



# The rise and endurance of radical right movements

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## Abstract

This article reviews the scholarship on radical right movements in Europe. It focuses on three strands of this literature: first, the macro-level contextual *opportunities-based* explanations for the fortunes of these movements; second, internal supply-side approaches, referring to the internal *organizational resources* – leadership, communication and propaganda – that support the mobilization; and third, the *individual (micro-level) factors* of the emergence and the rise of radical right movements. The goal is to shed light on all these different approaches to explain the ‘Who’, ‘When’, ‘How’ and ‘Why’ of the emergence and (violent) mobilization of radical right groups, using empirical evidence drawn from various case studies in Western, Eastern and Central Europe. This is a topic often neglected in the academic literature on the radical right, which still focuses mainly on political parties and elections. The article concludes by discussing possible future directions for radical right movement research, including the transnationalization of the radical right, the usage of the Internet and radical right ‘movement parties’.

## Keywords

Collective mobilization, European politics, radical right movements, micro, meso and macro explanatory factors, radical right violence

## Introduction

Recent developments in Europe, starting with the economic crisis and followed by the refugee crisis, seem to have created favorable conditions for a remarkable mobilization (Almeida, 2019; Arzheimer, 2015: 552; Caiani and Weisskircher, 2019) of radical right organizations and movements (Benček and Strasheim, 2016; Garland and Treadwell, 2012; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Mudde, 2016b). This is

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illustrated not only by the victory of Trump at the US presidential election, Brexit (which was supported by right-wing groups and politicians) and the emergence of new nationalist movements such as the ‘alt-right’ and Pegida (Boros et al., 2016), but also by the rising electoral success and social penetration of radical right groups all across Europe (Caiani and Graziano, 2019). The recent 2019 European Parliament elections, although with mixed outcomes for the radical right (performing strikingly well in some big countries such as Italy, Poland and Hungary), were no exception: with, overall, the number of radical right MEPs increasing significantly). This process can be observed in both Western and Central/Eastern Europe (and beyond), and both inside and outside the electoral arena (Kriesi, 2012). To mention just a few examples: the ‘Sweden Democrats’ (with 18% of votes in the September 2018 elections); the ‘Czech Trump’ of the party of ‘Unsatisfied Citizens’ (with 30% of the vote in 2018); ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) entering the German Bundestag (with almost 13% of the vote in the 2017 federal and 2018 regional elections); the success of the Danish People’s Party (21% in 2015); the Slovak Kotleba-People’s Party (8% in the 2016); and Jobbik in Hungary (maintaining 20% in both the 2014 and 2018 elections). Along with the growing importance of right-wing parties, new forms of right-wing social movements have emerged that function as incubators of new political and organizational ideas (Minkenberg, 2010; Pankowski, 2010). The rise of the anti-Islamic Pegida movement since 2014, with its weekly marches of anti-immigrant vigilante groups and citizen street patrols (e.g. the Soldiers of Odin), and the swift spread of the Identitarian movement, are just some of the latest sustained episodes of radical right mobilization outside the electoral arena (Berntzen and Weisskircher, 2016; Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018).

Although it may sometimes seem impossible to find generalizable trends – the strangely divergent fortunes of the Walloon National Front (which has not been successful) and the Flemish VB (which has achieved success) within the context of the same country point to the potential challenges with this – the European picture poses the urgent question of ‘*how*’ and ‘*why*’ *individual activists and organizations mobilize on the radical right*. This article addresses these issues, reviewing existing research on the causes of the *emergence of mobilization of radical right movements* (including violence; Taylor et al., 2013) in Europe, with a particular emphasis on three big approaches: macro-, meso- and micro-level explanations (Eatwell, 2016). Empirical evidence will be drawn from various European case studies (and beyond – e.g. the USA). The article will also emphasize somewhat neglected issues in the scholarship on the radical right, such as the transnationalization of radical right movements, the use of the Internet for their mobilization and new organizational hybrid forms of ‘movement parties’ (Caiani, 2018b).

Although the topic has a clear scientific and social relevance, the literature on the radical right, as has been noted (Muis and Immerzeel, 2017), mainly focuses on political parties and electoral behavior, paying less attention to the non-partisan milieu of the radical right that surrounds – and often supports – them (for exceptions see Caiani et al., 2012; Hutter and Kriesi, 2013; Leeson et al., 2012; Morrow and Meadowcroft, 2019; Ruzza, 2017; Veugelers and Menard, 2018; and on the East, Minkenberg, 2011). Moreover, the boundaries between radical right movements and parties are increasingly ‘blurred’ (Mudde, 2016a) and therefore focusing on radical right movements seems particularly appropriate.

In terms of definition, within the academic debate some scholars (Carter, 2005) define right-wing extremism using two criteria: anti-constitutionalism and anti-democratic values (hence 'extremist') and a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (hence 'right-wing'). Others (Norris, 2005) prefer the label 'radical right' to describe those political parties and non-party organizations that are located toward one pole on the standard ideological left–right scale. In fact, different labels such as 'radical right' (Ellinas, 2010), 'extreme right' (Caiani et al., 2012), 'populist radical right' (Mudde, 2007), anti-immigration movements and far right (Blee, 2003) are used interchangeably to refer to the same organizations (e.g. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, AfD or Pegida). Despite the still open debate, these movements are widely recognized as being characterized by some common core ideological attributes: such as nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, the quest for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, revisionism and traditional ethics (Mudde, 2007: 21).

### **Radical right movements in context (when and why?)**

When analyzing the causes of the emergence and success of radical right movements' mobilization, one is confronted with three main analytical approaches. Some emphasize – at an individual (micro) level – the role of extremists' psychological characteristics and activists' values and motivations (Canetti and Pedahzur, 2002; Henry et al., 2005). Others focus instead on the meso organizational factors (i.e. organizations, propaganda and leadership) (Art, 2011; Eatwell, 2005). A third approach focuses on the environmental (e.g. societal and cultural) conditions that may influence actors' mobilization and success (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Koopmans, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005).

For the last group – i.e. the macro-level approaches – in particular, *economic* and social crises are mentioned in connection with the success of radical right parties and movements (Prowe, 2004). Among studies that focus on economic aspects, 'deprivation theory' relates right-wing extremism to anomie and poverty, bridging the macro-level socio-economic features and individual factors (Heitmeyer, 2002; Perrineau, 2002). The sense of insecurity arising from the breakdown of traditional social structures (e.g. social class, family, religion; Oesch, 2008; Rydgren, 2012) and the grievances generated by the economic and social conditions brought about by processes of globalization and modernization could be 'precipitant' factors for support of right-wing organizations. However, empirical analyses offer contrasting evidence in this respect (Goodwin et al., 2016). For example, some studies of right-wing radicals indicate that they match the 'stereotype' of the losers of globalization (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015): usually young (often younger than 18 years old), with a lower-class background and a lack of education or professional skills (Merkl, 2003). Other studies show that right-wing extremist sentiments are unrelated to socio-economic variables (Canetti and Pedahzur, 2002) and a comfortable individual situation is found to be more conducive to radical right party affinity than job insecurity and deprivation (De Weerd et al., 2004). Radical right groups are often supported by people who want to hold on to what they have in the face of the perceived threats of globalization, such as mass immigration and the post-industrial society (Mudde, 2007: 223). The level of radical right mobilization has been found to have been a significant phenomenon over a number of years (for example 1587 radical right

protests have been identified in seven Western European democracies between 2005 and 2009 – among which more than 25% were violent; Caiani and Parenti, 2013). This further increased after the 2008 economic crisis (Benček and Strasheim, 2016; Caiani and Graziano, 2018; Minkenberg, 2015a). However, considerable variations across countries have been observed: how, therefore, can we explain differences across countries and time against the background of the potential presence, in all times and spaces, of dissatisfaction and individual grievances?

Among studies which focus on the *political factors* that can facilitate (or hamper) the emergence and success of right-wing radical groups (e.g. long-term institutional characteristics countries such as electoral systems, Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 2007; models of party competition, Carter, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005; the power of radical right parties, which can compete or reinforce radical right movements, Hutter, 2014) particular attention has been paid to the ‘political opportunities’ structure available in a specific time and country, which can offer advantages or constraints to radical right mobilization (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Mudde, 2007). Political opportunities for radical right movements include institutional allies (Caiani et al., 2012; Mudde, 2007), the instability of political elites (Koopmans, 2005), the legacy of an authoritarian past (Bustikova, 2017) and low trust and confidence in democratic institutions (Lubbers et al., 2002). While ‘open’ opportunities imply easy access for new challengers in the political system, the lack (or the closing) of these opportunities often results in scarce mobilization or even the escalation of radicalization (della Porta, 2013). Having ‘allies’ in power can be either an opportunity for radical right mobilization (reinforced by institutional support) or a constraint, since radical right parties can compete with radical right movements, according to an inverse relationship between radical right electoral and protest politics (Hutter, 2014: 110). Koopmans (2005), for instance, argues that right-wing radicalism in Europe tends to be motivated more by the lack of opportunities (e.g. through established political channels of expression) than by the presence of grievances in society (e.g. presence of immigrants, economic difficulties). Contextual opportunities also imply so-called ‘*discursive opportunities*’ for the radical right, which determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘“legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi, 2004: 72; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; for a literature review, see McCammon, 2013). As far as Central and Eastern Europe is concerned, for example, the role of the former communist regime has been cited as favoring greater acceptance of right-wing discourses and ideologies; likewise, it has been suggested that the youth of the nation states in this region tends to favor a stronger appeal to ‘nationalism’ on the part of the people (Minkenberg, 2015b). Likewise, theories of diffusion and social contagion stress the importance of cognitive elements for the spread of right-wing radical mobilization (Braun, 2011; Jäckle and König, 2016; Muis, 2015). While left-leaning movements and groups have been found to focus primarily on economic issues, the radical right has been found to mobilize mainly in response to the perceived migration crisis (Inglehart and Norris, 2016), where it finds open discursive and cultural opportunities (including anti-immigrant discourses of the elites; Koopmans, 2005). In fact, right-wing populist movements are mostly associated with the cultural dimension of crisis, and are likely to emerge and be successful in those countries where the salience of immigration is high (Kriesi et al., 2008).

The success of the radical right in its ‘mobilization of the losers’, at least in some countries, is considered responsible for a shift in emphasis from questions of economics in the 1970s to questions of culture today (Kriesi et al., 2008: 265). With regard to the *cultural determinants* of radical right support (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2011, 2015), waves of right-wing violence have been linked with the spreading of values such as radical nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia, authoritarianism, opposition to the Left and anti-parliamentarism (Prowe, 2004), and levels of immigration have been related to the mobilization of the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005). A recent study, based on the collection of 1645 events involving anti-refugee violence and social unrest in Germany in 2014 and 2015, shows that radical right violent mobilization, in various forms, emerges primarily against immigrants (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). Scholars have recently emphasized (a) the refugee crisis in Europe and (b) the emergence of new nationalist populisms (Allen, 2014). Radical right movements across Europe, although differing in many ways, do share an emphasis on sovereignty and policies that promote a ‘national preference’ (hence ‘the new nationalism’). They are able to mobilize support by (rhetorically) advocating strict immigration policies, Euroscepticism and policies that place the ‘native’ inhabitants first in a range of areas including welfare and social services. However, the drivers of support are neither new nor necessarily nationalist – instead, a much more complex mechanism is at play (Allen, 2014). Radical right groups use welfare chauvinism as a method to extrapolate racist prejudices into more economic (rational) claims, targeting ethnic and religious minorities (in particular Muslim and Roma communities) (Bustikova, 2009; Holubec and Rae, 2010; Karl, 2017; Pirro, 2015; Płucienniczak and Płatek, 2017). It has been argued that the migrant crisis offered a unique opportunity for the transformation of radical right organizations in Eastern and Central Europe from extra-parliamentary movements into parties (Císař and Navrátil, 2018). The role of ‘nativist’ movements and parties in the political process of various countries has been emphasized (Gyarfašová, 2018). In fact, ‘immigration and multiculturalism continued to be among the key themes of right-wing extremists’ (Busher, 2016: 39–41).<sup>1</sup> The role of religion is also stressed within cultural-level approaches to understanding radical right movements. There has been an increase in protests against Muslims (violent in some cases) (Busher, 2016) and in the USA, Christian identity movements and other religiously motivated radical right groups have increased their activism – especially in the form of Islamophobic hate crimes (Kaplan, 2016) – and grown since 9/11. However, while much attention has been paid to the question of why a group of individuals may decide to mobilize, many scholars have concluded that grievances alone are not enough to create movements (Buechler, 2000).

### **Who mobilizes? When individual values and motivations matter**

Beyond the context within which radical right groups mobilize, scholars have underlined the importance of *individual values and motivations*, which can drive activism within radical right groups (Art, 2011; Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). This approach acknowledges that the survival and success of far-right parties does not exclusively depend on

their electoral success and media savviness but also on the participation of activists (Castelli and Pirro, 2018). The typical profile of a radical right movement activist is: a low level of education, between 35–59 years of age, male, in a traditional job or unemployed, relatively unsatisfied with democracy, fearful of immigration and expecting social decline (Schwörer, 2018).<sup>2</sup> In addition, difficulties in primary socialization, due to the weakening of the sense of family and entrenchment in the community (Merkl, 2003), are also considered factors that favor radical right activism. Indeed, as Kriesi et al. (2008) argue, radical right organizations stand on the side of the losers of mobilization, receiving support from those who economically, but even more so culturally, feel threatened by processes of globalization. However, some studies have indicated a more complex picture of ‘who mobilizes on the radical right’. Whereas the social bases of more successful and ‘accepted’ radical right parties such as Front National are more mixed in their social profile, more radical fringe groups (such as the German NPD) ‘have frightened off the middle classes’ (Arzheimer, 2012). An increase in the intensity of radical right activities in Europe is observable over the last two decades, which is connected with protest incidents (both violent and non-violent) involving activists (Minkenberg, 2011, 2017). In the USA, for example, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2018),<sup>3</sup> over 100 people have been killed and injured in 13 attacks by alt-right-influenced perpetrators since 2014. A new populist and xenophobic right and an underground subculture, represented by racist and frequently violent young extremists, have emerged, with their own rhetoric, mythology and practices (TE-SAT, 2012).

Overall, individual-level explanations for radical right-wing mobilization (including violent mobilization) draw mostly on *psychological and socio-psychological aspects*. The focus is on the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes of radical right supporters (Arzheimer, 2012; De Weerd et al., 2004). For example, an exposure to traditional, nationalist or even authoritarian values (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006: 171) during the activists’ childhood, and, secondly, feelings of stigmatization, together with the sense of loyalty and inclusion offered by the group, were identified as the main common factors leading people to join radical right organizations.<sup>4</sup> Among the social psychological approaches, the importance of belonging and identity, such as the search for status and identity when youths join racist groups and gangs, is also stressed (Björgo, 1997). However, recent research has suggested that, rather than being characterized by irrationality and alienation, radical right activists are not ‘sociopathic’; rather, they are (found) socially integrated and appear to be ‘perfectly normal people’ (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Klandermans and Mayer, 2006). Sociologists today generally approach the radical right as a social movement, not as an outcome of personality disorders (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Horgan, 2008). The importance of the specific value orientations of radical right organizations’ supporters (e.g. levels of trust in representative institutions, xenophobia and orientation towards immigration) is stressed (Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2012). Moreover, rather than being irrational, it has been shown that voting for these parties is connected largely with ideological and pragmatic considerations (Van der Brug et al., 2005; Zhirkov, 2014). In addition, (micro-level) explanations of the causes of radical right activism may vary according to different roles within these groups (e.g. leaders vs. followers) (Victoroff, 2005: 12). For instance, in Austria, researchers distinguished between at least two ‘socio-political types’ within

the electorate of the FPÖ: ‘welfare state chauvinists’ and right-wingers disillusioned by the system (Ullrich and Plasser, 2003).

The importance of the *link between the individuals and the groups* (Goodwin, 2011, on the British National Party; Busher, 2016, 2017, and Pilkington, 2016, on the anti-Islamist English Defence League movement) has also been stressed. Several studies concur in underlining the crucial role of the *Internet* for the maintenance and success of radical right groups (Atton, 2006; Conway, 2016; Klein and Muis, 2018; Krämer, 2017; Qin et al., 2007). Indeed, as underlined by social movement studies (focusing mainly on the Left), the Internet (and social media) can help processes of political socialization into the radical right (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Bartlett et al., 2011; on Eastern Europe, Karl, 2017). Radical right organizations are increasingly using the Internet for many different goals: to enhance their political education and worldwide communication with like-minded people and for recruitment (Burriss et al., 2000; Graham, 2016; Zhou et al., 2005); the building of collective identities (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Daniels, 2009; De Koster and Houtman, 2008); building contacts among radical right groups and the organization of their offline and online mobilization (Caiani, 2018b; Caiani and Parenti, 2013; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003); and propaganda and fund raising (Perry and Olsson, 2009; Saleem et al., 2017). Instead of a formal organization and leadership, face-to-face interactions and identities in the real world, the Web, and the technological potentialities it offers, is becoming the main organizational element for radical right-wing groups, providing potential activists with the feeling of ‘being at home’ and no longer marginalized by society (De Koster and Houtman, 2008). In addition, as many radical right events demonstrate (e.g. the US 2017 rallies in Virginia bringing together alt-right activists with members of other white supremacist and far-right movements), most of these online activists are ready to transfer their activism onto the streets (Bartlett et al., 2014).

## How mobilizing? Organizations and leaders of the radical right

Group-level analyses have, to date, been neglected compared with micro- and macro-level explanations of radical right movements; this is quite surprising, since studies have stressed the very crucial factor of the *organizations and their dynamics as ‘entrepreneurs’* of radical right mobilization and, eventually, political violence (della Porta, 2013). These studies (Chermak et al., 2013; Goodwin, 2011) focus mostly on leaders, ideologies and propaganda to explain the emergence, survival and endurance of the radical right (Art, 2011),<sup>5</sup> pointing to the combination of underlying (individual and contextual) motives for contention with organizations and their networks (either online or offline) as the basis for movement recruitment and the path to popular mobilization (Caiani et al., 2012; Diani, 2015).<sup>6</sup>

Morrow and Meadowcroft (2019), for example, with their original ethnographic study of the English Defence League, show how far-right groups overcome the collective action problem inherent in political organization in order to recruit sufficient activists by supplying selective incentives to members in the form of the club goods of access to violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity. These benefits were offset against the costs of stigma, time, money and unwanted police attention.<sup>7</sup> The desire to belong to

a group also plays an important role (i.e. the ‘protection factor’; Bjørgo, 2005). Group-level studies have also shown that, contrary to expectations, radical right organizations are able to use a variegated action repertoire (Caiani et al., 2012; Castelli Gattinara, 2016), including beyond violence (Goodwin, 2011), with some groups performing traditional political actions and others more oriented toward cultural (symbolic and expressive) initiatives (that become ways to express and disseminate their own vision of the world) reinforcing the in-group thinking and collective identity (Castelli Gattinara and Froio, 2014).

In this regard, the importance of ‘frames’ and discourses produced by radical right organizations (Ellinas, 2010; Rydgren, 2005), as mediating factors for mobilization between the individuals and the context, is also underlined (Furlow and Goodall, 2011; Morrow, 2015; Wodak, 2015; on the East, Kovács, 2013). Rightist organizations provide their members with structures of meaning which they can use to make sense of their lives: rather than assuming that individuals join these organizations because they believe that they can defend their interests defined by their social positions, ‘whiteness’ and ‘racist’ self-interests are constructed through activism (Blee, 2003).

*The role of ‘ideology’* (Adamczyk et al., 2014) is in fact considered crucial in right-wing movements (e.g. the role of ‘dream time’ in radical right-wing political violence; Griffin, 2003) to allow activists to justify even violent actions within a broader system of values (although deviant) (della Porta, 2013). Scholars have, for example, analyzed the Tea Party as a conservative (mostly) white, older, male and middle-class social movement in which a racist agenda is, unlike in the US radical right, largely implicit, yet which holds at its core a celebration of hardworking citizens based on racist constructions; in this movement, racist ideologies crucially intertwine with economic and social concerns (Blee, 2003; Burke, 2013; Skocpol and Williamson, 2012).

Moreover, *charismatic leadership* too is a prominent supply-side explanation for radical right mobilization in the academic literature (Eatwell, 2016): leaders can maintain peace in an organization and therefore instigate an upward spiral of organizational strength (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006); informal leadership roles filled by women, for example, can involve emotional work, which is crucial to sustaining the group’s cohesion and collective identities, as well as in recruiting and socializing new members (Blee, 2003). Finally, the networks that radical right organizations are able to build either at the national or the international level are also considered important for right-wing mobilization (Burriss et al., 2000; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003; Qin et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2005). In the USA, the Tea Party has been found to maintain its members through a loose, reticular organization with relations (albeit uneasy) with both the Republican Party and radical right groups (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). *Networking*, for the radical right as for any political party, represents an important political activity, and functions as a crucible for the exchange of ideas and information on policy and praxis (Graham, 2013: 177), particularly on an international level. This looks like the new frontier (i.e. cross- and transnationalization of organizations, ideas and mobilization) of radical right movements (Bar-On, 2011; Caiani, 2014, 2018a; Durham and Power, 2010; Hafez, 2014; Mammone et al., 2012; on the East, Mareš, 2010). Transnational ties with other radical right organizations in other countries are considered to play an important role in the success of right-wing radicalism in Europe, due to

'transnational processes of exchange and learning' (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011: 22). Like many other political actors, the radical right is currently expanding beyond national borders, creating cross-national links and establishing international cooperation (Caiani, 2018a). This process is helped (at the macro contextual level) by the political opportunities that European integration has provided for the transnationalization of radical right organizations: the 'easing of Europe's border', for example, has been one of the 'new enablers allowing white supremacists and neo-Nazis to connect and cooperate' (Whine, 2012: 317). Second, at the meso organizational level, the process is helped by the common 'frames' that these organizations develop and diffuse. For example, Pegida was often associated with 'subcultural milieus' in the rest of Germany and in other Northern and Central European countries, including individuals from minor and sometimes major political parties who used the Pegida 'brand' as a tool for organizing small-scale street activism (Berntzen and Weisskircher, 2016), thereby bringing about the biggest anti-Islamic 'transnational' social movement in contemporary Europe. To date, however, in sociology and political science there have been few empirical analyses on the topic.

More recently, scholars have stressed the radical right's ability to give birth – as has also happened on the left (della Porta et al., 2017) – to hybrid organizations such as 'movement parties' (Caiani and Cisar, 2018; Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018) as well as to transform itself from more fluid and informal groups into political actors (Hanna and Busher, 2018, on the UK case). These organizations have been seen to straddle the conceptual space between party and movement (Gunther and Diamond, 2003) in that they contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet seek to mobilize public support by framing contentious issues in particular ways (Minkenberg, 2002). As a new type of political organization, radical right 'movement parties' have proved successful in mobilizing voters in some countries (Kitschelt, 2006). The US Tea Party movement and Jobbik in Hungary are two examples (Pirro, 2018), as well as the AfD, which provides a partisan political anchor for nationalist and right-wing protests. 'New' right-wing movement parties usually exhibit a strongly anti-establishment attitude, deploying a populist discourse of 'us' (the people) against 'them' (the political elite), and drawing on society's mistrust of the dominant political class in times of crisis. It has already been argued that they are likely to emerge in times of political and economic crisis, when traditional cleavage structures are transformed and new societal grievances are not addressed by the existing parties (della Porta et al., 2017). More recently, a typology of movements–parties interactions has been proposed (Caiani and Cisar, 2018), which identified several types of possible forms: cooperation, co-optation, agenda appropriation or penetration, completion, attack, exclusion, indifference. Focusing on Eastern Europe, Minkenberg (2015b, 2017) demonstrates the effects of such interactions with regard to agenda setting and policies in 'loaded' policy fields, such as minorities and immigration, law and order, religion, territorial issues and democratization.

## Conclusion

Building on three decades of scholarly research on radical right politics in Europe, this article brings attention to the movement sector of the radical right.


The debate around the causes of the radical right movements and mobilization remains controversial, with, as illustrated, many different approaches. Micro-level accounts, which emphasize either activists' primary socialization and search for status and identity or their authoritarian or xenophobic attitudes, are all focused on the 'demand side' of radical right politics, namely on those individual factors that lead people to sympathize with, join or vote for radical right organizations. This approach has been questioned by other scholars (Mudde, 2010), who highlight the fact that all these explanations of right-wing radicalism implicitly share one assumption: that under 'normal circumstances' (i.e. without crisis), demand for far-right politics should be low. On the other hand, if macro-level studies, focusing on the socio-economic contextual variables (particularly economic disparities, ethnic or class cleavages, and structural factors like technology and communication) and/or political and cultural variables (such as political culture, religion and historical experiences), can offer explanations for the preconditions of the context conducive to radical right mobilization, meso-level studies emphasize the complementary role of the 'agency'. They emphasize that structural effects alone are insufficient to explain right-wing extremism. Rather, background conditions (i.e. societal, political, economic, etc.) are mediated by the militants' perception of reality and the small-group dynamics through which their political involvement develops (della Porta, 2013). As Muis and Immerzeel (2017) notice, with regard to right-wing political parties, the failure (of demand-side structural factors) to provide an overall explanation is clear when looking, for example, at contradictions in radical right fortunes found between neighboring states, which appear to share similar cultural values, post-industrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy.

In addition, these micro, meso-organizational and macro-level factors are generally studied separately, although there have been calls to combine them (Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018; Mudde, 2007). The elaboration of a comprehensive analytical framework, which takes into account simultaneously the context of both structural and group dynamics, as well as psychological factors (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2010) is the task of future research on the radical right. This would also mean, methodologically, the enhancement of studies so that they are not limited to observing causal inferences between macro variables, but can rather search for the mechanisms that mediate between macro variables (Klandermands and Mayer, 2006), and reflect on the macro-micro links in processes of radicalization on the right. Finally, the concept of time and space would also need to be taken into account in the explanations of the causes of right-wing movements' emergence and success. The relationship of these movements to the space(s), networks and subcultures that surround them is a significant gap and an opportunity for future research (Blee and Creasap, 2010).

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## Notes

1. To mention just a few: in 2013, hundreds of far-right activists attended anti-Roma events (including marches and demonstrations) across the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Violent incidents and acts of revenge also emerged in connection with right-wing extremists and Muslim extremists in Britain in the same year (Busher, 2016).
2. Data from Infratest Dimap (<http://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2017-09-24-BT-DE/umfrage-alter.shtml>).
3. [www.splcenter.org/](http://www.splcenter.org/)
4. Indeed, this type of early socialization produces a sharp contrast between activists' traditional values and the values of post-industrial society (such as permissiveness, multiculturalism, etc.) that would in turn cause them to lean towards radicalism (Ignazi, 2003).
5. For example, by drawing on 140 interviews with party activists in different countries, Art (2011) explains the cross-national variation in electoral support for the radical right, using the dynamics of party building and, in particular, the skill of radical right parties in recruiting and maintaining a moderate and educated membership and leadership.
6. In the USA, the monitoring organization Southern Poverty Law Center ([www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map](http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map)) counted 939 hate groups in 2013; in Europe, 70–100 radical right organizations were identified in 2012 in the following European countries: Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Great Britain and Austria.
7. The desire to belong to a group also plays an important role (i.e. the 'protection factor'; Bjørge, 2005).

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## Author biography

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## Résumé

Cet article passe en revue les travaux consacrés aux mouvements de la droite radicale en Europe, en s'intéressant plus particulièrement à trois éléments de cette littérature : premièrement, les explications contextuelles du succès de ces mouvements basées sur les opportunités au niveau macro ; deuxièmement, les approches axées sur l'offre, en référence aux ressources organisationnelles internes, au leadership, à la communication et

à la propagande qui favorisent la mobilisation ; et troisièmement, les *facteurs individuels* (au niveau *micro*) de l'émergence et de la montée des mouvements de droite radicale. L'objectif est d'éclairer ces différentes explications sur « qui » se trouve derrière ces formations de la droite radicale et « quand », « comment » et « pourquoi » ils émergent et se mobilisent (en employant la violence), à partir de données empiriques tirées de différentes études de cas menées en Europe de l'Ouest, en Europe de l'Est et en Europe centrale. Il s'agit d'une question souvent peu traitée dans la littérature scientifique sur la droite radicale, qui reste principalement axée sur les partis politiques et les élections. La dernière partie de l'article expose les futures orientations possibles de la recherche sur les mouvements de droite radicale, notamment la transnationalisation de la droite radicale, l'utilisation d'Internet et les « partis-mouvements » de droite radicale.

### **Mots-clés**

Facteurs d'explication aux niveaux micro, méso et macro, mobilisation collective, mouvements de droite radicale, politique européenne, violence de la droite radicale

### **Resumen**

Este artículo revisa la literatura sobre movimientos sociales de derecha radical en Europa. Se pone la atención en tres abordajes distintos del fenómeno. Primero, nos referimos a aquellas explicaciones contextuales sobre el éxito de estos movimientos que se basan en las *oportunidades* que proporciona el nivel macro. Segundo, nos centramos en los enfoques sobre el lado de la 'oferta interna' de dichos movimientos, refiriéndonos a los *recursos organizacionales*, el liderazgo, la comunicación y la propaganda que sustentan la movilización. En tercer lugar, tomamos en cuenta los *factores individuales* (a nivel *micro*) que están relacionados con la emergencia y consolidación de movimientos sociales de derecha radical. El objetivo es aclarar cómo estos abordajes pueden explicar 'quienes son' estos movimientos y 'cuándo', 'cómo' y 'por qué' surgen y se movilizan (de forma violenta), a través de la evidencia empírica procedente de diferentes estudios de caso en Europa Occidental, Central y del Este. Este tema ha sido a menudo descuidado por la literatura, que sigue centrándose mucho más en las elecciones y los partidos. El artículo concluye con una discusión sobre las orientaciones futuras para una agenda de investigación sobre movimientos sociales de extrema derecha, incluyendo los fenómenos de transnacionalización de la derecha radical, el uso de Internet y el surgimiento de 'partidos-movimientos' de extrema derecha.

### **Palabras clave**

Factores explicativos a nivel micro, meso y macro, movilización colectiva, movimientos de derecha radical, política europea, violencia de la derecha radical