
Original Article

The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany[†]

Manuela Caiani^{a,*} and Donatella della Porta^b

^aDepartment of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Stumpergasse 56, Wien A-1060, Austria.

E-mail: caiani@ihs.ac.at

^bDepartment of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, San Domenico di Fiesole Firenze 50014, Italy.

E-mail: donatella.dellaporta@eui.eu

Website: <http://www.eui.eu/Personal/DonatellaDellaPorta/>

*Corresponding author.

[†]This article is part of the broader research project VETO, conducted at the European University Institute and financed by the START Center of the University of Maryland.

Abstract In this article, we investigate the presence and forms of populist frames in the discourse of the extreme right by looking at different types of extreme right organizations in Italy and Germany. Focusing on the meso, organizational level, and applying a frame analysis to written documents (for example newspapers, magazines) of certain selected extreme right organizations, chosen from the political party and non-party extreme right milieu in the two countries, the article examines the relevance and the characteristics of the populist discourse in the extreme right. Similarities and differences between types of extreme right groups and countries in the framing strategies of populism are underlined and linked to the cultural (historical) and political-discursive opportunities. The bridging of appeal to the people with other (more traditional) frames of the extreme right (for example nativism) is shown. In particular, we look at how the central populist frame (namely the people versus the elite) is linked to the extreme right definition of the ‘us’ and the ‘them’, when developing diagnoses, prognoses and motivations to action. The analysis is based on a total of around 4000 frames collected in documents from 2002 to 2006.

Acta Politica (2011) **46**, 180–202. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.28

Keywords: extreme right; populism; Italy and Germany; frame analysis; social movements



Extreme Right and Populism: An Introduction

Populism and the extreme right have been discussed, sometimes as interrelated syndromes, in various (academic and political) interpretations of current challenges to liberal democracies (for example, Ignazi, 1997; Mény and Surel, 2002). In his book on the *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cas Mudde writes that ‘the populist radical right is the only successful new party family in Europe’ (2007, p. 1). Despite the still open debate on conceptual definition and terminology (which is beyond the scope of this article to address in details), this party family is defined in the literature by some common ideological attributes, such as nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, the quest for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, revisionism and traditional ethics (Mudde, 2007, p. 21) and usually associated, empirically, to various political parties in Europe, such as the Austrian FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), the French FN (Front national), the Belgian FNb (Front national) and VB (Vlaams Belang), the German REP (Die Republikaner) and so on (see Mudde, 2007, p. 44). Acknowledging the complexity of the terminological debate,¹ we use the term extreme right to refer to those groups that exhibit in their common ideological cores the characteristics of nationalism, xenophobia (ethno-nationalist xenophobia), antiestablishment critiques and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values) (Mudde, 2007). This deliberately includes political party and non-party organizations, even subcultural violent groups.

Even though the presence of the extreme right is discontinuous in time, heterogeneous in space and altogether relatively weak – slightly rising in Western Europe from 6.5 per cent of electoral support on average in the 1980s to 8.3 per cent in the 1990s (Wilcox *et al*, 2003), with similar scores also in Eastern Europe (Mudde, 2007, p. 2) – its main (negative) effects have been singled out in their capacity to spread xenophobic and populist positions in the European party systems (Art, 2007).

In this article, we address the interactions between the extreme right and populism, looking at right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany. From the empirical point of view, research on the populist extreme right has focused on political parties (and often on the most successful ones), ‘leaving aside highly important developments within non-party organizations and subcultures’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 5). Our study includes, instead, non-party organizations and subcultural groups. Our first aim is to investigate to what extent ‘populist’ elements can be found in both types of organizations. This is an object of research worthy of exploration, as, ‘the populist radical right is not merely a moderate form of the extreme right, but it includes fascism and Nationalist Socialism as well as its various neo-forms’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 31). From the theoretical point of view, we shall address these issues by adopting and adapting some main concepts coming from social movement studies.



Recent academic attempts to define the (new) extreme right have tended to shift attention from 'old' fascism to 'new populism'. 'Old' extreme right referring to fascism has been identified with ultranationalism, the myth of decadence, the myth of rebirth (antidemocracy) and conspiracy theories (Ignazi, 1997; Merkl, 1997; Eatwell, 2003). Today, populism is considered as one among the four main traits that characterize the common ideological core of the new extreme right (the other three being nationalism, xenophobia and socio-cultural authoritarianism, that is, law and order) (Mudde, 2007, p. 21). Populism has been conceptualized as a political *rhetoric*, which appeals to 'the power of the common people in order to challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment' (Abt and Rummens, 2007, p. 407), or an *ideology*, 'that considers society to be ultimately separated in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and that argues that politics should be an expression of the *volontée general* of the people' (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Specific elements are the references to antagonistic relations between the people and the elite; the idea of restoring popular sovereignty; a conception of the people as a homogeneous body (Norocel, 2009; for a review of the literature on the concept, see Deiwicks, 2009).

In order to investigate populist traits in the extreme-right discourse, we build on this field of research and make use of a concept developed especially (but not exclusively) in social movement studies: *interpretative frame*. Frames are defined as cognitive instruments that allow making sense of the external reality (Snow and Benford, 1992). They are very often produced by organizational leadership, which provides the necessary background within which individual activists can locate their actions (Snow *et al.*, 1986; Gamson, 1988; Snow and Benford, 1988). As it is the case for any collective actor, extreme-right organizations have to motivate individuals to action, providing followers and potential followers with rationales for participating and supporting their organizations. In particular, *diagnostic* frames allow for the conversion of a phenomenon into a social problem, potentially the object of collective action (Snow *et al.*, 1986); *prognostic* framing also involves the suggestion of future developments that could solve the identified problems; and *motivational* frames are needed to produce the motivations and the incentives for action. In order to convince individuals to act, frames 'must generalize a certain problem or controversy, showing the connections with other events or with the condition of other social groups; and also demonstrate the relevance of a given problem to individual life experiences. Along with the critique of dominant representations of order and of social patterns, interpretative frames must therefore produce new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity, to transform actors' identity in a way which favours action' (della Porta and Diani, 2006). In doing these, framing processes also allow for the definition of the self and the opponents, in short for the definition of the 'Us' and the 'them' category



(Tilly, 2003, p. 139). The social science literature on frames has taken two different approaches (Johnston and Noakes, 2005). With a focus on individual cognitive processes, some authors have analyzed the way in which normal people try to make sense of what happens by framing events into familiar categories (Gamson, 1988). Looking, instead, at the meso-organizational level, other scholars have considered the instrumental dimension of the symbolic construction of reality by collective entrepreneurs (Snow and Benford, 1988).

In this article, focusing on the organizational level, we shall empirically address the question of the conceptualization of *populism* by the *extreme right* by investigating the frames produced in the discourse of different types of extreme-right organizations in Italy and Germany, chosen from the political party and non-party extreme right milieu. Conducting a frame analysis on various types of documents of these organizations (newspapers, magazines, archives of online discussion forum),² we shall examine the relevance and characteristics of populism in the extreme right, underlining the similarities and differences in the framing strategies of these groups and linking these features to historically determined political cultures in the two countries. In particular, we will explore the bridging of the populist appeal with other (more traditional) frames of the extreme right (for example, nativism, authoritarianism and so on), as well as how the populist frame (namely, the people versus the elite) is linked to the extreme-right definition of the 'Us' and the 'them', when developing diagnoses, prognoses and motivations to action.

We prefer to talk of frames rather than of ideology, as ideology is too monolithic a concept to address the broad discursive variations among different groups, and also lacks the flexibility required in order to link ideas, actions and events (Snow and Byrd, 2007). We also prefer to refer to the concept of frames rather than 'thin ideology', which has recently been used in research on the extreme-right parties. In fact, looking at frames, we can first of all better interact with other research in the social movement studies that have long used that term. Furthermore, the Goffmanian concept of frame allows us to stress both the fragmentation of the extreme-right discourse (whose eclecticism has often been stressed) as well as the cognitive function of the discourse we analyze, as it provides the readers of right-wing documents with an immediate instrument to make sense of the external reality. Pointing at structuration and complexity, the term ideology seems less useful for these purposes.

The discourse of the extreme right has been addressed by several subfields of the social sciences. Political communication studies have looked at political campaigns, stressing that, by making use of an antiestablishment and antiparty rhetoric, radical-right populist parties and movements are able to gain visibility and mobilize citizens' feelings of disaffection toward the national and European political class (for example, Mazzoleni *et al*, 2003). Electoral studies have explored extreme-right party manifestoes (for example, the influence of



the Left/Right dimension on party position toward European integration; for a summary, refer Statham, 2008). Social-movement scholars have argued that the size, forms and content of extreme-right action and claim making is influenced by the political–institutional and cultural–discursive opportunities (for example, Koopmans *et al.*, 2005). Social constructionist studies have addressed the discourse of the extreme right as ‘a site of the construction’ of extreme-right identity; ‘exploring how meaning works in discourse’ (Ferber, 1998, p. 48). Also, the success/failure of extreme-right parties has been linked to their discourse and frames (for example, Rydgren, 2008). Indeed, the ideology and propaganda of xenophobic parties or movements ‘may influence people’s frame of thought’ (Rydgren, 2003, pp. 52–53), offering ‘a theory guidance in black-box situations (...), a ‘powerful tool to reframe unsolved political problems’. On delicate issues such as migration, nationalism and religion, the extreme right has put exclusive frames on the agenda, often influencing right-wing and even centre-left parties. Analyzing the discourse of the extreme-right organizations is therefore also important in the context of democratic representation studies ‘due to the criticism they voice and the “real” policy effects they have even without participating in government coalitions’ (Minkenberg, 2001; Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio, 2010, p. 3).

In our cross-national comparison, we not only aim to extend descriptive knowledge on the extreme-right discourses – and therefore its potential appeals to recruitment – beyond the party literature, but also, on the basis of social movement studies, attempt to develop some explanations for the presence and forms of populist discourses. Typically, explanations for the development of populism have stressed the negative consequences of economic globalization, in terms of the mobilization of the ‘losers’ as well as ethnic competition (Rydgren, 2005), political discontent toward liberal democracies that have emphasized constitutional counterweights over electoral accountability (Mény and Surel, 2002), but also a mix of modernization crisis, insecurity and authoritarian legacy (Mudde, 2007). Without denying the presence of grievances, social movement studies, however, tend to give more leverage to the capacity of collective actors, such as social movement organizations, to adapt to contextual resources and constraints, or, as it has been said with specific references to extreme right movements, ‘to take advantage of the available opportunities’ (Rydgren, 2003, p. 49). Particularly relevant for a study focusing on frames is the analysis of the discursive opportunities and constraints, that is, the ‘political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be “legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi, 2004, p. 72). Instrumentally or because of their own culture, collective actors would tend to make their discourses resonant in the populations they wish to address, by bridging (that is, linking) their own traditional frames with those present in the environment (Snow *et al.*, 1986). As institutions



are path dependent, we might, however, also expect some resilience of the historical discourse of the extreme right, as this would define which frames can resonate better with internally deep-rooted traditions.

From this perspective, in this article, we hypothesize that the populist frames of the extreme right involve more of a criticism of the corruption of the political elites in Italy, where the wounds of the political scandals of the early 1990s have not yet been healed, and therefore criticism of the political class has a greater resonance in the public domain than in Germany, where we expect to find a stronger emphasis on the (racial) definition of the people. Indeed, we expect that Germany offers a particularly favorable context for xenophobic frames, due to an 'ethno-cultural conception of citizenship and national identity' that prevails in this country (Koopmans *et al*, 2005, p. 190). Beyond this, however, we also expect framing to be constrained not only by the general cultures in which extreme-right groups develop, but also by the organizations' own culture. In developing their frames, organizations try, in fact, to make their discourses appealing for different circles of potential supporters – the culture of which therefore constrains the range of potentially useful arguments. On the basis of the existing literature (Merkl, 1997; Zimmermann, 2003), we hypothesize to find different configurations of frames concerning the concept of populism, depending on the type of right-wing organization. In particular, we expect to find some differences between political parties, even of an extreme type, and subcultural groups: political parties are expected to privilege a type of populism that focuses more on the corruption of the political class, whereas more emphasis on the heroic role of an elite is expected in the documents of non-party subcultural organizations.

In the next section, after having discussed our methodological choices (Section 'Research design, method and sources'), we will analyze the characteristics of the extreme-right discourse (the main issues, actors, allies and enemies), looking in particular at the role played by the categories 'the people' and 'the politicians' (the way they are pictured, the issues on which they act, the main allies and opponents they are related to) (Section 'The 'People' in the discourse of the extreme right'). The specificities of the usage of the populist paradigm by extreme-right organizations will be explored, as well as the bridging, in their discourse, between populism and other issues (Section 'Bridging populist and antiestablishment frames'). We will suggest that in the frames of the extreme right, there is a rather *exclusive* vision of the people, which refers to a strongly *hierarchical and elitist* conception of the society. Indeed, not only corrupt political elites but also other political and ethnic adversaries are excluded from this conception of the people, which is, furthermore, relegated to a passive role in politics. In the conclusion (Section 'Conclusion: The extreme right and the populist frame'), we discuss the concept of populism, arguing that it can be interpreted as a 'frame', which can be



present to various extents and with different characteristics in different countries and groups.

Research Design, Method and Sources

Adopting a comparative perspective, we look at the extreme right in Italy and Germany, two countries that, although sharing an authoritarian fascist past, show some differences in the political and discursive opportunities (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 225) that we assume have an influence on the extreme-right discourse. Italy has been the first European country in the past 50 years in which the extreme right reached a full political and institutional recognition, with a presence in the center-right governments after 1994 (Caldiron, 2001, p. 15). In Germany, the extreme right is instead completely marginalized; it has never entered the National Parliament (although occasionally at the subnational level) and there is a high level of public sensitivity toward right-wing extremism, which is broadly stigmatized as unacceptable (Kersten, 2004, p. 186). Discursive opportunities for populist frames spread in Italy with corruption scandals that erupted in 1992, bringing about high levels of mistrust in representative institutions (Morlino and Tarchi, 1996; Norris, 2005). In Germany, ‘party democracy’ remains relatively more stable and is more highly trusted (Dietmar, 2009), whereas an ‘exclusively ethnic understanding of the German nation’ (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 264) promoted by the radical right seems to resonate with the ethnic-based conception of citizenship and national identity that prevails in this country (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005, p. 152). Moreover, right-wing radicalism in Germany is characterized by a higher degree of violence than in Italy, particularly concerning violence against immigrants, which has increased considerably since 2000 (Schellenberg, 2009, p. 179).

For the frame analysis of documents of the extreme-right organizations in the two countries, we have used a standardized codebook, including qualitative and quantitative variables.³ Snow’s and Benford’s distinction among the three types of frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames) and Franzosi’s idea (2004) about a story–grammar based on subject–action–object connections inspired our proceeding and the analytical variables relevant for the coding. The unit of analysis (the statement) was indeed broken down into the following analytical categories: ‘subject actor’, ‘issue field’, ‘action’, ‘object actor’ and ‘ally and enemy actor’. The variable ‘actor’ is composed of more than 200 specific categories (for example, domestic politician, political party, unions and so on).⁴ Moreover, for this variable, it is also possible to codify further specifications, such as for instance the name of the organization/institution (for example, the Green Italian party) and the description of the actor done by the extreme right (the so-called ‘linguistic qualifiers’), such as



adjectives or adverbials.⁵ The variable ‘issue field’ is composed of 76 possible specific subissues (for example, abortion, corruption and so on), which have been identified through a pre-test done on extreme right documents.⁶ As for the variable ‘action’, three categories (‘is’/‘will’/‘should’ category) are used to record if the statement describes a situation in the present (or the past), if it makes a forecast for the future or if is an (explicit or implicit) call for action – as a proxy referring to the three types of diagnostic, prognostic and motivation to action frames. Frames have later been re-aggregated by codified statements. Proceeding in this way, we have obtained a relational database, which allows us to relate every diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frame with the relevant identity or oppositional actors and to the issue area with which the frame deals. We are therefore able to reconstruct the discourse of the extreme right related to certain actors and/or issue areas. Such a grammatical analysis indeed allows reconstructing the frames by coding not only the words but also their position (subject, object, verb) in the statement. If, for example, an analysis of the grammatical subject ‘politicians’ is conducted, all relational information regarding ‘politicians’ and (1) possible actions that politicians take; (2) possible objects that – following the propaganda of the extreme right – would be positively or negatively affected by the actions of politicians; and (3) combinations of actions and objects can be revealed. This grammar analysis, holding ‘potential for more empirical rigor than intuitive reading of the text’ (Johnston, 2002, p. 80), appears particularly suitable for our research question, because it allows us to describe in a systematic way frames across different countries and movements (ibid, p. 75). In sum, among the several strategies of frame analysis (for a review, see Johnston, 2002), we opted for a mixed approach, performing a quantitative frame analysis based on a story–grammar analysis (Johnston, 2002, p. 75) (measuring the frequency and intensity of relevant categories, but also the relations among them), devoting, however, strong attention to qualitative variables (that is, open string) in order to grasp the meaning, and understanding the key frame elements and the context of their production.

Regarding the cases selection, reflecting our attention to the existence of different types of actors in the world of right-wing extremism, we have chosen in each country three organizations, representative of the main areas of the extreme right milieu: a political party, a political neofascist/neonazi organization and a subcultural skinhead group. As for Germany, we have chosen the NPD party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) (analyzing its party newspaper, the *Deutsche Stimme*), because of its recent growing success in German elections and because it has close contacts to the violent extreme right in the country (Backes and Moreau, 1994); the political movement NBD (*Nationales Bündnis Dresden*) (analyzing the archives of its online forum of discussion) as an example for many local initiatives in which right-wing forces try to embark on local political issues of high relevance in order to spread their



ideology; and two *Kameradschaften*, loose groups of violent skinheads and other right-wing extremists (analyzing the documents available on their websites, for example, leaflets). As for Italy, we have selected the party *Forza Nuova* (analyzing its newspaper *Foglio di Lotta*), because it is broadly recognized as the most rapidly growing, active and determined right-wing extremist party currently in Italy (Caldiron, 2001); the skinhead organization *Veneto Fronte Skinhead* (analyzing its magazine *L'Inferocito*), being the main, still active and oldest organization representative of the skinhead movement in Italy;⁷ and a network of several political movements grouped around the online discussion forum *Camerata Virtuale*, which we have analyzed through its archives.

Beyond problems of accessibility, the selection of different types of sources is due to the different communication strategies of the different types of groups (for example, some types of organizations do not have published newspapers or magazines as their main tool of communication, but only online written products). In all cases, we aimed, however, at selecting sources that are used to interact with the public, rather than for internal consumption.

Taking into account constraints of source availability for each of the three published sources (the newspapers and the magazine), four issues per year have been sampled (where all articles contained in the first three pages were analyzed),⁸ whereas all the contributions present in the archives of the online forums of discussion have been analyzed for the years 2005 and 2006 (only 2006 for the documents, that is, leaflets, on the German skinhead websites).⁹ The *frame analysis* is based on a total number of around 4000 statements (2460 for Italy, 1353 for Germany).¹⁰

The 'People' in the Discourse of the Extreme Right

Definitions of the populist rhetoric generally converge in seeing as a core aspect of populism the attempt to create a direct connection between 'the people' and the political power, bypassing the electoral process (Ruzza, 2009). Indeed, according to the populist paradigm, although politics should be an expression of the general will of the people, people's aspirations are betrayed by corrupt political elites (*ibid.*). The charismatic leader is the one who embodies the will of the people and is able to speak on its behalf (Mudde, 2004; Rydgren, 2007). Consequently, it seems crucial to reflect over the following two questions: who are the people according to the extreme right? And who is the leader? And, finally, what is the relation between them? We will explore these questions in this section.

Looking at the main issue areas of the discourse of the extreme right (Figure 1), overall, in both countries, political issues emerge as the most prominent ones




Figure 1: The role of political issues in the discourse of the extreme right in Italy and Germany.

Table 1: The 10 most quoted (identity and oppositional) actors in the discourse of the Italian and German extreme-right organizations

<i>Germany</i>			<i>Italy</i>		
Rank	Type of actor	Per cent	Rank	Type of actor	Per cent
1	Us/We	5.4	1	The domestic political class	6.4
2	NPD	5.3	2	The European Union	4.5
3	The people	4.2	3	The immigrants	4.2
4	The Germans	3.4	4	The USA	4.0
5	The politicians	3.3	5	'Them'	3.2
6	Political parties	3.0	6	Italy	3.1
7	Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) politicians	2.9	7	The people	2.9
8	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) politicians	2.8	8	The extreme right	2.7
9	Foreigners	2.8	9	Economic actors and banks	2.7
10	Mass Media	2.2	10	The Italians	2.4
	All 10 first actors (out of 200 categories)	35.3		All 10 first actors (out of 200 categories)	36.1
	(N of statements = 1353)	100		(N of statements = 2460)	100



(without relevant differences between the different types of groups), including subissues such as corruption, the current mode of political party competition in the country, behavior and misbehavior of politicians.¹¹

When looking at which are the main identity and oppositional actors in the discourse of the extreme-right organizations and their characteristics (Table 1), a picture emerges that identifies the ‘pure’ people as an exclusive (in terms of ethno-national characteristics) category.

First of all, the category ‘the people’ represents in both countries an important component of the discourse of the extreme-right groups. It is, among 200 categories, the third and the seventh most frequently quoted actor – regardless if as subject, object or ally – respectively, in Germany and Italy (accounting for 4.2 per cent and 2.9 per cent of all codified statements). In the Italian case, the actor people is equally prominent in the discourse of the political party and skinhead group (recurring, respectively, in 3.2 per cent and 3.7 per cent of all their statements), whereas it plays a slightly less important role in the discourse of the political movement (1.2 per cent of all statements). Differently, in the German case, the identity category ‘the people’ is more emphasized in the political extreme right (parliamentary and extra parliamentary, recurring in 4.8 per cent and 5.3 per cent of all statements respectively in the political party and political movement), than in the discourse of subcultural organizations (being present in only 2.3 per cent of all their statements).

Second, not far behind the category people, the other identity actors that recur most frequently in the discourse of the extreme-right organizations are (similarly in both countries) all categories well *territorially–ethnically and culturally* specified – offering some suggestions to clarify who the people really are. These include the following: in Germany, the ‘We’/‘Us’ (which refers to the extreme right itself) (5.4 per cent of all statements), the ‘NPD’ (5.3 per cent), ‘the people’ (4.2 per cent) and ‘the Germans’ (3.4 per cent); in Italy, ‘Italy’ (3.1 per cent), ‘the Italians’ (2.4 per cent), ‘the people’ (2.9 per cent) and ‘the extreme right’ (2.7 per cent). Many frames in fact insist on the exclusive character of the people, referring to their ethno-national characteristics and identifying the people with the (ethnic) nation. In the documents of German extreme-right organizations, for example, the people are often described as those who ‘want to be Germans also in the future’ (NPD, July 2005), that is, ‘they do not want to be deprived of their national identity’ (NBD, May 2006). One of the main concerns when referring to the people are the threats derived from a multicultural German society; indeed, it is often said that ‘the people risk being destroyed’, being ‘annihilated, because politicians are selling the [German] people to Turkey’ (Kam, January 2004). Numerous expressions place emphasis on the importance of the preservation of ‘the national identity of the people, who are characterized by German culture and traditions’ (NPD, September 2003). Furthermore, when looking at which actors are most frequently quoted among

Table 2: ‘The people’ in the documents of the Italian and German extreme-right organizations

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Frames description</i>
Actor	‘The people’
Grammatical position	Mainly as ‘object actor’ (passive role)
Adjectives	(DE/IT) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Adjectives: ‘hopeless’, ‘powerless’, ‘reduced as simple producers-consumers’, ‘with no more vitality, values and spirit’, ‘unhappy’, ‘angry’ and ‘poor’, ‘not heard’ (by politicians) ✓ ‘Dissatisfied’ (with the domestic political class), ‘still timorous’, ‘needing to be encouraged in this direction’ (rebellion) ✓ ‘Sovereign’, ‘naturally free’, ‘who have the right to rebel’ ✓ ‘Ingenuous’, ‘illiterate’, who ‘are not aware of their own condition’, ‘easily manipulated’, ‘in need of a guide’
(main) Corresponding subjects actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (DE) ‘Politicians’ (13.6%), ‘political parties in general’ (8%), ‘we/extreme right’ (9.1%) ✓ (IT) ‘The domestic political class’ (13.4%), ‘Extreme right organizations’ (6.3%) (for example, <i>Forza Nuova</i>)
Actions	(DE/IT) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (people as object actor) (are) ‘betrayed’, ‘exploited’, ‘neglected’, ‘prosecuted’, ‘not respected’, ‘given promises’, ‘not helped’, ‘robbed’ ✓ (people as subject actor) ‘should wake up’, ‘should get out of the flock’, ‘should start the struggle’, ‘take back its sovereignty’, ‘take back its power’, ‘determine own future’, ‘will react’, ‘will rebel’

the oppositional categories, not only political adversaries and the political elite (domestic and sovranational) but also, in both countries, ethnically defined groups (for example, ‘foreigners’ in Germany, 2.8 per cent; ‘immigrants’ in Italy, 4.2 per cent) are excluded from the ‘in-group’ of the people.

An exclusivist, but also an *elitist*, meaning of the people emerges when analyzing in more detail (with our grammar analysis and analysis of adjectives) the way in which extreme-right organizations describe themselves, the people and the relation they have with them.

When addressing the people (Table 2), the frames of the discourse point to an identification between the extreme right and the people, but also to a rather hierarchical relationship with them. The people are often described as ‘sovereign’ in right-wing documents, as well as being ‘opposed to the political elites’. Among the actions that are attributed to the people, we find many calls (‘should’ statements) that invite the people to ‘wake up’, ‘abandon the flock’, ‘start the struggle’, ‘take back its sovereignty and its power’ and ‘determine its own future’. The people are also frequently presented as an actor ‘naturally



free', 'who have the right to rebel in order to improve their life situation'. Indeed, in terms of adjectives, in both countries, the people are very often described as being 'hopeless', 'powerless', 'subjugated by the invaders', 'desperate', 'unhappy', 'angry' and 'poor', 'with no more vitality, values and spirit', and the main source of this desperate condition is indicated in the domestic political class (see the next section). In fact, they are said to be strongly 'dissatisfied' with the domestic political class, and 'critical' of it. They 'ineffectively beseech the political class for urgent interventions on several social and political problems'; they 'call for help', yet, 'receive none'. For this reason, in numerous (prescriptive) frames it is said that they 'should go against the political class', and 'should reduce [its] power'. It is believed that the people will rebel against the political class in a near future (they 'will react', 'will rebel'); nevertheless, they are presented as still apprehensive and in need of being encouraged. In fact, in many statements, the people are considered by extreme-right organizations to be 'ingenuous', 'illiterate', 'unaware of its own condition', 'easily manipulated', 'in need of a guide' and with a 'moral and intellectual level [which] is decreasing day by day'. It is not by chance that, in both countries, the people are mainly presented in statements as an object of the action (in 53.3 per cent and 44.1 per cent of cases, respectively, in Germany and Italy), suggesting a rather passive role of this actor in the discourse of right-wing groups.

Although the extreme right identifies itself with the people ('we are the people', FN, September 2004; synonyms that are used for the extreme right are frequently 'the only true German/Italians'), nevertheless, it presents the people as rather ignorant and in need of a guide, which is explicitly indicated in the right itself. In fact, the discourse regarding the people is very often combined in the documents with the action of resistance of the extreme-right groups. This emerges from our grammar analysis, which shows that the most frequently corresponding object actors to the 'Us/extreme right' as subject of the statement are, on the one hand, the domestic political class, and, on the other hand, various categories of the people. They are 'the Germans', 'the German people', 'young people', 'the family' and 'women' in the German extreme-right discourses. Similarly, in the discourse of Italian extreme-right organizations, they are 'Italy' and the 'Italians', 'the European peoples', 'the workers', the 'young people' and the 'unemployed'. These categories (apart from stressing again the exclusive nature of the people) describe actors in favor of whom the 'Us/extreme' is active. Indeed, the actions attributed in documents to the extreme right are mainly of two types: either reactive-defensive (against the ruling political class) or protective (for the people) (for example, they 'care about the people', 'defend the interests of Italians/Germans'). A frequently recurring idea is that a historical change (for example, a 'new phase in the history of Italy' VFS, March 2005) will take

**Table 3:** The ‘politicians’ in the documents of the Italian and German extreme-right organizations

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Frames description</i>
Actor	‘The politicians’
Grammatical position	Mainly as subject actor (active role)
Adjectives	(DE/IT) ‘Corrupt’, ‘only interested to power’, ‘a caste’, ‘an oligarchy’, ‘cowards’, ‘narrow-minded’, ‘electoral tricksters’, ‘cartel politicians’, ‘behaving improperly’, ‘alien to the people’, ‘not credible’, ‘not courageous’, ‘corrupt’, ‘afraid of saying the truth’, ‘good doers’, ‘responsible for social deprivation’, ‘anti-German/Italians’
Objects actors (%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✔ (IT) ‘the Italians’ (19.1%), ‘Italy’ (10%), ‘the ordinary people’ (6.4%), ‘the workers’ (3.6%) ✔ (DE) ‘the people’ (17.3%), ‘the Germans’ (6.2%)
Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✔ (DE/IT) ‘break laws systematically’, ‘tell lies’, ‘do not help’, ‘do not think to the problems’ [of the Italians], ‘move [the people] away from politics’, ‘profit’ [of the people], ‘sleep’, ‘not respect’(the people) ✔ (DE) ‘celebrate the cult of being guilty (with regard to the holocaust)’, ‘latently dissolve democracy’, ‘destroy the country systematically’, ‘sell the [German] people to Turkey’

place and that the extreme-right organizations themselves (‘valiant combatants who do not bow their head’ and as the ‘only force that manages to protect the victims of the complot’) are the political actors able to lead the country toward this change.

Bridging Populist and Antiestablishment Frames

In line with an *antiestablishment interpretation* of the new extreme right, when Italian and German extreme-right organizations mention the domestic political classes, they harshly criticize them for their misbehavior in relation to politics as well as with moral norms and values. Political elites (both from the left and the moderate right) are pictured as corrupt and only focused on own personal interests and not really caring about the country. Above all, a lack of accountability to the people is emphasized. Also, conspiracy theories that are typical of the traditional extreme right ideological framework (Simmons, 2003) are mentioned (Table 3).

The political elites have indeed a strongly negative connotation in the discourse of the extreme-right organizations. In terms of adjectives, politicians are described as ‘cartel politicians’, ‘behaving improperly’, ‘only oriented towards



power', 'highly paid', 'alien to the people', 'not credible', 'not linear', 'not courageous', 'corrupt' and 'easily corruptible', 'focused on money' and even, in the most critical statements, 'anti-German/Italians'. From the point of view of their political action, they are characterized as 'cowards', 'short-sighted', 'narrow-minded', 'electoral tricksters' and even 'drug addicts'. Very common are statements in which it is stressed that the political class is part of a 'secret economic-political agreement whose goal is to dominate the country, make money and subjugate the people' (Kam, October 2005).

Especially in the Italian right-wing discourse, the antiestablishment critiques are strongly related to the current political party politics. Political parties are said to be 'hostile to human dignity', 'decoupled from the people's will', 'no longer have political personnel', 'not interested in finding solutions' and 'responsible for social deprivation'. We frequently found expressions such as 'cartel parties', underlying how closely mainstream political parties collaborate

Table 4: The 'Us/extreme right' in the documents of the Italian and German extreme-right organizations

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Frames description</i>
Actor	The 'Us'/extreme right
Grammatical position	Mainly as subject actor (active role)
Adjectives	(DE/IT) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Adjectives: 'being present', 'being disciplined', 'telling the true', 'generous', 'brave', 'the only true Germans/Italians', 'the power', 'strong hearts', 'prepared for a civil war', 'naturally allergic to any form of power', 'loyal to the historic memory', 'alternative to the system'
(main) Corresponding objects actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Object actors: (DE/IT) 'domestic political class' (8.9%), 'the politicians' (5.7%) ➤ Other object actors: (DE) 'the Germans' (7.1%), 'the German people' (7.1%), 'young people' (7.1%), 'the family' (5.4%) and 'the women' (5.4%) (IT) 'Italy' (6.6%), the 'Italians' (5.7%), 'the European peoples' (5.7%), 'the workers' (3.8%), the 'young people' and the 'unemployed people' (1.9%)
Actions	(DE/IT) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Actions 1: 'defend the interests of Germans/Italians', 'interpret the will', 'protect', 'work for', 'save' ➤ Actions 2: (IT) 'fight against the arrogance of power', 'oppose', 'criticize', 'condemn', 'disdain', 'should (or will) replace' (the domestic political class), (DE) 'win the hearts', 'give the feeling of comradeship', 'will fight for the common good'



with each other in order to exploit their 'clients' (the electorate), 'enriching them at the expenses of the ordinary people'. Political parties are also often identified as 'old parties'.

In the German right-wing discourse, criticism of politicians is above all framed with reference to the national historical past and national identity. The politicians are said to be 'hysterical with regard to German history' (Kam, June 2006) and many statements seek a new evaluation of German history, calling for a German society that 'should not be built on feelings of guilt because of the past'. Politicians are accused of 'celebrating the cult of being guilty (regarding the holocaust)', being 'far too politically correct' and for being 'afraid to say the truth'.

The opposition between the extreme-right organizations and the politicians is also evident grammatically (Table 4).

The actions that connect the extreme right and the domestic political class stress that the extreme right 'should replace' the domestic political class 'in order to form a new political elite for the country', or, more strongly, 'should lynch on the street' the domestic political class; the need for defence and action against the political class is also underlined. In general, the calls for action concerning the subject actor 'Us/extreme right' are relatively strong and contain revolutionary frames. In several documents, it is emphasized that 'there is the need for a national movement that provokes an extreme change for Italy', that 'the extreme right forces, the nationalists are ready for this change' and that they 'will remodel Germany into a new, a truly German and a socially fair Germany'. More in general (especially in the skinhead source), it is said that in order to provoke a change in the country, it is necessary to 'distinguish between the state [the Italian institutions] and the nation [Italy]', and to 'straighten the national and cultural identity of Italy'. Italy needs someone who can carry on 'politics characterized by big aims', launching 'a project of national re-birth of 360° for Italy'. The extreme right thus presents itself as the only force that can save the country ('a force of the life and the re-birth').

Also in terms of adjectives, the opposition between the extreme-right organizations and the domestic political is affirmed. In particular, in the discourse of the subcultural skinhead groups (in both countries), this is often framed in a very generic and evocative form, as a 'fight against the arrogance of power', for the 'freedom of thought', whereas references to concrete political and policy contents (and critiques) are especially present in the parties' discourse. For example, in the extreme right party documents, the attributes used to describe the extreme right stress its profound difference and distance with respect to the current political party forces and their way of doing politics. The extreme right presents itself as a 'political militant movement', a group of activists 'motivated by passion to do politics' and 'ready to run risks for their ideas', as an 'antagonist right', stressing its 'distance from both the left



and the moderate right' (FN, March 2004). For example, in the Italian extreme right documents, the emphasis is put on the novelty and modernity of the extreme right forces versus the current political parties. *Forza Nuova* presents itself as an organization that 'also accepts [as own sympathizers] people that are neither greatly politicized nor ideological', that 'aggregates the discontent that emerges from the country and in the other parties', 'makes militant activity also after the election' and 'wants to be a militant structure, always in movement' (FN, April 2005, December 2006). Indeed, the fight is carried on through 'the support of the people'. Similarly, in the German extreme right party discourse, we frequently find the term 'block party'; assimilating the current parties in the Federal Republic of Germany with that of the German Democratic Republic, as 'all parties collaborate with each other [in exploiting the people], their ideological differences are meaningless (NPD, February 2003).

Also, in subcultural right-wing discourse, the description of the extreme right itself is made through the lens of the opposition against the political establishment, however, also with many references to the internal life of the extreme-right group. In the German case, especially the classical 'virtues' of Germanic nationalism, such as honor, nation and comradeship, are over-emphasized. The extreme right mainly characterizes itself as an actor 'naturally allergic to any form of power', and (differently than the politicians) 'loyal to the historic memory' (Kam, November 2006). Overall, the extreme right is presented as a group of actors who 'help each other' and 'are an example for others'. The main features are to be 'strong hearts', which are 'prepared for a civil war' and 'cannot even be stopped by state orders'. In reference to politics, the documents range from very emotional actions form attributed to the extreme right (in that the 'Us/extreme right will win the hearts of everyone') over very vaguely formulated activities (such as 'give the feeling of comradeship', 'overcome loneliness'). Very frequently it is underlined that they are actors who 'find the solution', 'unite those who think as should be thought' and 'do not just simply speak, but act' (as other political forces). The intention is to 'overcome the system' (Kam, April 2006). With regard to the means that should be used, the necessities of 'fighting', 'working for the vision', 'standing up' and 'joining forces' are repeated several times. The extreme right emerges as the strong actor of these processes.

A characteristic of the fascist rhetoric is the self-definition of the fascist party as a 'new epoch' (Härmänmaa, 2002, p. 897). The extreme-right organizations we studied also pointed to the historical change that they shall produce. In Italy, this is even stronger than in Germany, and takes the form of criticism against the mainstream political parties (from both the moderate right and the left side). In Germany, the populist paradigm is adopted by right-wing organizations and combined more often with references to history and the



national identity; this national identity is perceived as being not adequately defended by the domestic political class.

Conclusion: The Extreme Right and the Populist Frame

The recent development of the extreme right has often been addressed by referring to the concept of populism, defined as an organizational form, a rhetorical style or an ideology. Referring to social movement studies, we suggested instead to analyze populism as a frame, which can be bridged with other (in some cases, more traditional) frames of the extreme-right discourse. We argue that it is more useful to conceptualize populism as a 'frame', instead of as an ideology, which, although 'thin', seems too rigid a concept in order to account for the variation of the configurations that it can take in the discourse of different extreme-right groups as well as in different countries. Looking at populism as a frame, we were able not only to map the presence of references to 'the people', but also to locate them – in a grammatical analysis – in complex configurations of different frames. If the corruption of the political class is the diagnosis, the prognosis is not to return the power to the people, but to advocate it to an exclusive (more or less heroic) elite.

In our empirical research, we have observed that populism (in terms of issues and actors) is relevant in the discourse of the German and Italian extreme right. 'The people' are indeed often referred to in the discourses of different extreme-right organizations in Italy and Germany (although less in the discourse of the subcultural skinhead groups in Germany). They are defined as suffering from the misdeeds of the elite, and in need of protection by the extreme right itself. In this sense, there is a strong emphasis (not usually stressed in the analysis of populism) on the role of an alternative elite – the militants of the extreme rights – in the protection of the people. The references to the people were also bridged with two traditional frames of the extreme right: exclusive nationalism (or nativism) and antiestablishment positions.

As for explanations of the presence and characteristics of the discourse on the people in the extreme right, our cross-national perspective allows us to develop some hypotheses on the determinants of the extreme-right discourse, or at least to single out some causes-to-the-effect (Goetz and Mahoney, 2006). First of all, some differences between Germany and Italy can be explained by the larger or smaller resonance of some frames in the public opinion. As it has been underlined, in developing their frames, actors attempt to gain resonance, which is a function of the consistency of the frame, of its empirical credibility or cultural compatibility, and of the relevance of the addressed issues (Johnston and Noakes, 2005). In particular, the more frequent reference to the corruption of politicians in Italy than in Germany reflects the profound



mistrust in political parties and representative institutions that followed the political scandals of the early 1990s. The collapse of all governmental parties left an empty political space in the center-right, offering the extreme right populist parties and discourses an opportunity to emerge (Baldini, 2001, p. 3). It also provided them with strong credentials to distance themselves from the other parties (*ibid.*). Second, the specific versions of extreme right populism in the two countries are resonant with the historical traditions within the extreme right itself. In this sense, the more frequent bridging of populism and nationalism in Germany than in Italy reflects the stronger presence in the traditional discourse of the German extreme right of nationalist reference to past history (Wagemann, 2006), as well as the ethnic-based conception of citizenship that characterizes this country (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005, p. 152) and facilitates these frames. As it has been observed, ‘the nation’s sensitivity about the historical past and German guilt have rendered the provocative potential of racist symbolism very high’ (Kersten, 2004, p. 180), something that can be easily abused by the extreme right. Some difference emerged also from the comparison of different organizations, with more reference to the people and specific criticism of the establishment in the political parties, and instead more emphasis on the heroic action of the Us/extreme right in the subcultural groups.

In sum, we could observe some tensions in the conceptualization of populism when applied to the extreme right. Indeed, the frames of the extreme right regarding politics, the leader and the people are still characterized by elements that resonate with the discourse the old fascism (for example, conspiracy theory, revolutionary elements). On the one hand, there is a hierarchical (elitist) and exclusive conception of the people, according to which the extreme right identifies itself as being part of the people, but allocates to itself the task of protecting a passive people. Within an elitarian vision of the society, the pure people are in fact presented as unable to (re)act politically, and in need of a guide (explicitly indicated in the right itself). The extreme-right discourse on the people is not only elitist but also exclusivist, as not only corrupt political elites but also other groups (for example, ethnic minorities, political adversaries, sovranational and non-national actors) are excluded from it. On the other hand, the strong criticism of the existing elites recycles the traditional antiestablishment frames of the old extreme right.

Acknowledgements

We thank Claudius Wagemann for the empirical data collection on the German case. Although the authors share responsibility for the whole article, Manuela Caiani contributed the final text of Sections 1–3, and Dontella della Porta of Sections 4 and 5.



About the Authors

Manuela Caiani is Assistant Professor in Comparative European Politics at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) of Wien. She has worked on several comparative projects on collective action and European mobilization and on right wing extremism. She is currently working on a project on extreme right organizations in the United States and Europe, and their use of the Internet for political activism. Among her publications: *‘Quale Europa, Europeizzazione, Identità e Conflitti’*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006 and *‘Social Movements and Europeanisation’*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009 (both with Donatella della Porta).

Donatella Della Porta is Professor of sociology in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. She is on leave of absence from the University of Florence, where she was full Professor of Political Science, President of the corso di laurea in Administrative Sciences and Director of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Florence. Her main research interests concern social movements, political violence, terrorism, corruption, police and policies of public order. On these issues she has conducted investigations in Italy, France, Germany and Spain. She recently tendered successfully for European Research Council (ERC) projects.

Notes

- 1 Mudde has found in the literature 26 different ways of defining the extreme right (Minkenberg, 2000). Some scholars (for example, Carter, 2005) define right-wing extremism using two criteria: anticonstitutionalism and antidemocratic values (this is the reason it is called extremist), and a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (this is the reason why it is called right wing). Others (for example, Norris, 2005) prefer the label radical right in order to describe those political parties and non-party organizations that are located toward one pole on the standard ideological left–right scale.
- 2 For frame analysis applied to organizational documents.
- 3 The codebook is available from the authors on request.
- 4 These specific categories can be distinguished in ‘identity actors’ (100–499), namely actors who are considered in the discourse of the extreme right as part of the right-wing group (the ‘us’), and ‘oppositional actors’ (500–999) (the ‘them’). As for the former, we differentiate further between ‘more proximate’ and ‘more remote identities’: the peer group of right-wing activists itself (100–199) (for example, ‘skinheads’, ‘extreme right political parties’, ‘generic references to extreme right individuals’ and so on); the wider (racial, national and social) groups with which the extreme right identifies itself (200–399) (for example, ‘the occidental’, ‘the Europeans’ or ‘the Nordic race’, ‘the nationalists’ and so on.); other actors (399–499) (for example, judges, media and so on). Similarly, oppositional actors included the following differentiated categories: (500–599) ‘ethnic adversaries’ (for example, foreigners, immigrants and so on);



- (600–699) ‘social adversaries’ (for example, the homeless, homosexuals and so on); and (700–899) ‘political adversaries/actors’ (for example, domestic and international institutions); (900–999) other actors (for example, business, mass media, the Churches and so on).
- 5 The differentiation between ‘subject actors’, ‘object actors’ and ‘ally actors’ mainly refers to the grammatical position of an actor within a sentence (for example, ‘ally actors’ are those actors who are mentioned as supporters of the ‘subject actors’).
 - 6 These specific subissues have been later re-aggregated into the following broader fields: conservative values and history/nation; immigration; globalization/European integration; political issues; social and economic issues; internal life of the extreme right.
 - 7 Founded in 1985 as a non-profit organization for the promotion of cultural, musical and sports activities, the Veneto Fronte Skinhead is considered one of the most violent racist organizations in Italy (EUMC, 2004, p. 15).
 - 8 This resulted in a sample of 623 articles for the Italian case and 402 for the German case, which constituted the texts for our frame analysis.
 - 9 The length of the articles found in the newspaper and magazine sources could vary from 1 to 3 columns, whereas the contributions in the online forum and guest book online could vary from 1 to several sentences.
 - 10 Abbreviations for documents’ sources: (Italy) FN=Forza Nuova; VFS=Veneto Fronte Skinhead; CV=Camerata Virtuale; (Germany) NDP=National Democratic Party of Germany; NBD=Nationales Bündnis Dresden; Kam=Kameradschaften.
 - 11 Political issues are the main field of the discourse in about one-fifth (19–20 per cent) of statements in each of the three types of organizations in Italy; they represent about 33–39 per cent of statements in both the political party and the political movement in Germany (but only 16 per cent of statements for what concerns the skinhead groups).

References

- Abt, K. and Rummens, S. (2007) Populism versus democracy. *Political Studies* 55: 405–424.
- Art, D. (2007) Reacting to the radical right. *Party Politics* 13(3): 331–349.
- Backes, U. and Moreau, P. (1994) *Die Extreme Rechte in Deutschland*. Munich, Germany: Akademischer Verlag.
- Baldini, G. (2001) Comparative Mapping of Extreme Right Electoral Dynamics: An Overview. Report, http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/publications/eps/onlineissues/autumn2001/research_extreme.htm, accessed 10 May 2010.
- Caldiron, G. (2001) *La destra plurale*. Rome: Manifestolibri.
- Deiwiks, C. (2009) Populism. Living Reviews in Democracy, www.livingreview.org.
- Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) *Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dietmar, L. (2009) Globalization and populist radical right parties in Europe: Austria, Denmark, Germany. Paper presented at ESA Conference; 2–5 September, Lisbon, Portugal.
- Eatwell, R. (2003) The theories of the extreme right. In: P. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds.) *Rightwing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Frank Cass.
- Ferber, A.L. (1998) Constructing whiteness: The intersections of race and gender in US white supremacist discourse. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21(1): 48–63.
- Franzosi, R. (2004) *From Words to Numbers. Narrative, Data, and Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, W.A. (1988) Political discourse and collective action. *International Social Movement Research* 1: 219–246.
- Goetz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2006) A tale of two cultures. *Political Analysis* 14: 227–249.



- Härmänmaa, M. (2002) Un modello per il nuovo discorso fascista. Alcune osservazioni sul linguaggio politico di Alleanza Nazionale. Paper presented at Romansk Forum XV Skandinaviske romanistkongress; 12–17 August, Oslo, Sweden.
- Ignazi, P. (1997) The extreme right in Europe. A survey. In: P.L. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds.) *The Revival of Right-wing Extremism in the Nineties*. London; Portland: Frank Cass, pp. 47–64.
- Johnston, H. (2002) Verification and proof in frame and discourse analysis. In: B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg (eds.) *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 62–91.
- Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. (2005) Verification and proof in frame and discourse analysis. In: B. Klandermans and S. Staggenborg (eds.) *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis, MN: the University of Minnesota Press, pp. 62–91.
- Kersten, J. (2004) The right wing network and the role of extremist youth grouping in Unified Germany. In: A. Fenner and E.D. Weitz (eds.) *Fascism and Neofascism. Critical Writings on the Extreme Right in Europe*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 175–188.
- Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (1999) Ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood and the differential success of the extreme right in Germany and Italy. In: M. Giugni, D. McAdam and C. Tilly (eds.) *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 225–251.
- Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (2005) *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Kriesi, H. (2004) Political context and opportunity. In: D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67–90.
- Lefkofridi, Z. and Casado-Asensio, J. (2010) European Vox Radicis: Representation and policy congruence on the extremes. Paper presented at the Conference on Policy Congruence and Representation in the EU; 27–29 May, Mannheim, Germany.
- Mazzoleni, G., Stewart, J. and Horsfield, B. (2003) *The Media and Neo-populism*. Westport, CT, London: Praeger.
- Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (2002) *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merkl, P.L. (1997) Why are they so strong now? Comparative reflections on the revival of the radical right in Europe. In: P.L. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds.) *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*. London; Portland: Frank Cass, pp. 17–46.
- Minkenberg, M. (2000) The renewal of the radical right: Between modernity and anti-modernity. *Government and Opposition* 35(2): 170–188.
- Minkenberg, M. (2001) The radical right in public office: Agenda – Setting and policy effects. *West European Politics* 4(24): 1–21.
- Minkenberg, M. (2002) The new radical right in the political process: Interaction effects in France and Germany. In: M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay (eds.) *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*. New York; Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 245–268.
- Morlino, L. and Tarchi, M. (1996) Crisis of parties and change of party system in Italy. *Party Politics* 2(1): 5–30.
- Mudde, C. (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition* 39(3): 542–564.
- Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norocel, O.C. (2009) How about taking gender in the theorizing of populism? Paper presented at the ESA Conference; 3–5 September, Lisbon, Portugal.
- Norris, P. (2005) *Radical Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruzza, C. and Fella, S. (2009) *Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and 'Post-fascism'*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, NY: Routledge.



- Rydgren, J. (2003) Meso-level reasons for racism and Xenophobia. *European Journal of Social Theory* 6(1): 45–68.
- Rydgren, J. (2005) Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 413–437.
- Rydgren, J. (2007) The sociology of the radical right. *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 241–262.
- Rydgren, J. (2008) Immigration sceptics, Xenophobes or racists? *European Journal of Political Research* 47: 737–765.
- Schellenberg, B. (2009) Country report Germany. In: B. Stiftung (ed.) *Strategies for Combating Right-wing Extremism in Europe*. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 179–247.
- Simmons, H.G. (2003) The French and European extreme right and globalization. Paper presented at the International Seminar Challenges to the New World Order; 30–31 May, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
- Snow, D.A. and Benford, R.D. (1988) Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. In: B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi and S. Tarrow (eds.) *From Structure to Action*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 197–218.
- Snow, D.A. and Benford, R.D. (1992) Master frame and cycles of protest. In: A. Morris and C. Mueller (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 133–155.
- Snow, D.A. and Byrd, S.C. (2007) Ideology, framing processes, and Islamic terrorist movements. *Mobilization* 12: 119–136.
- Snow, D.A., Rochford, E.B., Worden, S.K. and Benford, R.D. (1986) Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review* 51: 464–481.
- Statham, P. (2008) Political Party Contestation over Europe in Public Discourses: Emergent Euroscepticism? Oslo: Arena. Working Papers no. 8/2008.
- Tilly, C. (2003) *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wagemann, C. (2006) ‘Us’: A Literature Review on the Identity Frame of German Right-wing Extremists. Florence, Italy: European University Institute. Report.
- Wilcox, A., Weinberg, L. and Eubank, W. (2003) Explaining national variations in support for far right political parties in Western Europe, 1990–2000. In: P.H. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds.) *Right Wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 126–158.
- Zimmermann, E. (2003) Right-wing extremism and Xenophobia in Germany: Escalation, exaggeration, or what? In: P.L. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds.) *Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*. London; Portland: Frank Cass, pp. 220–250.