigated, are significant to understanding the layered antagonism, which does not only see wokeism and left-wing progressive movements as a threat but also reflects a particular attitude towards Muslim communities, highlighting the belief that they cannot truly adopt ‘woke’ agenda.

Compared to these debates, the connection between the anti-wokeness and the anti-gender/anti-LGBTI+ is a much more visible pattern in our interview data. While discussing wokeness, several interviewees directly associate it with gender-related issues ranging from trans identities to women’s rights, framing it as ‘an ideology aimed at destruction’ that forces an ideological sexuality agenda against ‘normal’, ‘biological’ or ‘scientifically illogical’ (Fr1, Fr7, Fr11). Such findings show that anti-wokeness functions perfectly as a master frame, which takes various forms and can be adopted according to the needs, goals and audiences of different organizations. To illustrate, the member of the identitarian women’s rights movement Nemesis described wokeness as a ‘threat’ to women’s rights and ‘equally dangerous for women’, highlighting its connection to ‘issue of transgender identity’ (Fr7). Emphasizing ‘biological realities’, the interviewee stated that ‘many aspects of woke ideology that concern us to varying degrees’ such as trans women’s presence in women’s sport competitions, which they consider as ‘absurd and yet another way to erase women in society’ (Fr7). An interviewee from Furie Francaise similarly mentioned that they ‘strongly oppose what’s often labelled as “woke culture”’, adding that they ‘stood against measures like same-sex marriage’ and ‘reject the trans ideology, seeing it as a social contagion preying on vulnerable youth’ because they ‘maintain that societal norms should uphold stability and avoid glorifying fringe ideologies’ (Fr8). Another interviewee from the similar movement also stated that they are also against ‘drag queens, who are a significant part of this woke culture’ (though they believe that ‘immigration and Islamization are much bigger issues’) because they ‘find it degenerate to force such things on children’ through public events (Fr9).

Several interviewees also approached the wokeness as a problem in the education system due to its emphasis on gender-related issues. A member of Parents Vigilants argued that woke ideas are ‘not rooted in objective scientific foundations’ or ‘justifiable’ and ‘should not be developed or supported within the school institution’ and their organization ‘seek to guarantee and would like to see the neutrality of education assured’ against the ‘interventions by associations from the LGBT community’ (Fr3). Similarly, a sympathizer of the Rassemblement National also highlighted that ‘wokeness is crazy’ as ‘it’s about wanting to make children believe that all of this (homosexuality and sexuality) is normality and to throw millions and billions of dollars into it’ through education (Fr1). As can be seen in these examples, different types of actors with distinct ideological principles and goals can easily

use anti-wokeness as a master frame to strengthen their position especially toward gender-related issues. Our findings, along with the findings of the studies reviewed throughout this article, show that further research on the strong connection between wokeness and gender-related issues in the framing strategies of the far-right actors is particularly important to understand the recent dynamics of far right and conservative politics in which anti-wokeness has been rapidly spreading.

6 | Conclusion

This research note does not present any conclusive results or definitive answers to the questions on the transnationalization of the far right or the emerging issue of political conflicts around wokeness/anti-wokeness; however, it indicates some interesting, albeit limited, findings that can be the premise of a broader study. As presented by our findings, the far-right actors in France were heavily inspired by the rising anti-wokeness in the United States and gradually adopted similar frames and strategies against the so-called ‘woke threat’. While it is ‘recontextualized’ according to the goals and values of the French actors, the core anti-wokeness master frame remained present in the discourses and activities of these actors. Despite the anti-woke position’s strong emphasis on the nativist stance and French identity, its transnational character, as evidenced by its connection to the global struggle against the ‘woke ideology’, is also identified in the findings. It is also shown that issues ranging from anti-immigration to anti-gender are aligned with the anti-woke position, which enables far-right actors to expand their framing strategies in general, considering the popularity of anti-wokeness in France.

Investigating this phenomenon, we hope to demonstrate that the research on far-right politics can further benefit from the analytical and theoretical frameworks widely used by social movement studies—such as the theories on framing and collective action diffusion. Analysing the adoption of anti-wokeness by the French far-right as a cross-national diffusion of a master frame easily enables us to detect the dynamics of such spread of an idea, such as actors interacting, the channels of diffusion, its motivations and conditions. Thus, we believe that such dynamics and agent-based approaches based on social movement studies can further provide the literature on far-right politics with an analytical and methodological toolbox. Furthermore, anti-wokeness represents a substantial phenomenon, though it does not constitute a singular occurrence, but rather exemplifies the transnationalization of far-right politics that has been observed in the recent two decades. Through such exchange of ideas, frames and tactics, establishment of various networks and the organization of different types of cooperative events, far-right politics have been transnationalized recently. In order to understand the reasons behind the rise of far-right political parties or movements in different countries, this transnationalization process should be further investigated.

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Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Endnotes

- ¹Inspired by Mudde (2019) and Pirro (2023), we consider far right as an umbrella category encompassing both populist/radical (illiberal-democratic) and extreme right (antidemocratic) movements, primarily based on nativism and authoritarianism.
- ²The project is “AUTHLIB—Neo-Authoritarianisms in Europe and the Liberal Democratic Response”, funded by the European Union. For details, please see the website: <https://www.authlib.eu/>.
- ³Our research focuses only on the dynamics of the cross-national adoption of anti-wokeness by French far-right actors, but for a broader discussion including the connection between the wokeness and progressive movements, please see Johnson (2024) and Campagne (2023).
- ⁴Software such as IRAMUTEQ can be used for further elaborating this multidimensional analysis of textual data including lexicometry and discourse analysis in qualitative research. Once the dataset is completed, comparative systematic analysis with US far-right social media data is also planned to be incorporated in the broader project.

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Appendix A

The anonymity of the interviewees is ensured through the use of identification codes, such as 'Fr[number]'. The interview data are stored and treated as strictly confidential, in accordance with the highest ethical standards of social research as defined by the Joint Ethical Committee of Scuola Normale Superiore.

Interview List

1. Fr1, sympathizer, (Rassemblement National, France), face-to-face, 21/09/2024, male.
2. Fr2, sympathizer, (Rassemblement National, France), face-to-face, 23/09/2024, female.
3. Fr3, member of 'Parents Vigilants' (Association from Reconquête [political party], anti-gender), phone, 2/12/2024, female.
4. Fr4, member of 'Frères Dissidents' (nationalist), phone, 24/11/2024, male.
5. Fr5, organizer of 'Cocarde' (Student union, nationalist), phone, 28/11/2024, male.
6. Fr6, organizer of 'Cercle des Legitimistes', (royalist, Catholic), phone, 4/12/2024, male.
7. Fr7, member of 'NEMESIS' (identitarian feminist group, anti-immigration), phone, 06/12/2024, female.
8. Fr8, member of Furie Francaise (identitarian, local), face-to-face interview, 11/12/2024, male.
9. Fr9, member of Furie Francaise (identitarian, local), face-to-face interview, 16/12/2024, male.
10. Fr10, organizer of Generation Z (youth organization of Reconquête), phone, 18/12/2024, male.
11. Fr11, ex-member of Reconquête, phone, 19/12/2024, male.

Appendix B

As the research is still ongoing, the dataset of social media content analysis is under embargo. Access to the data can be requested from Batuhan Eren or Manuela Caiani.