

WEAVING THE TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-GENDER NETWORKS*

Manuela Caiani and Ivan Tranfić †

This article presents the analytical framework for the special issue, “Weaving the Transnational Anti-gender Networks.” It investigates how different configurations of actors and identities, causes and conditions, and mechanisms and trajectories are related to the building of anti-gender transnational contention. Moving from social movement approaches, the article disentangles the definitions of anti-gender collective actors, transnationalization, and diffusion vis-à-vis various organizational and background factors. It argues that we have to look at contextual opportunities such as European integration and radical-right transnationalization, the “gender ideology” and “natural family” frames, as well as events and practices, to comprehensively account for the weaving of anti-gender networks that transcend national borders. The interplay of religious resources and conservative familial identity politics are diffused both bottom-up and top-down, depending on contextually specific threats and opportunities. The role of the internet in the transnationalization of the contemporary radical right is also highlighted.

In the summer of 2021, WikiLeaks published the “Intolerance Network”—17,000 internal documents of two Spanish organizations important in transnational anti-gender mobilizing efforts (Cariboni 2021). The documents provide further solid evidence of a vast global network of financial, ideological, and strategic ties between far-right parties and ultraconservative religious groups tied to various Christian denominations. Against the backdrop of rising populism and illiberalism, a network of antifeminist and anti-LGBTQ+ organizations has been forming worldwide. Rallying around the outcry to protect family values and children puts new wind in the sails of both national and transnational far-right actors. When transnationalizing, appealing to the commonsense politics of essentializing differences between women and men and extolling the virtues of the nuclear family might help far-right actors circumvent the uneasy political contradictions in issues of history and ethnic and religious differences.

Various forms of cooperation and interaction have been established in the last decade among NGOs and political parties, churches, foundations, and think tanks, which are identifiable under the label of “anti-gender movements,” but what are they? The anti-gender movement is a network of various actors, including antiabortion and profamily associations and conservative Catholic and far-right groups (Scrinzi 2023). It opposes policies promoting gender equality and sexual democracy, regarding them as an attempt by “globalist elites” to transform the fundamental basis of human society. The Vatican first forged this rhetoric in the 1990s and has been internationally spread by Catholic hierarchies since then (Lavizzari and Prearo 2019). On the one hand, traditional conservative national actors disseminate their strategies, share best practices, and help spread know-how and resources to develop new transnational anti-gender fora. On the other hand, regional and global anti-gender actors help support the creation of new local initiatives or chapters of existing prolife and anti-gender organizations. While scholars have mostly focused on national actors and discourses, the relational and transnational aspects of anti-gender campaigning have been neglected until recently.

* The authors thank AUTHLIB, as a supporting Horizon Project and the Cosmos Centre at the SNS.

† Manuela Caiani is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy. Ivan Tranfić is a postdoctoral researcher at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy. Direct correspondence to manuela.caiani@sns.it

This special issue empirically investigates the development and mobilization of anti-gender movements in Europe and beyond. It sheds light on the transnationalization and coordination efforts of radical right and conservative actors promoting heteronormative family values and mobilizing against “gender ideology” and abortion. It looks at the transnationalization and diffusion of anti-gender frames, networks, and strategies. It draws on social movement studies to address the dynamics of development, mobilization, and internationalization, paying particular attention to the political opportunities provided by European integration and globalization. The latter processes serve both as a liberal target of anti-gender contention around gender and sexual equality but also as an arena that provides institutional occasions for coordination, as the 2024 EU elections showcase best. Thus, as a subset of the radical-right movement, anti-gender actors mobilize organizational resources to frame their claims transnationally and build coalitional networks. In addition, this special issue considers how global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inequality may offer specific political and discursive opportunities for anti-gender contention. In sum, we investigate the development of anti-gender movements nationally and transnationally, focusing on collective identities, frames, repertoires of action, networks, and the catalysts helping with their transnationalization.

International exchanges among anti-gender forces have intensified recently through the cooperation between right-wing authoritarians at the European and global levels (Lavizzari and Siročić 2022). In Europe, in some respects, the boldest attempt happened recently, on July 2, 2021, with the “Declaration on the Future of Europe” signed by many of the parties supporting anti-gender efforts. A parallel arena of cooperation exists outside the institutional setting. It has been argued that “transnational processes of exchange and learning play an important role in the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe” (Langenbacher and Schellenberg 2011: 22). Confronted with the global challenges of the twenty-first century, there are increasing efforts to create a transnational network based on a “global white identity” (Daniels 2009). A focus on traditional values of the “natural family” is emerging partly as a parallel and an intertwined process to the former, rooted in ultraconservative Christian politics.

To date, however, in sociology and political science, there have been relatively fewer empirical analyses on the topic of the transnationalization of illiberal forces (but see Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012; Froio and Ganesh 2019; Enyedi 2020; Nissen 2022). Moreover, this scholarship has mostly focused on the transnationalization of anti-immigration forces rather than anti-gender ones.

Looking at the dynamics of anti-gender and far-right transnationalization and seeing transnationalization as a process driven by the discourses and (inter)actions of illiberals, this special issue contributes to the scientific literature in multiple ways. Firstly, it proposes different ways to measure the processes of transnationalization of anti-gender mobilizations (i.e., diffusion and/or transnationalization of frames, organizations, and actions). Second, it approaches the research on anti-gender politics with a social movement perspective, taking the study of the anti-gender and far-right phenomenon beyond electoral politics through a comparative lens. Moreover, it contributes to the social movement literature and transnationalization of contention by focusing on the transnationalization efforts by illiberal conservative mobilizations (see Caiani and Saridakis 2024), an area still relatively more neglected. It also adds to bridging the scholarship on social movements and religion—two fields that do not always communicate much (see also Caiani and Carvalho 2021). Finally, focusing on the role of the internet and diffusion of anti-gender practices, frames, and identities in and through the web, it also provides an interdisciplinary analysis combining political sociology and digital media studies.

WHAT IS ANTI-GENDER TRANSNATIONALIZATION?

The anti-gender movement can be defined as a heterogeneous network of conservative, religious, and radical-right actors opposing what they frame as “gender ideology” in favor of traditional family values. Anti-gender movements have been mobilizing across the globe for a decade now.

Various political parties, civil society organizations, and religious groups are rising to reaffirm traditionalist, socially conservative policies in morality politics, biopolitics, intimate citizenship, gender, sexual equality, and education. The “gender ideology” frame is used to denounce women’s and LGBTQ+ equality as an attack on the essence of the sex binary and the corresponding family model centered around procreation, conservative sexual morality, and nativism. It paints a traditionalist picture of a society that glorifies the heteronormative family model as a backbone of healthy nation-states and a bulwark against liberal moral relativism.

Scholars have also noted the important similarities between anti-gender ideology and radical right populism, including social conservatism, nativism, and populist illiberalism (Hennig 2018; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Tranfić 2022). While we can demarcate the “extreme right” as anti-democratic groups operating outside institutional politics, the “populist radical right” participates in elections despite challenging pluralism and representative democracy (Mudde 2007). Distinguishing between the extreme and the radical right in practice, however, proves challenging due to the numerous linkages connecting them. Other scholars, following David Art (2011) and Mudde (2019), use “far right” as an overarching concept to indicate both, also underlying that a “constellation approach” is the most appropriate to grasp empirically the phenomenon (Blee, Futrell, and Simi 2024), in the fourth wave of these political forces (Weisskircher 2024). In this special issue, we rely on Cas Mudde’s (2007) commonly accepted definition of the populist radical right based on their sharing different degrees of ideological populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. This does not exclude recognizing the continuities of populist radical-right politics with historical fascism in various contexts (Scrinzi 2023).

The “gender ideology” frame (for an overview of this perspective on studying collective contention, also on the far right, see Caiani 2023) serves as a floating signifier, allowing diverse illiberal actors to form coalitions around a common cause (Mayer and Sauer 2017). In social movement terms, this function of political signifiers is recognized as frame alignment (Snow et al. 1986), meaning that “gender ideology” bridges disparate frames of understanding and mobilizing different political and social groups around a common cause.

Graff and Korolczuk (2021) conceptualize this relationship as an opportunistic synergy in which religious conservatives seek political alliances among right-wing populist parties, who, in return, infuse their ideology with anti-gender claims to increase their legitimacy and voter pool. Beyond opportunistic co-optation of the anti-gender cause from existing radical right parties, illiberal social movement actors can also take the electoral turn themselves, forming anti-gender movement parties (see Lavizzari and Prearo 2019 for the Italian case). Moreover, in some cases, anti-gender policies are adopted by state actors and authoritarian governments without strong collective mobilization against “gender” in the streets (see Kováts and Pető 2017 and Moss 2017 for the Hungarian and Russian examples). Building on this rich emerging literature and drawing from social movement perspectives and concepts such as collective identity, frames, movement-counter-movement dynamics, networks, and action repertoire, our special issue contributes to this debate by analyzing the transnational dimension of anti-gender contention.

Social Movements’ Transnationalization and Diffusion

Numerous concepts have been used in social movement scholarship to describe similar phenomena such as internationalization, globalization, or transnationalization, each with a slightly different meaning. We shall focus our efforts here on several fundamental processes operating horizontally between states and movements and vertically between multileveled polities. First, *diffusion* denotes a transfer of an innovative aspect of contention from one site to another (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010), such as adopting a protest tactic in one country from another. Second, *externalization* is a process whereby national actors project domestic claims vertically onto international institutions or actors (Tarrow 2005), such as protesters appealing to the EU to help reaffirm civic rights and the rule of law infringed by a national government. Third, *internalization* is the opposite process, defined succinctly by della Porta and Tarrow (2005: 2) as “the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally.” One common example is

claims targeting national governments regarding decision-making on policies in supranational institutions. Fourth, a process we could call *transnationalization* in the strict sense denotes the formation of networks of actors beyond the nation-state to put forward claims and organize collective action targeting international institutions, actors, or other states.

Such a process can lead to the formation of global social movements that share common interpretations of reality, define their cause as global, and are rooted in international organizational networks (della Porta 2006). Finally, the *upward scale shift* is the process that leads from increasing horizontal coordination towards forming new organizations or coordinating bodies engaging within broader configurations of conflict (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). Specifically, we can define scale shift as a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened claims (Tarrow 2005). Thus, activists can also transfer contention to a lower level—one more local than the initial site of collective action—which is then called a *downward scale shift*. Both variants require complex facilitation through mechanisms such as coordination, brokerage, theorization of common conditions, shifting targets of contention, and adapting claims/frames (Tarrow 2005). Applying these concepts to anti-gender transnationalization can help us pinpoint the functions of the transmitted “gender ideology” and “natural family” frames, as well as the movement's repertoire of contention.

Although social movement literature on transnationalization has mostly focused on progressive actors, we can identify contextual conditions incentivizing transnationalization that are common for different types of movements. First, increasing cooperation and integration among nation-states towards complex forms of multilevel governance have changed the institutional set-up and locus of authority in an increasing number of policy areas. Responding to processes of globalization and its regional forms, social movements have sought to adapt to this new set of political constraints and opportunities. As Tarrow (2010) notes, movement actors will strategically engage in “venue shopping,” choosing those levels of polity that they expect to be more favorable to their goals. Second, the neoliberal model of globalization has created a common set of grievances in its socio-economic and political consequences. From rising inequality, the dismantling of the welfare state, increasingly precarious work and workforce migrations to the depoliticization and technocratization of policies via deregulation, movements of both the left (della Porta 2006) and the right (Caiani 2018) have been developing political alternatives to challenge the neoliberal status quo embodied by transnational institutions and actors.

Third, the rapid advancement of information and communication technologies and the easier, faster, and more affordable travel has profoundly impacted movement transnationalization and diffusion. The increasing sensitivity of old and new media for news and issues not confined to the nation-state helps ease the “attribution of similarity” (McAdam 1995) between movement actors in different contexts. Additionally, activists can use the internet to establish contacts, cooperate, and coordinate actions across borders. Fourth, sociopolitical changes particularly salient in democratic countries, manifested in the appearance of “new social movements,” have prompted a postmodern shift towards political participation around cultural diversity and subjectivity (della Porta and Tarrow 2005) that is particularly salient for the transnationalization of oppositional movements around gender and sexuality. Additionally, when states adopt anti-gender politics and politicized homo/transphobia as a part of their international agenda of protecting traditional values enshrined within Christian heritage, this provides unique political opportunities for anti-gender actors in other contexts and can serve as a mechanism of anti-gender diffusion and/or transnationalization. Furthermore, international institutions and polities such as the UN and the EU serve as “coral reefs” (Tarrow 2005) around which movements and actors cluster.

In the case of anti-gender movements, this includes transnational advocacy groups, NGOs, and think tanks such as the International Organization for the Family, Alliance Defending Freedom, and The European Centre for Law and Justice, to name a few. Additionally, triangular cooperation among Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christian Churches is established via international links and made easier given a common Christian identity and the supranational ambitions of religions claiming universal validity and scope. Finally, the EU serves as an impor-

tant vehicle of transnationalization not only for advocacy groups but also via EU-level political groups and parties, among which organizations such as the European Christian Political Movement, European Conservatives and Reformists, and Identity and Democracy figure as central actors. In the next section, we unpack the social movement literature on diffusion and transnationalization in more detail to see how it can be applied to anti-gender movements.

CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION

Right-wing extremist mobilization, including transnational activities, finds roots in various phenomena related to economic and social crises (Caiani 2019). Similarly, as Butler has argued (2019), anti-gender actors' focus on the family aims to shield the home from the ravages of market forces as neoliberal austerity rolls back support for families, childcare, and social services. The movement's framing itself targets neoliberalism, rejecting the "dictates of market ideology" and "ultra-individualism" (Kováts 2018). Moreover, political instability, powerful allies, lingering impacts of authoritarian legacies, but also youth subcultures, hooliganism, and the dissemination of xenophobic ideologies in society (Rydgren 2007) all serve as a breeding ground for right-wing extremism. In a situation of increasing insecurity and inequality, growing disengagement from politics, and distrust in democratic institutions, antiestablishment sentiments are gaining significance as fuel for radical right politicization. In the case of anti-gender movements, collective action for traditional values partly also arises as a form of contentious repoliticization against the "establishment" and its consensus politics on human rights issues (Kursar and Matan 2022). In Europe, antiestablishment populism has been fueled by the perceived elitist and technocratic tendencies of the EU, especially in gender and sexual equality (Rawłuszko 2021).

More broadly, scholars have shown that political opportunities conducive to the global expansion of the radical right also include European integration, which is a new contentious issue for radical parties and groups to compete on (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022). Beyond anti-immigrant and antiminority-rights campaigns, the European radical right is united by a vehement anti-Brussels stance, marked by Euroskepticism in both political parties and nonparty organizations (Vasilopoulou 2011). Euroskepticism, a prevalent trait in current radical right-wing formations, is driven by threats like immigration, multiculturalism, and the perceived erosion of national sovereignty and traditional values. Thus, the fundamental myths of the radical right are under threat from processes of supranational integration (Bar-On 2007). Furthermore, European institutions serve as an institutional arena for radical right organizations to become visible, accountable, recognize each other, and establish coordination.

To this broad set of political and discursive opportunities for radical right-wing actors, we can add several important contextual elements fostering anti-gender transnationalization specifically. First, on the level of EU, improving gender and sexual equality policies has become an important benchmark for all countries wishing to join the bloc. In the new millennium, fundamental human rights became part of the accession process, with LGBTQ+ rights explicitly becoming one of three key priorities of the enlargement process as defined by the European Commission in 2013 (Slootmaeckers 2023). Second, as a largely reactive political force, anti-gender movements had to adapt to an increasingly networked international feminist and LGBTQ+ movement by building their own transnational coalitions thereby instigating a transnational dynamic of contention around gender and sexuality both at the level of the UN and the EU (Ayoub and Stoeckl 2023). Finally, democratic backsliding in Europe and beyond created favorable opportunities for anti-gender actors to influence the policy process and set the legislative agendas of increasingly autocratic countries like Poland and Hungary (Krizsán and Roggeband 2021).

Multilevel Arenas: The EU and the UN

The relationship between radical right-wing groups and transnational politics, although ambiguous due to the potential clash between nationalism and cross-national coordination, does

not happen in a vacuum. This is true also for anti-gender movements, which are able to find allies in power in radical-right European parties. Since the mid-1980s, the European Parliament elections have been an occasion for West European radical right parties to coordinate among themselves, at least for the duration of the political campaign (Almeida 2010). Another factor that has favored transnationalization is the emergence of the Front National (FN), the then-new radical right-wing subject that appropriated populist demands that favored its rise and entry into mainstream politics. It became the new pivot around which to build international alliances. In fact, it was around the Front National in 1984 that the Group of the European Right (GDE) was born in the EU Parliament. In 2007, the radical grouping ITS (Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty) was born in the EU parliament, bringing together ultranationalist parties. Today, in the EU Parliament, there are three large groups of the radical right, which also include anti-gender stances: ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), ESN (Europe of Sovereign Nations), and the PEF (Patriots for Europe). The 2019 and 2024 elections, in particular, marked a clear advancement of nationalist and Eurosceptic radical right actors across Europe. In this context, anti-gender discourse appears as highly Eurosceptical and nativist, rejecting the Brussels elites' imposition of "unnatural ideologies." The rhetoric warning against the dangers that "moral relativism" poses to traditional values is heavily influenced by and linked to the Catholic church's discourse, exemplified by Pope Francis' concept of "ideological colonization." Polish illiberals have gone as far as comparing EU gender equality projects to the Ebola virus spreading throughout the continent (Korolczuk and Graff 2018). In a populist manner, anti-gender actors thus present themselves as protectors of the people who are under threat from alienated European elites and their deviant ideologies. As Hennig (2018) has argued, this aspect of anti-gender politics has the power to draw from beyond the narrow pool of religious fundamentalist communities precisely because it resonates with anti-elite and anti-EU populist discourse.

However, neither in the case of anti-gender nor radical-right politics more broadly does this entail a total rejection of European integration or identity. In the former case, ultraconservatives are working on a project of evangelization toward a Christian Europe that will reject secularism, liberalism, and moral relativism (Mos 2022). In the latter case, "pro-European nativists" celebrate a culturally exclusive European civilization that rejects Islam and immigrants (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022). Anti-gender politics, however, do not only respond to political threats and opportunities on the regional, European level. In fact, the "gender ideology" frame was concocted at the UN level by the Vatican to combat feminist advances in asserting global gender equality norms at the Cairo and Beijing conferences in 1994 and 1995 (Case 2011). Reacting to the newly emerged transnational coalition of feminist networks developed at the UN (della Porta and Tarrow 2005), the Christian right utilized both the Vatican's privileged position as a global actor and its emerging discourse against "gender" to develop its own transdenominational coalition of conservative Catholics and Protestants (Graff and Korolczuk 2021).

Christianity's global reach and universal set of values, symbols, religious rituals, and networks are crucial in providing material and symbolic resources for the transnational cooperation of ultraconservatives and nativists. In a study of the breakdown of denominational divisions and religious change in the U.S., Wuthnow pointed to new opportunities for crossdenominational alliances rooted in a common religious worldview and values transcending religious specificities (Wuthnow 1988). On a global scale, such alliances included not only ecumenical cooperation among different Christian churches but also the inclusion of Muslim and Jewish conservatives. Unlike the European level, the UN served as an opportune arena to forge alliances with a wide variety of conservative countries, including Muslim representatives, to combat gender equality and the emerging codification of sexual orientation and gender identity rights.

Religion and Discursive Opportunities

The rise of anti-gender actors in Europe and the increasing salience of religion in political discourse are closely interrelated phenomena. This special issue thus addresses the key role of religion in anti-gender movements frames, practices, and networks by adopting a comparative

cross-organizational perspective. The revival of “religious language” extends beyond Western European political landscapes, evident in instances like Trump’s association with Evangelical Christianity and Salvini’s embrace of Catholicism (Caiani and Carvalho 2021). This phenomenon is also observable in Latin America with Bolsonaro aligning with Pentecostalism and in Asia with Modi’s advocacy of Hindu nationalism (Steinmetz-Jenkins and Jager 2019). When it comes to transnational networking of anti-gender forces, a particularly salient opening in the political opportunities came with the awkward informal alliance of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in promoting traditional Christian values and politicized homophobia, leading to a period of intensified cross-denominational and cross-border diffusion of anti-gender contention across the Atlantic (see Edenborg 2023).

While most analyses of religion and radical-right politics focus on right-wing populism, this does not exhaust all possible relationships. Anti-gender movements use religion as grounds for internal “othering,” politics of exclusion, targeting gender and sexual minorities. In some cases, they emerge as distinctly religious phenomena, spilling over (Meyer and Whittier 1994) from lay and clerical movements and discursive/tactical innovations within churches (see Carnac 2020; Prearo 2020). Previous research on the populist radical right mostly focused on how radical-right parties/movements utilize or “hijack” religion (DeHanas and Shterin 2018). However, the anti-gender sector of the broader radical-right field reveals that churches and religious actors themselves generate and/or support right-wing radicalism for mobilization purposes. Religion is not just a useful resource imbued with symbolism that radical-right actors use to help demarcate those outside of the native communities, such as Muslim immigrants or autochthonous minorities of a different religion. Ultraconservative movements and political conflicts within Christian churches can spill over into the mainstream, reinvigorating the existing radical right or even fostering the creation of new movements and parties challenging secularism and liberalism.

The interaction between religion and radical-right politics is thus highly context-dependent. In some Eastern European countries, for example, religious actors, whether lay or clerical, figure as “torch-bearers of radical right thinking” (Minkenberg 2017: 47), targeting ‘moral others’ within their own ethnicity for deviating from socially conservative norms. The interplay between exclusionary politics targeting ethnic and religious minorities on the one hand and gender and sexual minorities on the other thus complicates the role of religion in illiberal politics. In some cases, where liberal, secular values and human rights are mainstreamed as part of the national identity, homo- and femo-nationalism are used to denounce the Muslim immigrant “other” as backward, homophobic, and misogynist (Akachar 2015; Caiani and Stefanutto Rosa 2024). In other instances, there is an affinity between ultraconservative intellectuals and activists of Christian and Muslim backgrounds, as both groups oppose secularism and globalization in their own versions of homogenizing nativist politics (Michael 2006). Hence, it should come as no surprise that some Muslim communities and leaders have rallied with anti-gender actors against “gender ideology” (Avanza and della Sudda 2017).

Summarizing the relationship between religion and right-wing populism, Caiani and Carvalho (2021) distinguished between religious politicization, whereby religious actors enter politics to advance their agenda (anti-gender movements), and religion as a marker of identity, whereby secular radical-right actors utilize religion for othering ethnic and religious minorities (nativists). In addition, they point towards a more movement-centered approach, listing ways in which religion helps collective mobilization: providing movements with mobilizing tactics, moral justification for activism, religious resources and networks, and a firm collective identity and emotional commitment.

If we look at resource mobilization, organizational networks, identity-building, and cultural production of the anti-gender movement, the core of the transnational anti-gender efforts is clearly formed by networks of Christian right actors, as many contributions of this special issue show. The Christian right can be defined as a broad range of (trans)national organizations, coalitions, and networks promoting an “orthodox Christian vision and a defense of the traditional nuclear family” (Buss and Herman 2003: xviii). Broadly speaking, this includes churches and clergymen, lay communities of activists, transnational faith-based think tanks, universities, and NGOs. In this

sense, we suggest treating religious groups that engage in power relations as other political organizations, i.e., as having internally defined goals, interests, and strategies they adopt in pursuing them (Potz 2020).

Organizations, Dynamics, and Networks

Collective identities and mobilizations require an organization to be initiated and supported and endure over time. To understand the processes of anti-gender transnationalization, we must unpack the different mechanisms and networks that facilitate the diffusion of repertoires, frames, and organizational forms between various national or local actors. According to Tarrow (2010), we can distinguish between relational, non-relational, and mediated diffusion. Relational diffusion entails the transfer of a particular aspect of collective action between transmitters and adopters who have previously established “relationships of trust, intimacy, or regular communication” (Tarrow 2010: 209). Cross-national organizational contacts and modes of coordination among organizations and groups across borders are and act as modes and vehicles of transnationalization.

The model of discursively secular familial protests against “gender ideology” has been frequently diffused through direct Catholic crossborder links. One notable example is the diffusion of *La Manif pour Tous* from France to Italy, where a local branch even kept the same name, inspired by massive demonstrations against same-sex marriage in France. Second, non-relational diffusion entails spreading an innovative element of a social movement through impersonal channels, i.e., the media and the internet. Crossnational links and networking, especially on social media, have been found to be particularly well-developed among radical right actors (Nissen 2022, Froio and Ganesh 2019). As an example of non-relational diffusion, even though the Slovak anti-gender NGO *Aliancia za Rodinu* had previously organized demonstrations locally, it was news from Croatia that inspired their use of a popular referendum as an action form: “Watching the success of referendum in Croatia and evaluating pressures in our country, we have been encouraged to organize our own referendum protecting family, marriage and children” (*Alianca za Rodinu* 2014). Finally, mediated diffusion refers to the transmission of forms of contention between two actors without previous ties via third-party brokers or mediators. For example, the US-backed Protestant communities in Bulgaria were able to mainstream their anti-gender efforts only after Alexandar Urumov, himself both a Protestant and a highly positioned advisor of a Bulgarian far-right party president, brokered and eased the links with the Orthodox nationalist majority. Beyond Europe, Catholic clergy and lay activists also facilitated the regional diffusion of the “gender ideology” frame in various South American countries (Corrêa 2020). Thus, as we can see from the importance of religious networks and diaspora communities, cultural similarity is an important catalyst (Soule and Roggeband 2018) for anti-gender diffusion. It is no wonder that prominent places in anti-gender leadership are held by diaspora community returnees to Eastern Europe, such as ADF’s Roger Kiska or *Vigilare*’s John Vice Batarelo in Croatia.

Scholars have been analyzing the rise of a conservative backlash to feminist advances at the level of transnational institutions such as the UN and the EU (Antić and Radačić 2020; Mos 2022; Zacharenko 2020). Moreover, on the meso-level of oppositional (or coalitional) dynamics among different groups, we must notice that the transnational dimension of the anti-gender movement is primarily linked to its oppositional character. Both religious and secular networks opposing gender and LGBTQ+ equality have taken the battle to supranational organizations such as the UN and the EU. This move is a response to the successes of the feminist and LGBTQ+ movements in translating their agenda into transnational policies, values, and norms (Corredor 2019; Hennig 2018). Applying social movement concepts, feminist and LGBTQ+ actors have thus engaged in politics of a higher scope and level via an upward scale shift while also adopting a highly cosmopolitan activist identity, even compared to other left-wing and liberal movements (Fillieule and Blanchard 2010). Given the oppositional nature of anti-gender movements, this move prompted Christian right actors to follow progressives into a new transnational arena. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996: 1647) have claimed, “Once a movement enters a particular venue, if there is the possibility of contest, an opposing movement is virtually forced to act in the same arena.”

According to a report by the European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development on antisexual and reproductive rights organizations, there are “currently 490 organizations and networks active in 32 European countries, most of which are faith-based” (Datta 2013: 25). Intending to form an international think tank, anti-gender activists, ideologues, politicians, and financiers have also gathered around a new advocacy coalition and a manifesto: “Restoring the Natural Order: An Agenda for Europe.” The extremist document goes as far as suggesting the reintroduction of antisodomy laws and laws to prohibit “gay propaganda.” Hence, the anti-gender movement is a properly transnational social movement as it engages in contentious interaction with authorities located in international institutions (Tarrow 2001). On a global level, four major hubs of the transnational anti-gender movement have been identified: the US Christian right which is strongly influential on the UN level; the conservative wing of the Catholic Church which inspired anti-gender grass-roots mobilization globally; a constellation of Russian actors such as the Russian Orthodox Church and Academy of Sciences; and finally, different populist radical-right parties advocating conservatism and traditionalism (Phillips and Reus-Smit 2020).

The Role of Frames in Transnationalization

It is important to point out the crucial role of framing in these transnationalizing anti-gender efforts. Framing can perform many functions, such as providing the necessary background within which individual activists can locate their actions (Gamson 1988; Snow and Benford 1988), facilitating the translation of a phenomenon into a social problem, potentially the object of collective action (Snow et al. 1986); involving the suggestion of future developments that could solve the identified problems; and producing motivations and incentives for action. Adopting similar frames on similar issues can become the basis for developing common collective identities and mobilizations (Pavan and Caiani 2017). As already noted, frames, frame alignment, and master frames (Snow et al. 1986) are considered important for bridging disparate issues for collective mobilization, both nationally and transnationally. In this sense, “gender ideology” can unite various grievances and mobilize different political and social groups around a common cause. The bridging of an appeal to “the people” with other (more traditional) frames of the extreme right, for example, nativism has been considered important for the success of many different right-wing populist actors in Europe in the last decades (della Porta and Caiani 2011).

The analytical concept of “gender” has historically been used by groups of feminist activists and academics. Yet, in the past decade, “gender” has also increasingly been uttered by religious leaders and far-right politicians. The rise of populism and illiberalism impacted gender-phobic policies immensely. Anti-gender movements, entwined with illiberal politics, became part of an ideological toolkit in the broader political strategy of right-wing populist parties. Beyond the Christian-inspired ultraconservative vision, these parties have a far-right political project aimed at gaining power by using gender as an ideological weapon to incite a cultural war. For example, after assuming control in Poland in 2015, the government led by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) has directed actions against women's rights groups, employing methods such as withholding financial support, conducting raids, weaponizing political rhetoric, and implementing policies that adversely impact these organizations. Anna Gwiazda (2021) thus defines “gender ideology” as a “catch-all term” used by the right-wing and far-right parties to imply that a gay and feminist-led transnational movement is threatening traditional family and conservative values and is used to justify discrimination against women and LGBTQ+ people.

As we will see in these contributions, the diagnostic “gender ideology” frame is conducive to transnationalization, not least given its transcultural meaning that traverses different religions, languages, and ideologies (Spallaccia 2020), thus easing the translation and lack of cultural homogeneity among actors that would normally facilitate diffusion (Soule and Roggeband 2018). The positive flip side, or prognostic aspect of anti-gender framing, is the protection of the natural (heteronormative) family. An example of the globalization of anti-gender politics via the “natural family” frame is the Cape Town Declaration from 2016 drafted by the International Organization for the Family, the World Congress of Families organizer. The first paragraph perfectly demonstrates an attempt at constructing a thoroughly global identity:

Spanning the globe, we have no common tongue, culture, or creed. We are divided by history and geography, by social customs and forms of government. . . . We are of one mind on the bedrock of civil society, on the basis of that first and primordial community called the family: We affirm the dignity of marriage as the conjugal bond of man and woman. . . . It not as the parochial practice of any sect or nation or age, but as the patrimony of all mankind. . . . It not as a matter of preference or temperament or taste but as the heart of any just social order. (IOF 2016)

Based on IOF's practices and discourse, we can thus conclude that anti-gender politics have birthed a new, not just transnational, but properly global social movement, defined by della Porta (2006: 18) as “supranational network of actors that define their causes as global and organize protest campaigns that involve more than one state. In the broader context of radical-right politics, the rise of ultraconservative familism is an innovative framing strategy and a basis for a new collective identity that has not been given the attention it deserves in the scholarship on right-wing radicalism. Jens Rydgren (2005) convincingly argued that it was precisely a new master frame combining antiestablishment populism and ethnopluralism that helped spread extreme-right parties across Europe after the 1980s. The last decade has seen a rise of a new set of frames combining opposition to “gender ideology” with a staunch defense of heteronormative familism that can easily bridge itself to nativist populism.

In conclusion, there are four key elements of framing that we can identify as crystallizing into a new transnational movement: the common Christian identity, a focus on the “naturally” conservative cultures and traditions of “the people” (populism), a familist focus on the heteronormative formula of a man and woman in a marriage as parents, and an opposition towards the dangers of “gender ideology.” Our special issue departs from a solid body of work on movement transnationalization rooted not only in studies of left-wing movements and countermovement scholarship. It also builds on radical-right studies warning us that extremism and radicalism are increasingly transnationalizing—across national boundaries at the EU level and via online communities and networks (Caiani and Kröll 2014; Caiani 2018).

Protests, Events, and Practices

Different types of transnationalization can be present at one time: beyond the formation of international nongovernmental organizations, the organization of transnational, global events and forums is undertaken, but also the direct and indirect diffusion between different national cases of repertoires and practices (della Porta and Kriesi 1999). Social movements can be defined as “informal networks of interaction between individuals and organizations that share a set of beliefs and a sense of belonging, using predominantly forms of protest in order to promote or oppose social and/or political transformations” (della Porta and Diani 1999: 30). Beyond informal networks, the development of a transnational social movement thus requires the sharing of beliefs and a sense of belonging; some common and similar use of forms of protest, although within a varying repertoire of action from unconventional to cultural and performative ones.

The campaigns “Europe for Family” and the European Citizens Initiatives “Mum, Dad and Kids” and “One of Us” have showcased the anti-gender movement’s use of new political opportunity structures on the EU level and their capability of innovation regarding action repertoires. Anti-gender activists in Europe have also adapted to the increasing Europeanization of policymaking, learning how to strategically use EU norms and values for their own goals. For example, their fight against abortion and embryo freezing has been framed as consistent with the laws and values of the EU, which protect “human life and dignity” (Mos 2018). Transnational collective action can be in this sense the result of intense networking and cooperation of national anti-gender actors in common coalitional processes and events such as the World Congress of Families, the Political Network for Values, or the European Advocacy Academy that serve as sites of strategic learning and diffusion of not only frames but also repertoires of contention and know-how. The long history of anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQ+ activism and networking facilitated the transmission of Christian-inspired action forms. The French initiative *Les Veilleurs* (the Watchers), which organized demonstrations, read literature, sang and occupied public spaces, has spread to

Italy as an “apolitical” and “aconfessional” initiative, called *Sentinelle in Piede*, which employs the same action repertoire. Another U.S.-originating global organization, “40 Days for Life,” performs vigils and public prayers against abortions in front of hospitals.

Repertoires of contention thus circulate transnationally and between movements as well. Originally, cultural and symbolic action forms utilizing music, for example, were adopted by the civil rights movement from Black churches and lay communities (Reed 2019) and then increasingly became associated with left-wing, progressive protest culture. Once such initiatives are transnationalized, they can be transplanted and internalized/domesticated by local pro-life adopters taking up the cause. Ironically, such logic of protest is inherently post-modern, seeking to exact cultural change via theatrical, playful expression of identity and subjectivity (Alimi 2015). Nevertheless, strictly political forms of protest that also diffused across different countries are rarer (see, for example, national referendums on same-sex marriage, organized successfully in Croatia by anti-gender actors in 2013 and followed by unsuccessful emulation in Slovakia and Romania in 2015 and 2018, respectively).

Finally, in anti-gender contention, we can also follow the logic of diffusion via the timeline of national activists' adoption of certain action forms: from innovators who first adopt a tactic to early adopters who legitimate its use among broader audiences and communities to later adopters and non-adopters (Tarrow 1998). The best example is anti-gender opposition to the ratification of the Istanbul Convention that followed the same logic of protest in all countries: from early petition signing against the convention via the transnational platform CitizenGO, the spread of the “gender ideology” scare across Christian media and networks, to protest and government lobbying against ratification (see Krizsán and Roggeband 2021 for a comparative analysis). In this case, Poland was an early innovator associating the Convention with dangerous feminist and gender ideology between 2012 and 2014. Hungary and Croatia appeared as early adopters, with publicized protest resonating transnationally and popularizing the struggle. Countries like Czechia, with a vastly atheist population and weaker anti-gender mobilization networks, joined as late as 2024 when the Senate rejected the ratification of the Convention. Finally, some nonadopter countries like Romania or Serbia have not politicized the issue despite budding anti-gender networks. The CitizenGO online petition platform (see Righetti in this issue), originally an innovation of the Spanish anti-gender organization HazteOír, became a common transnational tool of contention, indicating the middle-class civic character of anti-gender contention. As Sarah Soule and Conny Roggeband (2018) emphasize, it is not just action forms and frames that can be diffused, but also organizational forms. This is a crucial point in the case of anti-gender contention, with the movement identity built around a civic image of people's grassroots initiatives, conservative NGOs, and concerned parents and citizens. The similar middle-class, white identity of anti-gender entrepreneurs in various cases has also been recognized as an important facilitating condition of diffusion in left-wing movements (McAdam and Rucht 1993).

Diffusion is key to understanding the transnational spread of social movements and collective actors and actions, also on the regressive anti-gender side of contention. Given the relevance of new transnational dynamics future scholarship should also focus on the diffusion process beyond movements' intense periods of visibility (França 2024). This could illuminate the role of transnational diffusion in feeding far-right/anti-gender mobilization outside their peak, disclosing how submerged networks survive during their invisible phases, as well as how transnational diffusion emerges as a key mechanism for maintaining their frames.

CONTENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS

In this special issue, we consider all the dimensions mentioned above. We also consider aspects of anti-gender transnationalization and movement development—frames, strategies, networks, mechanisms, contexts and opportunities at the national, European, and global level. The contributions explore empirical manifestations of these in several European countries and beyond. Each contribution is a stand-alone article whose author selected at least one elements of the

analytical framework and applied it to specific countries. Empirically, this special issue draws on various methods: ethnography and in-depth interviews, frame and discourse analysis, analysis of social networks, qualitative content analysis, and archival work. In addition, the authors' methods help overcome existing biases in approaching right-wing movements from an outsider's perspective and answer calls for analyzing them as movements in their own right (Avanza 2018; Castelli Gattinara 2020).

The broad research questions guiding our special issue are: what is the role of the radical right in anti-gender movements? How do transnational anti-gender actors and fora/spaces (conferences, summits, meetings) develop? How are anti-gender networks, campaigns, discourses, and repertoires diffused across country cases? What role do churches and religious groups play in anti-gender mobilization transnationally? What is the role of the internet and social media in transnationalization? How do anti-gender movements interact with opposing feminist and progressive movements? To answer these questions, we employ comparative analyses of anti-gender, anti-abortion, and religious mobilization with the goal of theoretically and conceptually grounding transnational anti-gender politics. The contributions to our special issue build upon preceding works by shedding new light on previously under-researched topics.

Employing a translocal approach, Ipek Demirsu analyses coalition building between local far-right and religious groups in Verona and the transnational Christian right gathered for the 2019 World Congress of Families. Combining online and offline ethnography with archival work, the study investigates how anti-gender alliances are locally institutionalized and reflects on the local resistances and the hope of progressive change. The in-depth analyses allow us to go above and below typical national case studies to unravel how transnational anti-gender politics become embedded in concrete, everyday local spaces, resonating with situated histories of far-right and religious conservatism. By emphasizing the connection between the global and the local, Demirsu demonstrates how transnational frames and repertoires of contention are adapted to serve as a political reinvention of neo-fascist and ultraconservative forces.

Taking more of a birds-eye view of the World Congress of Families, Kristopher Velasco provides us with a much-needed mapping of WCF conferences and actors since its inception in 1997, generating a rich database of anti-gender networking for future research. Using descriptive and network analysis, Velasco demonstrates a Western-centric nature of anti-gender networking by locating global conferences primarily in the US and mostly post-communist Europe. However, it also reveals a rapid growth of regional conferences located primarily in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and a mushrooming of new Christian right networks that sprung from its participants' initiatives. Anti-gender norms are spread via top-down internalization in new countries while also providing locally present actors to increase their legitimacy via transnationalization.

Employing a macrolevel theory of society drawing from gender studies, Emanuela Lombardo introduces the innovative, theoretically fruitful concept of "anti-gender regimes," linking them to specific societal domains such as the economy, polity, violence, civil society, cathexis, and episteme. Such an approach allows us to analyze subnational and supranational dynamics and the effects of anti-gender politics. By including various social domains, her approach provides a useful analytical tool for scrutinizing the hegemony-seeking strategies of anti-gender actors beyond institutional and movement mobilization. It demonstrates the worrying autocratizing consequences of anti-gender regimes. Her contribution adds to theories of democracy by convincingly asserting the centrality of (anti)gender politics as well as the inequality and diminished inclusion of minority groups to argue for an encompassing, participatory societal democratization.

Dominika Tronina's contribution investigates transnational online networking of 148 anti-gender actors on Twitter in Croatia, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland. Using social network analysis, the paper analyzes interactions (retweets, replies, and mentions) between intra and international Twitter (X) accounts to assess the level of transnational networking of anti-gender organizations. Her findings indicate that dominant national organizations, namely, *Ordo Iuris* in Poland, *LMPT* in France, *Pro Vita & Famiglia* in Italy, and *Demo für alle* in Germany, also serve as central gatekeepers and brokers in transnational online networking. Although the number of transnational interactions compared to intranational ones is significantly lower and fluctuates

irregularly over time, quality can surpass quantity with powerful brokers directing and promoting transnational flows of anti-gender politics.

Whereas most contributions aim to explain the development of anti-gender politics, Anna Meeuwisse et al. investigate the impact of anti-gender contention on the discursive boundary-making within feminist and LGBTQ+ organizations by comparing two contrasting contexts—Italy and Sweden. The authors argue the need to go beyond the movement-counter-movement dynamic by looking at a broader field of contention and the complex interactions, alliances, and conflicts within seemingly homogenous actors. Importantly, they find similarities and discursive overlaps between some feminist and anti-gender actors. Despite the two different national contexts, anti-gender politics in Italy and Sweden deepened divisions and polarizations within the progressive camp, unsettling boundaries of “Us” and “Them.” These crosscontextual similarities result partly from the transnational character of (anti)gender politics and the diffusion of contention around the issue, as local actors tend to seek international allies to solidify their positioning.

Despite a shifted spotlight on pandemic-related issues in broader society, Martijn Mos’s contribution shows how the Christian right tried to turn the COVID-19 crisis into an opportunity to stay relevant and gain new audiences. The article, employing an analysis of digital media, news, and legal documents, shows how anti-gender actors respond to societal crises. Taking the case of two leading transnational Christian right organizations shows that the crucial discursive strategy utilized by both organizations was one of frame extension aiming to include new issues and grievances into their agenda to attract different additional supporters affected by the all-pervading effects of the global pandemic. Importantly, this article provides a path to analyzing different types of global crises as threats and opportunities for transnational anti-gender actors.

Using ethnographic observation and thematic and discourse analyses of texts and speeches, Katja Kahlina delves into the geopolitical dimension of collective identity building and framing by focusing on the East/West power hierarchies in the post-Cold War setting. Using the natural family frame to build common ground across national and regional boundaries, anti-gender actors disrupt the traditional Western hegemonic discourse that posits the West as a liberal ideal to be emulated by the backward Eastern “pupils” struggling to advance gender and sexual equality. Attacking this perceived Western cultural imperialism, WCF participants construct a common anti-gender, anti-immigrant Christian civilizationism that reverses the power relations, constructing Eastern Europe as a role model for saving societies from destructive liberalism, individualist capitalism, and demographic collapse sponsored by Western hegemonic powers.

This special issue will address the different aspects of the process of “weaving” a transnational anti-gender network from an empirical and social movement perspective in terms of methods and hypotheses. Social movements accompany the democratization process and, subsequently, the consolidation of democracy, often insisting on cleavages and conflicts that developed precisely in connection to this process. How to handle the normative question posed by the development of a conservative “democratic backsliding” social movement at a transnational level is beyond the ambition of this SI. However, we hope that the empirical insights we can derive from this SI’s contributions will add to this debate.

REFERENCES

- Alianca za Rodinu. 2014. Application for Funding a Key Referendum in Central Europe—Referendum for the Protection of Family in Slovakia in WikiLeaks Intolerance Network. <https://wikileaks.org/intolerancenetwork/files/6527>. Retrieved February 12, 2024.
- Akachar, Soumia. 2015. “Stuck between Islamophobia and Homophobia: Applying Intersectionality to Understand the Position of Gay Muslim Identities in the Netherlands.” *DiGeSt. Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies* 2(1-2): 173.
- Alimi, Eitan Y. 2015. “Repertoires of Contention.” Pp. 410-422 in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Almeida, Dimitri. 2010. “Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration.” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11(3): 237–53.

- Antić, Marija, and Ivana Radačić. 2020. "The Evolving Understanding of Gender in International Law and "Gender Ideology" Pushback 25 years since the Beijing Conference on Women." *Women's Studies International Forum* 83(3): 1024-21.
- Art, David. 2011. *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Avanza, Martina. 2018. "Plea for an Emic Approach Towards "Ugly Movements": Lessons from the Divisions within the Italian Pro-Life Movement." *Politics and Governance* 6(3): 112–25.
- Avanza, Martina, and Magali Della Sudda. 2017. "Riposte Catholiques: Recherches Contemporaines Sur Les Mobilisations Conservatrices Autour de Questions Sexuelles." *Genre, Sexualité et Société* 18.
- Ayoub, Phillip M., and Kristina Stoeckl. 2023. "The Double-Helix Entanglements of Transnational Advocacy: Moral Conservative Resistance to LGBTI Rights." *Review of International Studies* 50(2): 289–311.
- Bar-On, Tamir. 2007. *Where Have All the Fascists Gone?* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Blee, Kathleen, Futrell, Robert, and Simi Pete. 2024. "A Constellation Approach to Understanding Extremist White Supremacy." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 28(4): 435–444.
- Buss, Doris, and Didi Herman. 2003. *Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Butler, Judith. 2019. "Anti-Gender Ideology and Mahmood's Critique of the Secular Age." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 87(4): 955–67.
- Caiani, Manuela. 2018. "Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation." Pp. 394-411 in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Jens Rydgren, ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2019. "The Rise and Endurance of Radical Right Movements." *Current Sociology* 67(6): 918–35.
- . 2023. "Framing and Social Movements." *Discourse Studies* 25(2): 195-209.
- . 2024. "The Transnationalisation of the Far-Right between Movements and Parties" in *Transnational Political Contention in the European Union and Beyond*, edited by Chiara Milan and Aron Buzogány. Routledge, forthcoming.
- Caiani, Manuela, and Tiago Carvalho. 2021. "The Use of Religion by Populist Parties: The Case of Italy and Its Broader Implications." *Religion, State and Society* 49(3): 211–30.
- Caiani, Manuela, Donatella della Porta, and Claudius Wagemann. 2012. *Mobilizing on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Caiani, Manuela, and Patricia Kröll. 2014. "A transnational extreme right? New right-wing tactics and the use of the internet." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39(3): 1-21.
- Caiani, Manuela, and Manès Weisskircher. 2022. "Anti-Nationalist Europeans and Pro-European Nativists on the Streets: Visions of Europe from the Left to the Far Right." *Social Movement Studies* 21(1–2): 216–33.
- Caiani, Manuela, and Federico Stefanutto Rosa. 2024. *Giorgia and the Others: Female Leadership on the Radical Right*. <https://www.authlib.eu/giorgia-meloni-female-leadership-radical-right/>. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
- Caiani, Manuela, Pal Susanszky, and Nikos Saridakis. 2024. "Radical Right and Anti-Vax Protests between Movements and Parties: A Comparative Study." *Acta Politica*. Published 22 May, 2024 <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00339-5>
- Cariboni, Diana. 2021. "How the Far Right Tried to Exploit Spain's Anti-austerity 15-M Protests." *Open Democracy*, August 25, 2021. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/how-the-far-right-tried-to-exploit-spains-anti-austerity-15-m-protests/>. Retrieved February 12, 2024.
- Carnac, Romain. 2020. "Imaginary Enemy, Real Wounds: Counter-Movements, "Gender Theory", and the French Catholic Church." *Social Movement Studies* 19(1): 63–81.
- Case, Mary Anne. 2011. "After Gender The Destruction of Man? The Vatican's Nightmare Vision of the "Gender Agenda" for Law." *Pace Law Review* 31(3): 802–17.
- Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. 2020. "The Study of the Far Right and Its Three E's: Why Scholarship Must Go beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism." *French Politics* 18(3): 314–33.
- Corrêa, Sonia. 2020. *Anti-Gender Politics in Latin America. Anti-Gender Politics in Latin America*. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinas de Aids.
- Corredor, Elizabeth S. 2019. "Unpacking "Gender Ideology" and the Global Right's Anti-gender Counter-movement." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44(3): 613–38.
- Daniels, Jessie. 2009. *Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights. Perspectives on a Multiracial America Series*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Datta, Neil. 2013. "Keeping It All in the Family. Europe's Antichoice Movement." *Conscience. The Newjournal of Catholic Opinion* 34(2): 22-27
- DeHanas, Daniel Nilsson, and Marat Shterin. 2018. "Religion and the Rise of Populism." *Religion, State and Society* 46(3): 177–85.

- della Porta, Donatella, ed. 2006. *Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Manuela Caiani. 2011. *Social Movements and Europeanization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 1999. "Social Movements." *European Studies* : 365.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 1999. "Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An Introduction." Pp. 3-22 in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, edited by Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney G. Tarrow. 2005. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism. People, Passions, and Power*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Edenborg, Emil. 2023. "Anti-Gender Politics as Discourse Coalitions: Russia's Domestic and International Promotion of 'Traditional Values.'" *Problems of Post-Communism* 70(2) 175–84.
- Enyedi, Zsolt. 2020. "Right-wing Authoritarian Innovations in Central and Eastern Europe." *East European Politics* 36(3): 363–377.
- Fillieule, Olivier, Philippe Blanchard. 2010. "Individual surveys in rallies (INSURA). A New Eldorado for Comparative Social Movement Research?" Pp. 186-210 in *The Transnational Condition. Protest Dynamics in an Entangled Europe*. Berlin: Berghahn.
- França, Thais. 2024. "Transnational Diffusion and Far-Right Latent Social Movements: Unveiling the Survival of Anti-Immigration Mobilisation in Portugal." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2389452>
- Froio, Caterina, and Bharath Ganesh. 2019. "The Far Right Across Borders. Networks and Issues of (Trans)National Cooperation in Western Europe on Twitter." Pp. 93-106 in *Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe and the US*, edited by Maik Fielitz and Nick Thurston. Bielefeld: Verlag.
- Gamson, Williams A. 1988. "Political Discourse and Collective Action." Pp. 219-244 in *International Social Movement Research: From Structure to Action*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Givan, Rebecca Kolins, Kenneth M. Roberts, and Sarah Anne Soule. 2010. *The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Graff, Agnieszka, and Elżbieta Korolczuk. 2021. *Anti-Gender Politics in the Populist Moment*. London: Routledge.
- Gwiazda, Anna. 2021. "Right-Wing Populism and Feminist Politics: The Case of Law and Justice in Poland." *International Political Science Review* 42(5): 580–95.
- Hennig, Anja. 2018. "Political Genderphobia in Europe: Accounting for Right-Wing Political-Religious Alliances against Gender-Sensitive Education Reforms since 2012." *Zeitschrift Für Religion, Gesellschaft Und Politik* 2(2): 193–219.
- International Organization for the Family. 2016. "Universal Declaration on the Family and Marriage." https://www.upf-deutschland.de/files/The_Cape_Town_Declaration_on_the_Family_and_Marriage-2016.pdf. Retrieved on February 12.
- Korolczuk, Elżbieta, and Agnieszka Graff. 2018. "Gender as 'Ebola from Brussels'": The Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 43(4): 797–821.
- Kováts, Eszter. 2018. "Conservative Counter-Movements? Overcoming Culturalising Interpretations of Right-Wing Mobilizations Against 'Gender Ideology'." *Femina Politica - Zeitschrift Für Feministische Politikwissenschaft* 27(1): 75–88.
- Kováts, Eszter, and Andrea Pető. 2017. "Anti-Gender Discourse in Hungary: A Discourse Without a Movement?" Pp. 117–131 in *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing Against Equality*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Krizsán, Andrea, and Conny Roggeband. 2021. *Politicizing Gender and Democracy in the Context of the Istanbul Convention*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Kuhar, Roman, and David Paternotte. 2017. *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing Against Equality*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kursar, Tonči, and Ana Matan. 2022. "Forms of Politicization in Croatia: A Road to a Consensus Democracy 2.0." Pp. 173-90 in *Democratic Crisis Revisited*, edited by Meike Schmidt-Gleim, Ruzha Smilova, and Claudia Wiesner. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH.
- Langenbacher, Nora, and Britta Schellenberg. 2011. *Is Europe on the Right Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Lavizzari, Anna, and Massimo Prearo. 2019. "The Anti-Gender Movement in Italy: Catholic Participation between Electoral and Protest Politics." *European Societies* 21(3) 422–42.

- Lavizzari, Anna, and Zorica Siročić. 2023. "Contentious Gender Politics in Italy and Croatia: Diffusion of Transnational Anti-Gender Movements to National Contexts." *Social Movement Studies* 22(4): 475–93.
- Mayer, Stefanie, and Birgit Sauer. 2017. "'Gender Ideology' in Austria: Coalitions around an Empty Signifier." Pp. 23–40 in *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing against Equality*, edited by Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- McAdam, Doug. 1995. "'Initiator' and 'Spin-off' Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest cycles." Pp. 217–239 in *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, edited by Mark Traugott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press
- McAdam, Doug, and Dieter Rucht. 1993. "Cross-National Diffusion of Social Movement Ideas." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528: 56–74.
- Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Sociology* 101(6): 1628–60.
- Meyer, David, and Nancy Whittier. 1994. "Social Movement Spillover." *Social Problems* 41(2): 277–98.
- Michael, George. 2006. *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Minkenberg, Michael. 2017. *The Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under Siege? Europe in Crisis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mos, Martijn. 2023. "Routing or Rerouting Europe? The Civilizational Mission of Anti-Gender Politics in Eastern Europe." *Problems of Post-Communism* 70(2): 143–52.
- . 2018. "The Fight of the Religious Right in Europe: Old Whines in New Bottles." *European Journal of Politics and Gender* 1(3): 325–43.
- Moss, Kevin. 2017. "Russia as the Saviour of European Civilization: Gender and the Geopolitics of Traditional values." Pp. 195–214 in *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against Equality*, edited by Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ———. 2019. *The Far Right Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Nissen, Anita. 2022. *Europeanisation of the Contemporary Far Right: Generation Identity and Fortress Europe*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- . 2020. "The Trans-European Mobilization of 'Generation Identity'". Pp. 85–100 in *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, edited by Ov Cristian Norocel, Anders Hellström, and Martin Bak Jørgensen.. Cham: Springer International
- Pavan, Elena, and Manuela Caiani. 2017. "'Not in My Europe': Extreme Right Online Networks and Their Contestation of EU Legitimacy." Pp. 169–93 in *Eurocepticism, Democracy and the Media*, edited by Manuela Caiani and Simona Guerra. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Phillips, Andrew, and Christian Reus-Smit. 2020. *Culture and Order in World Politics*. LSE International Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Potz, Maciej. 2020. *Political Science of Religion: Theorising the Political Role of Religion*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Prearo, Massimo. 2020. *L'ipotesi neocattolica: politologia dei movimenti anti-gender*. Milano: Mimesis.
- Rawłuszko, Marta. 2021. "And If the Opponents of Gender Ideology Are Right? Gender Politics, Europeanization, and the Democratic Deficit." *Politics & Gender* 17(2): 301–23.
- Reed, T. V. 2019. *The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights Movement to the Present*. Second edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2007. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33(1): 241–62.
- Scrinzi, Francesca. 2023. *The Racialization of Sexism: Men, Women and Gender in the Populist Radical Right*. London: Routledge.
- Slootmaeckers, Koen. 2023. *Coming In: Sexual Politics and EU Accession in Serbia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Rrame resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* 1(1): 197–217.
- Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51(4): 464.
- Soule, Sarah A., and Conny Roggeband. 2018. "Diffusion Processes Within and Across Movements." Pp. 236–51 in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Holly J. McCammon. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Spallaccia, Beatrice. 2020. "Ideologia Del Gender: Towards a Transcultural Understanding of the Phenomenon." *Modern Italy* 25(2): 131–45.

- Steinmetz-Jenkins, Daniel, and Anton Jäger. 2019. *The Populist Right is Forging an Unholy Alliance with Religion*. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/11/populists-right-unholy-alliance-religion>. Retrieved September 20, 2024.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2001. “Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4(1): 1–20.
- Tarrow Sidney, and McAdam Doug. 2005. “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention.” Pp. 121–47 in *Transnational Activism and Global Contention*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2010. “Dynamics of Diffusion: Mechanisms, Institutions, and Scale Shift.” Pp. 204–220 in *The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*, edited by Rebecca K. Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts, and Sarah A. Soule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tranfić, Ivan. 2022. “Framing ‘Gender Ideology’: Religious Populism in the Croatian Catholic Church.” *Identities* 29(4): 466–482.
- Vasilopoulou, Sofia. 2011. “European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition.” *Government and Opposition* 46(2): 223–44.
- Weisskircher, Manès. 2024. *Contemporary Germany and the Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics From the Streets to Parliament*. London: Routledge.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1988. *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II*. Studies in Church and State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Zacharenko, Elena. 2020. “Anti-gender Mobilisations in Europe.” Greens/EFA of the European Parliament. https://heidihautala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Anti-gender-Mobilisations-in-Europe_Nov25.pdf