



Normalization through transnationalization? Far right international coordination and cooperation

Manuela Caiani

Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the normalization of the far right via the transnationalization of identities, networks and mobilization. Normalization is related to transformations in the socio-political landscape, and the travelling across borders of discursive strategies and practices of backlash political players play a role on it. Focusing on the crucial Italian case, first, we distinguish extent of far right transnationalization in terms of framing strategy, organizational contacts and networks, and events, underlining the existence of different paths toward the same outcome. Second, we apply these concepts to key cases of various types of far right organizations, tracing the transnationalization processes of the political party Fratelli d'Italia (FdI), two radical right movements (GI Italia, and CasaPound) and one 'movement-party' (Forza Nuova). The findings, (i) underline the contextual political opportunities European integration provides for the transnationalization of the far right and (ii) identify distinct practices and processes of transnationalization across different types of actors. These aspects are fundamental to consider, as the far right's transnational alignment may lead to a stronger European far-right public sphere, in opposition to the one envisioned by the EU. We can call this normalization or mainstreaming. The study draws on an analysis of organisational documents, protest event data and interviews.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 22 May 2024
Accepted 29 July 2025

KEYWORDS

Far right; normalization; international cooperation and coordination; identities and frames; interviews

'The European Right follows the Italian example – The Prime Minister is an inspiration for those European parties that have recently changed their strategy: instead of leaving the Union, they want to take control of it'


(David Broder, The New York Times, in Internazionale May 2 2024)".

1. Introduction

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the various mechanisms of far-right transnationalization, by examining four distinct far-right parties/movements in Italy. Although it does not claim to provide definitive answers, it establishes a compelling framework for understanding these different trajectories, and lays a strong foundation for future

CONTACT Manuela Caiani  Manuela.caiani@sns.it  Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Palazzo Strozzi, Piazza Degli Strozzi, Florence 50123, Italy

This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online version. Please see Correction (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2025.2557706>).

 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2025.2543333>

© 2025 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

research on transnational practices and their influence on the mainstreaming of radical actors. The ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘normalization’ (Krzyżanowski 2020; Mondon and Winter 2020a; Wodak 2020) of the far right is a phenomenon which is considered to be one of the most pressing issues in the current research on right-wing radicalism and extremism in Europe (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2023; Caiani 2025; Volk 2025). Processes of mainstreaming or normalization may rely on different mechanisms, discourses and practices of far right actors. In this article, we analyze the renewed significance of *transnational* (i.e. *European*) *identities, networks and strategies* for far right¹ collective actors, namely their recent efforts at international coordination and cooperation, as a means of normalization understood as mainstreaming. By focusing on far right transnationalization in Italy, this study contributes to this growing body of work by conceptualizing mainstreaming. These aspects are therefore fundamental to consider, as the far right’s transnational alignment may lead to a stronger European far-right public sphere, in contrast to the one envisaged by the EU. We can call this normalization or mainstreaming.

One mechanism of normalization is the exit from demonization (Mondon and Winter 2020a), and transnationalization can influence how once marginalized ideas, actors and initiatives creep, or are ushered, back into public discourse. In this regard, the extent to which common framing on similar (e.g. European) issues, coalition building on a large scale and coordinated political actions are diffused among far right groups (including political parties and movements) in various countries can potentially empower and therefore normalize, a ‘regressive’ (della Porta 2023) public sphere (Kallis 2013). This is also related to how stigmatized political preferences become normalized (Valentim 2021) through parliamentary (and extraparliamentary) far right groupings at the European level. The more coordinated these forces become across European states in terms of structures and agendas, the more likely citizens are to perceive that their views have been legitimized (ibid.).

Moreover, the normalization of the populist radical right can happen through discursive practices (Ekström, Patrona, and Thornborrow 2020), and joint mobilization events across borders can play a role as ‘critical’ or ‘transformative’ events (della Porta and Diani 2020), as ongoing transformations through which political views previously treated as radical and extreme appear as increasingly normal and uncontroversial elements of public political discourse.

The aim of this article is to trace the transnationalization of the far right along three key dimensions: (a) *the framing of transnational identities and issues*, (b) *the development of transnational networks and contacts*, and (c) *the organization of far right transnational events*. Each empirical section below is organized around these dimensions across the cases analyzed.

Conceptually, we draw from a collective action approach to the European far right as a social movement (Minkenberg 2019; Caiani 2018). The first aspect pertains to the approach of ‘collective action frames’ (namely the symbolic construction of political and social reality) which is considered a pre condition of both the emergence of new collective identities (in our case ‘sovrational’) and political action. The second and third aspects refer to the (potential) development of discourse coalitions and protest alliances.

Far right transnationalization in terms of the development of European identity frames, transnational networking and joint initiatives is ‘a factor’ in what scholars refer to as the mainstreaming of the far right (Krzyżanowski 2020; Mondon and Winter 2020a; Wodak

2020). Mainstreaming refers in fact to ‘the process by which parties/actors, discourses and/or attitudes move from marginal positions on the political spectrum or public sphere to more central ones, shifting what is deemed to be acceptable or legitimate in political, media and public circles and contexts’ (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2023, in; Volk 2025). Emphasizing the discursive dimension of mainstreaming, the notion of the ‘normalization’ of the far right (Krzyżanowski 2020; Wodak 2020) is often used synonymously to mainstreaming.

The past decades has seen an increase in research on various types of far right actors in Europe, such as anti-immigrant actors and anti-gender actors, as well as actors mobilizing in relation to various crises, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic-related mobilization. Instances of transnationalization are evident: development of positive ‘European identities’ (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022), organizing into transnational networks (Nissen 2022, on the recent waiving of a transnational far right anti-gender network, see; Caiani and Tranfić 2024) and the increasing usage of the Internet and social media to spread ideas and frames (Heft et al. 2023). However, while scholarly interest in the transnationalisation processes of the far right has increased in recent years (e.g. Anievas and Richard 2023) (albeit relatively less than the literature on transnationalism on the progressive side of political contestation), research has tended to specialize in one type of actor at a time, focusing either on political parties² or on social movements.³ Although some attempts have been made to bridge party literature and social movement studies (e.g. Tarrow 2021), the two branches of scholarship have rarely intersected in analyses of the far right.

In this article, we attempt to address this puzzle by comparing different subtypes of the far right in Italy (including both social movements and political parties, as well as the hybrid category of ‘movement parties’, Caiani and Císař 2018) and their transnationalization. This is consistent with the increase in internal heterogeneity of the far right (Wondreys and Mudde 2022) in the fourth wave of far-right politics in post-war Europe (Mudde 2019), in which the mainstreaming is considered a key feature (Krzyżanowski 2020; Mondon and Winter 2020a; Wodak 2020). Moreover, as highlighted in the introduction to this SI, in recent years, the boundaries between right-wing populism, the far right and conservative parties have become increasingly blurred, and right-wing frames, ideologies and policies are being adopted and implemented by a wide range of political actors, which may further reinforce their normalization and hence mainstreaming. It is therefore worth examining the issue by comparing different types of organizations within the same far-right milieu.

By comparing different subtypes of the far right, we attempt to understand different characteristics of their transnational diffusion in terms of *framing strategy*,⁴ *organizational contacts and networks*, and *mobilization events*, identifying various *trajectories or ‘paths’* toward the same outcome (i.e. transnationalization). While the overall ambition is to contextualize comparatively the findings (in Europe), this paper is based on the analysis of the Italian case. We conceptualize it as a ‘critical case’ of far-right mobilization transnationalization (for the richness, variety and strength of the far right organizational field and its recent dynamics of mainstreaming), that is, as a case that is ‘ideal for getting a clear fix on the relevant empirical and theoretical issues’.

In this article, we make three contributions to the study of the transnationalization of the far right in Europe, and thereby, we hope to the broader special issues’ goal to enrich the concept of ‘normalization’ of the far right. First, we propose a conceptual framework

that captures the current (and still largely unexplored) trends of transnationalization of the far right, namely, the increasing presence of dominant European identities (but also networks and practices) in the protest and institutional arena on the ‘regressive’ side of the political spectrum (della Porta 2024). We distinguish between transnationalization in terms of framing strategies, cross-national linkages and transnational events, a categorization that underlines the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon and the mutual relationship among the various aspects of transnationalization. Strong transnational identities and practices exist across various subsectors of the far right. They are deeply embedded in the mindset of organizations that sharply criticize European integration in its current form. Second, we apply these concepts to three key cases of far-right transnationalization in Italy: We empirically analyze in a comparative perspective, political parties, social movements, movement-parties, and areas of inquiry that usually do not talk to each other.

The next section (2) outlines the guiding concepts, section 3 explains our case selection and methodological approach before delving into our empirical case analysis (section 4). Here for our four cases of different types of far right organizations, we investigate their (a). *framing of transnational identities and issues*, (b). *development of transnational networks* and (c). *organization of transnational events*. In section 5, we contextualize our findings showing similarities and differences on transnationalism among different types of far right actors.

2. Guiding concepts: transnationalization and diffusion of collective actors

Transnationalization processes have featured prominently in social movement studies over the past three decades (della Porta and Kriesi 1999). In *social movement studies*, transnationalization is defined as ‘sustained contentious interactions with opponents – national or non-national – by connected networks of challengers organized across national boundaries’ (Tarrow 2005). This means that, first, *transnationalization* can substantially mean very different things. It is not only about the simple diffusion of movements’ resources, strategies and tactics. For instance, transnational contention happens through five processes: domestication (of transnational issues), global framing (of national struggles), transnational diffusion (of practices and repertoires), (actors’) scale shift, externalization and transnational coalition formation (Tarrow 2011). Second, transnationalization does not happen only within the transnational public sphere and through transnational events. On the contrary, the most significant political impacts of movements’ transnationalization can sometimes be recognized in domestic contexts (as shown in the model by della Porta and Kriesi 1999, 5).

The concept of transnationalization is also closely connected to diffusion, defined as the adoption of similar frames and strategies of action across distant places in two different social movements (della Porta and Mattoni 2014). Protest organizers do not have to reinvent the wheel in each conflict because they often can find inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and practiced by other activists (McAdam and Rucht 1993). In this conceptualization, the object of the diffusion can be either a behavioral component consisting of the practices and repertoires of collective action such as ‘strikes, riots, protests, sit-ins, boycotts, petition drives, and other forms of contentious action’ or ideational components involving the interpretive schemata

based on identities and collective action frames that ‘define issues, goals, and targets’ (Kolins Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010, 4).⁵ These innovations can diffuse through relational channels, such as ‘interpersonal contacts, organizational linkages, or associational networks’ (Tarrow 2005), nonrelational channels (e.g. communication channels such as mass media and Internet), or brokerage by a third actor.

Bourne and Chatzopoulou (2015) argue that political actors’ (including both party and non-party organizations) transnationalization (understood as ‘Europeanization’) ‘occurs when movements collaborate or make horizontal communicative linkages with movements in other countries, contest authorities beyond the state, frame issues as European and claim a European identity’ (2015, 34). In this sense, the EU arena offers new possible protest targets and a shared space of contention for collective actors from across the EU member states (Monforte 2014).

Finally, looking also at political parties, scholars qualify activism as transnational when organizations from more than one country place a similar discursive emphasis on issues (Froio and Ganesh 2019). Focusing on common issues (such as immigration or European integration) is a preliminary step in building the necessary interpretative ‘frames’, i.e. interpretations of social reality elaborated by the leaders of organizations who orient activists’ actions, as well as broader coalitions and mobilizations.

In this article, we argue that although born within the literature on social movements and contention, these concepts can be applied to any other kind of collective actors, whether they are political parties acting within the cultural public sphere beyond elections or ‘movement parties’ (such as some of the actors analyzed in this study). Building on these scholars’ insights, we suggest that the transnationalization of the far right in Europe can take at least three forms (or trajectories), which can also be understood as processes of mainstreaming, namely diffusing widely: transnationalization in terms of networks and organizations, in terms of common identity developments and framing on transnational (i.e. European) issues and in terms of coordinated actions.

3. Method and cases

Conceptually, we draw from a collective action approach to the European far right as a social movement (Caiani 2018; Minkenberg 2019), and the chosen methods follow from this. Our approach to data generation draws on the interpretive research practice of triangulation of sources and data on the far right (Volk 2025). Here in detail, we trace the transnationalization processes of three key organizational types of far right in Italy: the far-right political party Fratelli d’Italia (Fdi),⁶ two far-right social movement organizations (Gl Generazione Identitaria Italia,⁷ (Nissen 2022) and CasaPound⁸) and one hybrid ‘movement party’ (Minkenberg 2019)⁹ that employs social movement strategies and repertoires.¹⁰ These are analytical categories that can empirically overlap and can all be considered ‘backlash movements’ (della Porta 2020). Our empirical focus reflects the selection of different cases where the identification of common trends is unexpected (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The broad case selection allows us to assess common trends regarding how these diverse political players relate to transnational politics. For instance, none of the cases are ‘technical campaigns’ that lobby EU institutions (Parks 2015); rather, they are examples of collective actors which, under one form or another,

'transnationalize'. Moreover, all our cases have received widespread international media attention, which underlines their empirical relevance.

Methodologically, aiming for the 'detailed, thick and holistic elaboration of the case', we therefore rely on several methods and sources: secondary literature about our cases; organizations' online and offline publications (such as mission statements, blogs, manifestos, and books) analysis that articulate how organizations relate to transnational politics, particularly Europe¹¹; a qualitative (della Porta et al. 2023) and quantitative (Hutter 2014) *protest event analysis* drawing on a search of news reports to observe the recent evolution of the transnational mobilization of far-right actors (2008–2022); and, finally, semi-structured *interviews* with different types of far-right organizations (political parties, movements and movement-parties), which also provide us with information on how these actors the opportunities and constraints of the transnational arena of contention. For methodological details on the methods applied, see Tables A, B and C in the online appendix.

4. Empirical analysis: the slow and multifaceted transnationalization of the far right

Until recently, the primary focus of far-right mobilization in Italy and Europe has been the domestic and largely local level (Figure A1 in the online appendix). From 2005 to 2009, out of 1,465 registered 'protest events' organized by a far right actor in Europe, some 28.4% had a national scope, 39.5% were organized by a right-wing national actor and 33.4% had a national target. In addition, 66.2% of the total events have a local scope, 57.4% are initiated by a local actor while 53.9% have a local target (Caiani and Parenti 2013, Ch 5). Only 3.1% of the total registered events in the aforementioned European countries have a transnational actor initiating the event, 6.5% a transnational target and 5.4% a transnational scope of the mobilization. These numbers even decrease as regards Italy: of 338 far right 'protest events' identified in the referred time frame (2005–08), only 0.6% ($N = 2$) of events have a 'transnational actor' which initiate them; 3.6% events ($N = 12$) have 'transnational target'; and, finally, 4.7% of events ($N = 16$) have a 'transnational scope of the mobilization'. Although the sovranational practices are still (at least those reported in newspapers), further analyses also show significant signs of an emerging transnationalization of the far right over time (either in terms of targets, actors and scope of the mobilization) (Figure B in the online appendix). In fact, moving to the most recent years, we observe that there has been a significant increase in the transnational mobilization of various types of far right organizations (Table 1): 160 'transnational

Table 1. The transnationalization of far right mobilization, by type, 2008–22 (Italy).

<i>Types of far right organizations in Italy</i>	Number of far right 'transnational' protest events
Far right political parties	60
Far right social movements	42
Generic references/individuals/anonymous far right actors	36
Farr right 'Movement-parties'	22
	(N tot = 160)

Source: our data from Protest Event Analysis. The absolute number of 'transnational' protest events (which sum up events characterized by having a 'transnational actors', a 'transnational scope of the mobilization/issue', or a 'transnational targets') is showed, per subsectors.

protest events' initiated by far-right groups were identified in Italy between 2008 and 2022. This is true for all the different sub-sectors of the far right, although pertain mainly far right political parties, which emerge as the champion of sovranational orientation in their political action.

Although we must admit that transnational far right events remain much less frequent than national or local political events, as also recent research confirms (see table A2 in the online appendix), these types of transnational right-wing protest events are variegated, including events like political rallies and assemblies like the 'Conservative Political Action Conference', organized in Budapest by many political party leaders and movements (19–20/05/2022 La Repubblica), the 'REUROPA tour' organized in Rome (01–31/05/2019), grouping Italian and European neo-fascists (including Russian sympathizers) around conspiracy theory topics as well as foreign politics – but also cultural events, such as the Edmund Burke Foundation Conference (01/02/2020), or the Fortress Europe cultural and musical event, bringing together far right youth in Verona (09/07/2022).

Moving from an 'epidemic' (i.e. formalized, quantitative) to a 'narrative' approach, we can observe several aspects of the transnationalization trends of the far right, that are usually under-represented in 'protest event analyses'.

4.1 (Case 1) Far right political parties: Fratelli d'Italia

4.1.1 Transnational identity frames

The political party Fratelli d'Italia (Fdl) ideologically appertains to the far right within the Italian party system, with origins in neo-fascist or post-fascist political parties and social movements. However, the terms 'post-fascist' and 'neo-fascist' often fail to grasp the nuances of Fdl's ideological positioning (Donà 2022). An analysis of various documents generated by the party since its establishment in 2012, including its electoral platforms, party congress speeches, and other similar sources, shows that after an anti-EU radicalization in the period from 2014 to 2018, Fdl has moderated its Euroscepticism, softening its position to a 'Europe of sovereign nations' (Vampa 2023). As noted by many authors, the EU-related trajectory reflected the dynamics of economic and other crises that hit the European Union (Piccolino and Puleo 2022).

Analyzing the Trieste Theses (*Tesi di Trieste*), a programmatic manifesto created during the Fdl's second congress in 2017, strong anti-EU stances are identifiable, including policy proposals to facilitate Italy's exit from the Eurozone (Baldini, Tronconi, and Angelucci 2022). Contrastingly, more recent Fdl statements acknowledge the need for the EU on the global geopolitical stage and EU member states' need for collaboration in foreign affairs and defense (Steven and Szczerbiak 2023). Overall, Fdl still opposes a federal model of the EU and accuses the EU of being overly bureaucratic while posing a threat to national identity (Sondel-Cedarmas 2022). As Fdl has raised its profile, becoming one of the leading parties within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) in the European Parliament, it has also begun to emphasize the notion of a 'Europe of sovereign nations', where everything save the governance over borders and security is left to the autonomy of the member states (Sondel-Cedarmas 2022). In the same manifesto, Fdl aligns itself with Central European countries with strong radical-right mobilization potential. Accordingly, they 'look with attention to the "Visegrád group", of which Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are already members, and which could soon

be joined by Austria, as a symbol of opposition to the bureaucratic degeneration of the European Union and the defense of real and historical Europe' (Fratelli D'Italia 2017). Fdl's alternative vision of the European Union frames it as a historical 'civilizational' project existing despite foreign influence, especially coming from the process of 'Islamization'. Fdl's openly Islamophobic and nativist discourse chimes with the identitarian mobilizations present in Central Europe.

4.1.2 Transnational networking and events

The formation and development of Fdl are closely intertwined with other far right social movements and political parties across Europe. Transnational collaboration is not simply an add-on to the domestic activities of Fdl but is also a source of inspiration and access to various resources (Int. 1, 2). A case in point is Giorgia Meloni's active participation in the Atreju Festival, an event established in 1998 by the youth branch of Fdl's direct predecessor Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and which has hosted high-profile international political figures such as Steve Bannon and Viktor Orbán. Of particular historical importance is the relationship between Fdl and the French far right, which arguably dates back to the 1950s, when in the wake of the post-war period, far right actors started to try to rebuild the so-called 'Black International', continuing for several decades of mutual collaboration and help (Schir 2022). The Italian Social Movement (MSI), although electorally weak at home, became a role model for the French far right, which founded the National Front (FN), (now known as National Rally) following the example and the symbolism of MSI (Schir 2022).

At the same time, Fdl has been internationally vocal about supporting the Hungarian governing party Fidesz and its leader, Viktor Orbán, who has had long-standing controversies. (Int.1). Giorgia Meloni has maintained a very close relationship with the Hungarian far right movement, whose events she regularly attends as a guest of honor. During a recent wave of criticism, when 15 EU member states and the European Parliament joined a legal case against Hungary for its anti-LGBT legislation, Meloni decided not to add Italy to the lawsuit. Similarly, Fdl has been developing a close relationship with Law and Justice (PiS), the far right party previously governing Poland (Int.2, 3). In an interview with the Italian national broadcaster in Rome, Polish, and PiS-aligned president Andrzej Duda said, 'I am Andrzej, I am a man, I am a father, I am a Catholic', echoing Meloni's famous speech (Tilles 2022). Often, these leaders expressed their shared position with respect to building a 'Europe of strong states' (Tilles 2022).

Another key Fdl international partner is the Spanish far right party Vox. Given Vox's strong nationalistic leaning and The League's moderate support for Catalan independence, the Spanish party found a stronger rationale for collaborating with Fdl. On closer examination, a shifting of the language in both parties can be identified from using terms like 'nationalism' to 'patriotism' and 'sovereignism', as well as a diminishing centrality of religion and religiousness in their strategic framing (Botti 2022). On an EU level, Fdl won over 6% of the election vote for the European Parliament in 2019, where it operates as part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). Fdl's decision to join the ECR, perceived as less far right than ID, can be interpreted as an attempt by Meloni to construct a more moderate image of herself on the European plane (Vampa 2023).

Giorgia Meloni has invested ample time and energy in building up her profile in international far right events, including the National Conservatism Conference, the first edition of which was organized in Rome in 2020 by a conservative think-tank, the Edmund

Burke Foundation. Analyzing her speech, we see that unlike its predecessor, the MSI, FdI fully embraces neoliberalism and market fundamentalism as part of its ideological stance (Broder 2023). Due to the constant participation in coordinated international political events, Meloni has positioned her party within a wider right-wing alliance, including US Republican Donald Trump and many other right-wing parties in Europe, as Vox in Spain. In general, during her speeches at these events, she frames the necessity of constructing and fortifying European ‘civilization’ as key to persevering against totalitarian cosmopolitanism and internationalism (Int. 3).

4.2 (Case 2) Far right social movements: CasaPound/Generation identity – Italy

4.2.1 Transnational identity frames

Generazione Identitaria (GI) was founded on 21 November 2012 in Turin as the Italian branch of the French-based *Génération Identitaire*, at the time when such branches were already active in Austria and Germany. The Italian GI defines itself as ‘young Italian patriots motivated by a love of their country and a determination to save its culture, environment, and sovereignty through militant action’ (Generazione Identitaria n.d.). Despite limited resources and organizational strength, Italian GI branches created a coherent mobilizational framework around several central topics (Jacquet-Vaillant 2021). Similar to its international partners, Italian GI invested its energy into diffusing the myth of the ‘great replacement’, which claims that immigration is part of the conspiracy to change the ethnic structure of European countries and to spread Islam.¹² According to the group, ‘European nations need to fight together against the “great replacement”’. This framing comprises four interconnected types of perceived threats: cultural threat, alluding to the loss of European cultural identity; demographic threat, related to the biological substitution and extinction of ‘autochthonous’ Europeans; economic threat, linked to the alleged exploitation of European welfare by immigrants; and security threat, associated with the claim that ethnic diversity will inevitably increase terrorism (Nissen 2022). One of the specificities of GI’s framing is the emphasis on pan-European solidarity and the importance of overcoming intra-European conflicts, all of which should unite European peoples in a common struggle against these perceived threats.

4.2.2 Transnational networking and events

Given its strong transnational identity, the establishment of the Italian GI had to be coordinated with the original French GI organization to grow into a pan-European network. As mentioned in the existing research, French GI set different conditions for all newly emerging national groups, including Italy (Jacquet-Vaillant 2021). At its peak, the Italian GI had relatively limited resources (Int. 10) compared to its French and Austrian counterparts, managing to recruit around 150 members (Bruns, Glösel, and Strobl 2017). It took part in all major transnational events of the Generation Identity-Identitarian Movement. One of the well-documented cases is the ‘Defend Europe’ action, which GI organized on 17 July 2017 when a group of GI activists boarded a ship with the aim of supervising a refugee-related rescue undertaken by NGO ships situated in the Mediterranean. GI funded the action autonomously through an international crowdfunding campaign through which they raised the €70k necessary to cover the action costs (Musolino 2017). Correspondingly, the Italian GI co-organized an event in the European

Parliament, which was another opportunity to promote its activities (Generazione Identitaria 2018). In addition, two subsequent 'Defend Europe' missions – the first in 2018 on the French-Italian border in the Alps and the second in 2021 on the French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees – had an essential symbolic aim of raising the profile of GI in the international media (Keşkekci and Nissen 2023). GI, thus, undertakes a two-level game strategy (domestic-transnational). Furthermore, their protest style includes tactics similar to other identitarian movements in European countries, such as using stickers to express political messages in public spaces. For example, in 2018, GI affixed stickers reading '*islamizzazione*' (Islamisation) to stop signs in many Italian city centers (Sima 2021).

4.2.3 Transnational identity frames

CasaPound Italia (CPI) is one of Italy's most visible far right groups. Its ideological positioning can be described as neofascist, although it is sometimes incoherent and contradictory (Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2015). Like other far right actors, CPI often problematizes the 'great replacement' process within the European continent, characterizing it as an outcome of mobility caused by increased globalization. Comparative research has shown that communicative strategies of CPI share several similarities with other far right groups across Europe (e.g. with Les Identitaires in France, Castelli Gattinara and Bouron 2020), using consistent symbolism (borrowed from Nazism, McSwiney et al. 2021) and 'branding' to strengthen the collective sense of belonging among their members, and, on external communication strategy, allocating resources to create narratives that can easily attract attention without having to rely on traditional news media. In general, CasaPound has always consumed foreign trends and repackaged them for an Italian audience: it absorbed the anti-capitalist ideas of France's Nouvelle Droite movement and built friendships with members of Greece's neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (de Jonge 2021). CasaPound has also promoted initiatives outside Italy through its non-profit organization Solidarité Identités. Although on foreign policy, CPI's core beliefs include fondness for Russia and sharp opposition to the EU, globalization, and immigration, the group defines itself as a pro-European organization – supporting a communitarian-nationalist Europe. This element connects them to the tradition of the neo-fascist right dating back to the early 1950s, when fascist groups were transnational actors proposing an ideal European nation-state based on shared traditions and homogeneous cultures and values.

4.2.4 Transnational networking and events

Though less transnational when compared to projects such as GI Italia, CPI became an important model for the far right across Europe with specific references identified in Germany and Spain (Int.6 and 3). Indeed, CPI's leaders have been invited to explain its 'political model' in many major European capitals (Paris, Madrid, London, Lisbon, Brussels, Warsaw)". As one of our expert interviews explain, CPI has, since 2006, taken part in *Zentropa*, a network of political and cultural activists that have participated in developing and sustaining various far right projects. In light of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it is important to note that CPI previously participated in pan-European conferences, which took place in 2017 and 2018 in Kyiv, also as a hosting institution (in 2016). CPI has also

participated in the European Solidarity Front for Syria, one of the most vocal European networks of organizations and groups supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Koch, 2020).

4.3 (Case 3) Far right ‘movement-parties’: Forza Nuova

4.3.1 Transnational identity frames

The far right political party Forza Nuova (FN), established in 1997, centers its political party platform around eight key priorities, mainly based on law and order and conservative values as well as sharp anti-immigration stances (but also against the ‘usury’ of the banking system) (Forza Nuova n.d.). It is a neo-fascist party with explicitly racist, xenophobic and authoritarian political rhetoric. Given its continuous activity at the EU level and EU parliamentary elections, FN positions itself as pro-European in the sense of promoting collaboration among ‘authentic’ European nations (despite its leader’s occasional anti-EU rejectionist positions, Int.7¹³ (Castelli Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro 2022)). Like the other subtypes of far right actors hitherto analyzed, it presents common core elements of transnational identities: the presence of a positive (from moderate to strong) identification with Europe, strong criticism of actual European integration (both in terms of policies and institutions),¹⁴ identification of Europe with culturally exclusive slants and, finally, affinity towards nationalism (in the form of ethnonationalism and conservative values) (Int. 3). In this sense, they are ‘pro-European nativists’ (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022).

4.3.2 Transnational networking and events

Since its establishment in 1997, FN has been part of different European networks and groups in various periods. On the European level, FN was particularly active in the period between 2005 and 2009, when it participated in the creation of the European National Front, with FN leader Roberto Fiore serving as general secretary and, for a brief period between 2008 and 2009, as a member of the European Parliament. In light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is important to note that, like many other far right actors in Italy, FN has a long historical relationship with Putin and Russia. In 2008, along with a German far right party representative, Fiore praised Putin’s policies. Even after Russia annexed Ukraine, Roberto Fiore was also a prominent guest in a series of events in Russia in late 2014 and early 2015 (Savino and Laruelle 2015). The long-standing support for Putin was recently corroborated in an analysis of FN social network activity, indicating a pro-Putin positioning of most of FN’s militants on Facebook (Guerra 2023). For FN militants, Putin is a ‘new Duce’ who fights against supposedly increasing liberal prevalence over conservative values (Guerra 2023).

On top of having local offices in most Italian cities, FN has kept international links with various far right actors in different European countries, developing a transnational network of collaborations and predominantly small and local initiatives (Caiani and Parenti 2013). The FN leader, Roberto Fiore, who spent most of the 1980s and 1990s in the UK, created many contacts and friendships with UK far right figures, such as Nick Griffin, who was the leader of the far right British National Party until 2014.

5. Routes of transnationalization of the far right in the European public sphere: comparison and discussion

Comparing different subsectors of the far right indicates similarities and differences in various actors' engagement in transnationalization, also showing some prevalent paths. How far right actors *frame* their transnationalization is often related to the nativist and civilizationist discourse around the preservation of Europe (Brubaker 2017). Although attentively emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty, actors frequently claim that transnational collaboration is necessary. The far right constructs transnational collective identities around the need for nationalists (or patriots) to heroically defend Europe with the goal of safeguarding the European civilization and thus, the various nation-states, despite facing strong opposition (i.e. they construct their identity around victimhood and battle frames). These groups' general orientations toward a European project function as frames that can facilitate large-scale coalition-building by overcoming internal conflicts over more specific issues (e.g. competing national identities and historical conflicts). A similar logic is also common to right-wing populists in the East (Brubaker 2017). This is particularly prevalent in the framing of the *political party* Fratelli d'Italia (Fdi), especially after coming into power in October 2022. *Far right movements* exhibit significant variation when compared.

On the one hand, there are movements such as the Italian branch of *Generazione Identitaria*, which prominently centers its organizational identity on transnational collaboration. On the other hand, movements such as *CasaPound* are much less inclined to promote transnational cooperation. However, none of the far right movements advocate stopping EU integration or leaving the EU, which has already been noted as a general trend in research (Van Kessel et al. 2020). When it comes to *networks*, differences can be observed in terms of coordination and centralization, as well as resource-sharing. While far right political parties, such as Fdi, can easily rely on the EU parliament groupings and related infrastructure, organizing and sharing resources for political movements is much more complicated. Finally, all actors combine three types of transnational *events*: political rallies and assemblies, educational events and transnational protest events. It is, however, essential to note that transnational protest events seem to be particularly hard to organize and do not happen very often. While actors can share framing and best practices, organizing events that coincide in different countries and share a fairly unified message is more challenging.

In sum, we found various 'paths' of transnationalization of far right actors. Some focus on events, others focus on frames and common issues, and others even build transnational organizations networks (Table 2). They can represent as many mainstreaming mechanisms of the far right in Europe.

Table 2. Routes of transnationalization of the far right in Italy: a summary.

Types of far right organizations (Italy)	Dimensions of transnationalization		
	Transnational Identity Frames	Transnational networking	Transnational events
Far right political parties (Case 1 , Fdi)	XX	XX	XX
Far right movements (Case 2 , CP, GI)	XX	X	X
Far right 'movement- parties' (Case 3 , FN)	XX	XX	X

Legend: - = 'absent/scarcely present'; x = 'weak/moderate', xx = 'strong'.

6. Conclusion: toward varieties of transnationalization of the far right

In Europe, we are currently witnessing the emergence of a new political elite whose core values and ideas were historically marginalized after the Second World War. This phenomenon, commonly referred to as the resurgence of far-right political parties, is often characterized as a cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) or the onset of a fourth wave of far-right political movements (Mudde 2019).

This article explored the link between far right transnationalization and its potential mainstreaming. It addressed the question of to what extent and how various types of far right actors, including both political parties and social movement organizations, align with 'mainstream' trends of transnationalization of politics and consequently of political mobilization (already well known and studied for what concerns left-wing progressive actors and more of a 'taboo', until recently for what concern the nativist forces). Drawing from a social movement approach, the article contributes a novel operationalization of the mainstreaming of the far right in terms of (potential) 'discourse coalitions' and 'protest alliances', with 'civilization' frames on Europe working as a symbolic glue among the far right across countries, concerning both mainstream and fringe actors on the extreme right. We argue that a collective action approach to the far right as a social movement (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012), especially an approach that focuses on 'agents' and the symbolic/cultural construction of the socio political reality (Caiani 2023; Jasper 2004), and that looks – as we try to do in this article – at how far-right groups work together to create meaning as well as at 'alliance formation processes' (Volk 2025 on gender, but also Caiani and Tranfić 2024) can help us understand how the far right is becoming more mainstream, and therefore 'normalize'.

In the last two decades, social sciences have decisively shaped debates on right-wing populism and its relation to democracy backlash. With the emergence of right-wing populist movements, scholars have also started paying attention to far-right strategies for disseminating right-wing extremist content and ideology in the public sphere (Hochschild 2016). In this article, focusing on varieties of 'backsliding far right organizations', we have analyzed the renewed importance of transnational (European) identities (frames), networks, and strategies for far-right collective actors as a means for their mainstreaming (i.e. wide diffusion). Our analysis does not offer a definitive answer, solution or strategy for dealing with the assumption that the transnationalization of far-right politics can increase the normalization and mainstreaming capacity of these forces; however, our data do highlight some common features in the discourses and practices of the current far-right (at least in the Italian case analysed) that are worth highlighting. First, our research suggests that the transnationalisation of the far right is an increasing and widespread phenomenon across different types of institutional and non-institutional extreme right organisations. Second, the study suggests that it is a multifaceted phenomenon, both in terms of the types of actors involved and in terms of different aspects. Indeed, as the analysis of our cases has shown, the extent of the transnationalization of the far right needs to be qualified, not only in terms of degree (the 'how much') but also in terms of forms (the roads to, 'the how'). Indeed, each of our four cases turned out to be highly transnationalized in one way or another. Our categorization, which distinguishes the 'transnationalisation' of these actors' politics in terms of frameworks, networks and events, seems to work well in this respect, as: *i.* it underlines that there can be different

trajectories towards the same 'outcome', but also, *ii.* that the relationship between one dimension and another is not always obvious. As shown, the data analyzed provide strong evidence of the diachronic evolution of each collective actor and their increasing investment in pan-European frames. It resonates well with the semi-structured interviews with experts and notable far-right actors. The main point of coordinated transnational action being an increasingly widespread source for legitimation emerged from different standpoints. Shared frames and transformative joint events can shed an innovative light on the current strengthening of far-right organizations in mainstream public discourse throughout Europe, and this often is the intention of the agents. However, the extent of cross-border activities and networking results is somewhat limited, even in cases of relatively strong transnationally developing identities. Joint protest events (the third dimension of transnationalization analysed), for example, remain still relatively rare, as both the PEA and the analysis of documents and interviews pointed out, for all varieties of the Italian far right (for similar results in other European countries).

Moreover, the relationship between far-right groups and transnational politics appeared often multi-level, according to a double-level game (national-supranational or better, often 'trans-local'), both in terms of actions, issues and networks. This confirms what research on (left-liberal) social movements has already underlined (della Porta and Kriesi 1999), but also that the transnational sphere is still a challenging endeavour for the far right, beyond being an opportunity to expand its cause worldwide.

Future studies, comparing more countries and actors, should explore the extent to which our conceptual framework and concepts, borrowed from social movement research, travel and apply beyond this single qualitative case study and among different types of collective actors, thus helping us to understand the normalisation of these forces. In particular, we should elaborate more hypotheses – still lacking in the current literature on transnationalism – on the potential interaction among the three types or mechanisms of transnationalization here analyzed as they stand side-by-side: via networks, shared frames and joint protest events. How do these mechanisms relate to one another conceptually? Are all three independent? Are they conditional on one another? From signals seen in our analysis, we can expect that the three pathways to far-right transnationalisation that we outline may be interdependent. Once triggered, the mechanisms associated with the pathways may also trigger each other, occurring in a dynamic cycle of reinforcement. For example, research has shown (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022) that the general orientation of these groups towards a European project (the 'pro-European' nativist frame) can act as a frame that can facilitate large-scale coalition-building across borders – thus overcoming internal conflicts over more specific issues (e.g. competing national identities and historical conflicts). Indeed, for far-right groups, as seen, pro-Europeanism and opposition to the perceived threat of Islam facilitated transnational coordination, thereby attenuating competing national identities and historical conflicts. However, we have also seen that the link from one dimension or step of transnationalisation to another is neither automatic nor to be taken for granted: transnational identity frames and coordination efforts as examples of coalition building did not necessarily lead to strong 'transnational practices' (i.e. joint or coordinated events). As emphasized in the text and shown by our analysis of protest events, with the exception of party and leaders rallies, although all our cases had some 'transnational reach', the extent

of cross-border activity was rather limited, especially when compared to activities at the national level. Whether strong European identities on the far right will contribute to increased transnational practices in the long run remains to be seen, as do the recent EU election results, which still show the far right in action. Moreover, the role of emotions (in these processes of transnationalisation), moving from the meso- to the micro-level (Fillieule 2025), through biographical interviews with far-right activists and individuals, remains to be explored (for some exceptions, see Fangen and Weisskircher 2024). Indeed, emotional relations to places (Jasper 2019) are a central practice of far-right social movements, as spaces influence both organizational in-group/out-group dynamics and strategic considerations about the possibility of using different action strategies.

The mainstreaming of the radical right occurs in different ways. First, the mainstreaming may involve the normalization of political parties that were once pariahs, shunned by society because of their extreme right-wing political ideologies. These parties may now have become accepted and integrated into wider society. Second, mainstreaming can also involve the radicalization of centre-right parties, a phenomenon often attributed to their strategy of capturing the electorate of radical right parties. In this context, the ideas and values previously considered extreme have become an acceptable part of the liberal democratic discourse. In this article, we argue a third path, which is transnationalization of political mobilization and discourse and therefore legitimization vis a vis a broader audience.

Finally, our analysis contributes to critical approaches to the concepts of 'far right' as well as 'mainstream'. Underscoring the importance of transnationalization issue for far-right mobilization, our findings address a gap in theorizing about the far right: Whereas the centrality of nation/nativism in the far right has long been emphasized, dominant definitions yet do not refer to it, overcoming an important and dominant process which appear as a constitutive element of the current radical right world white (for similar argument in Latin America see, Kaltwasser and Sandoval 2024).

The far right is on the rise and increasingly consolidated (and united?) across Europe.¹⁵ They are likely to increase a shared agenda (and agenda setting capacity) characterized, commonly across borders by their exclusionary, anti-egalitarian, racist, misogynist and anti-democratic messages embedded in their exclusive, although positive and pro, European visions (for instance of commonalities on European environmental issues, see Caiani and Lubarda 2023). Although these organizations are sometimes still in competition with each other (see at the EU level after the last EU elections, Selcen 2023) – the European arena and institutions can be used by far-right groups to establish contacts with similar groups, spread their ideology and promote mobilization. These aspects are fundamental to consider, as the transnational orientation of the far right may lead to a stronger European far right public sphere, in contrast to the one envisaged by the EU.

Notes

1. In this article, we use the broad and inclusive meaning of the 'far-right' category, which encompasses other labels commonly used in the literature such as 'radical right' or 'populist radical right' (Wondreys and Mudde 2022). This deliberately includes political party and non-party organizations (Mudde 2019).

2. Such as those studies focused on far right political parties 'Europeanisation' (e.g. McDonnell and Werner 2020).
3. Such as those studies focusing on transnationalism and political mobilisation of far right (identitarian, anti Islamic) social movements (e.g. Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016; Nissen 2022); or those studies focusing on the use of social media by far right actors for the transnationalization of ('illiberal') contents (e.g. Heft et al. 2023; Ahmed and Pisiou 2021, Davis 2019) and networks (e.g. Törnberg and Nissen 2023).
4. For our frame-analytical lens through which we look at the development of transnational (i.e. European) identity, we draw on the work of D. A. Snow and Benford.
5. Scholars qualify activism as transnational when organizations from more than one country place similar discursive emphasis on particular issues (e.g. Froio and Ganesh 2019). Focusing on common issues (such as immigration or European integration) is a preliminary step in the construction of the necessary interpretative frames, i.e. interpretations of social reality elaborated by the leaders of organizations who orient activists' actions.
6. *The political party Fratelli d'Italia (Fdi)* ideologically appertains to the far right within the Italian party system, with origins in neo-fascist or post-fascist political parties and social movements. However, the terms 'post-fascist' and 'neo-fascist' mostly fail to grasp nuances of Fdi's ideological positioning (Donà 2022): while initially developed as a conservative party, after the second party congress in 2017, Fdi transformed its profile into a fully-fledged far right party, endorsing nativism, sovereignty, authoritarianism, and anti-EU positioning. After years of marginalization as a 'niche' party or pariah, in 2022, Fdi won the Italian national election, with her leader, Giorgia Meloni, becoming the country's prime minister.
7. *GI Generazione Identitaria Italia* is commonly considered as the best example of Europeanized far right social movements or extra parliamentary far right organizations in Europe (Nissen 2022). It is in fact one of the few examples of the identitarian scene in Southern Europe. Since 2012, several *Generazione Identitaria* groups have been established in Italy; they draw heavily from their high-profile Rome-based neo-fascist *CasaPound* forerunners and also have French inspiration. They have adopted the identitarian corporate identity including the main themes of *Reconquista*, ethno-pluralism, and support for youth sport.
8. *CasaPound Italia* is a neo-fascist movement openly inspired by historical Fascism. While its electoral force in Italy remain marginal, *CasaPound* has developed a network of activists in multiple Italian cities. Given its nativist nature, *CasaPound* has received a significant media attention for its manifestations against migration, Roma population and LGBTQ rights. Although some scholars consider it as a movement-party (Pirro and Gattinara 2018), in this paper we wanted to emphasize its movementistic nature which is commonly recognized.

CasaPound remains substantially marginal from an electoral point of view, its visibility in the Italian system is symptomatic of the ability of the extreme right to assimilate populist and alternative agendas in order to increase the attractiveness of their communication campaigns (www.populismstudies.org, 2021). We chose two social movements in order to increase the validity of the data, given the number and heterogeneity of possible 'units of analysis' within this category in the country (e.g. Caiani and Parenti 2013), and to 'saturate' the field with the data collection. We are aware that comparing the transnational scope of a national organisation born from the local level and the Italian branch of an already transnational project could be seen as inherently biased, but we did it in order to increase the 'variance' in our research design across different types of organisations. Finally, we deliberately excluded the Lega party, as its inclusion in the far-right or populist-right category is debated among scholars (e.g. see the Populist, <https://popu-list.org/>).
9. 'Movement parties', as a new type of political organization that is also spreading among the far right, have proven effective in mobilizing voters. They participate in elections to obtain representation, while simultaneously mobilizing public support by adopting action strategies and organizational forms similar to movements (Caiani and Cisar 2018).
10. Being one of the oldest far-right parties in Italy, *Forza Nuova* ideology is neofascist, conservative and ultra-nationalist. Under the leadership of its founder, Roberto Fiore, the party

follows a dual strategy by organizing various protest mobilizations, while simultaneously participating in elections.

11. For framing theory applied to the far right, we follow Caiani and della Porta 2011.
12. Although it is noteworthy that the same framing has also been used by Italian right-wing political officials such as Giorgia Meloni, Matteo Salvini and Francesco Lollobrigida. <https://www.wired.it/article/sostituzione-etnica-teoria-del-complotto/>.
13. FN proposes transforming the EU into a type of intergovernmental set of relationships among sovereign member states (Int.7).
14. For example, according to the leader of FN Castellini, the EU's immigration policy constitutes a conspiracy against the people of the EU, consisting of 'forced migration which no longer allows states to close their borders, hence designed to bring about an invasion of Europe and an ethnic substitution of peoples' (Int.7).
15. The section on Fdl affirms its closeness to Viktor Orban and the Spanish Vox, but Meloni's party sits with neither of them following the latest EP elections.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

- Ahmed, R., and D. Pisiou. 2021. "Uniting the Far Right: How the Far-Right Extremist, New Right, and Populist Frames Overlap on Twitter—a German Case Study." *European Societies* 23 (2): 232–254. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2020.1818112>.
- Anievas, A., and S. Richard. 2023. "The Far-Right in World Politics/World Politics in the Far-Right." *Globalizations* 20 (5): 715–730. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2022.2035061>.
- Baldini, G., F. Tronconi, and D. Angelucci. 2022. "Yet Another Populist Party? Understanding the Rise of Brothers of Italy." *South European Society & Politics* 27 (3): 385–405.
- Berntzen, L., and M. Weisskircher. 2016. "Anti-Islamic PEGIDA Beyond Germany: Explaining Differences in Mobilisation." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 37 (6): 556–573.
- Botti, A. 2022. "Meloni, Vox e le Metamorfosi del Nazionalismo." October 19. <https://www.rivistailmulino.it/a/meloni-vox-e-le-metamorfosi-del-nazionalismo>.
- Bourne, A., and S. Chatzopoulou. 2015. "Europeanization and Social Movement Mobilization During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Cases of Spain and Greece." *Recerca* 2015 (17): 33–60. <https://doi.org/10.6035/Recerca.2015.17.3>.
- Broder, D. 2023. *Mussolini's Grandchildren: Fascism in Contemporary Italy*. London: Pluto Press.
- Brown, K., A. Mondon, and A. Winter. 2023. "The Far Right, the Mainstream and Mainstreaming: Towards a Heuristic Framework." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 28 (2): 162–179. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1949829>.
- Brubaker, R. 2017. "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (8): 1191–1226. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700>.
- Bruns, J., K. Glösel, and N. Strobl. 2017. "More Than Just an Online Phenomenon: Roots, Characteristics and Strategies of the «Identitarian Movement»." https://biwaz.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/paper_gloesel_identitarianmovement.pdf.
- Caiani, M. 2018. "Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, edited by J. Rydgren, 394–411. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Caiani, M. 2023. "Framing and Social Movements." *Discourse Studies* 25 (2): 195–209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614456231154734>.
- Caiani, M. 2025. *La Transnazionalizzazione Della Destra Radicale: Identità, Reticoli, Conflitti*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Caiani, M., and O. Císař. 2018. *Radical Right Movements- Parties in Europe*. London: Routledge.

- Caiani, M. and della Porta, D. 2011. 'The Elitist Populism of the Extreme Right: A Frame Analysis of Extreme Right Wing Discourses in Italy and Germany', *Acta Politica*, 46 (2): 180-202.
- Caiani, M., D. della Porta, and C. Wagemann. 2012. *Mobilizing on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Caiani, M., and B. Lubarda. 2023. "Conditional Environmentalism of Right-Wing Populism in Power: Ideology and/or Opportunities?" *Environmental Politics* 33 (4): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2023.2242749>.
- Caiani, M., and L. Parenti. 2013. *European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet*. Abingdon, Ashgate: Palgrave.
- Caiani, M., and I. Tranfić. 2024. "Weaving the Transnational Anti-Gender Networks." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 29 (4): 423–439. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-29-4-423>.
- Caiani, M., and M. Weisskircher. 2022. "Anti-Nationalist Europeans and Pro-European Nativists on the Streets: Visions of Europe from the Left to the Far Right." *Social Movement Studies* 21 (1–2): 216–233. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.2010527>.
- Castelli Gattinara, P., and S. Bouron. 2020. "Extreme-Right Communication in Italy and France: Political Culture and Media Practices in CasaPound Italia and Les Identitaires." *Information, Communication & Society* 23 (12): 1805–1819. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1631370>.
- Castelli Gattinara, P., and C. Froio. 2015. "Discourse and Practice of Violence in the Italian Extreme Right: Frames, Symbols, and Identity-Building in CasaPound Italia." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 8 (1): 155–170.
- Castelli Gattinara, P., C. Froio, and A. L. P. Pirro. 2022. "Far-Right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities, and Resources." *European Journal of Political Research*, n. 61 (4): 1019–1041. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12484>.
- della Porta, D. 2024. *Regressive Movements in Times of Emergency: The Protests Against Anti-Contagion Measures and Vaccination During the Covid-19 Pandemic*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- de Jonge, L. 2021. *The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- della Porta, D. 2020. "Conceptualising Backlash Movements: A (Patch-Worked) Perspective from Social Movement Studies." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 22 (4): 585–597. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120947360>.
- della Porta, D. 2023. *Regressive Movements in Time of Emergency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- della Porta, D., and M. Diani. 2020. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- della Porta, D., and H. Kriesi. 1999. "Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An Introduction." In *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, edited by D. della Porta, 3–22. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- della Porta, D., A. Lavizzari, H. Reiter, M. Sommer, E. Steinhilper, and F. Ajayi. 2023. "Patterns of Adaptation and Recontextualisation: The Transnational Diffusion of Black Lives Matter to Italy and Germany." *European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology* 10 (4): 653–677. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2023.2239324>.
- della Porta, D., and A. Mattoni. 2014. *Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Donà, A. 2022. "The Rise of the Far Right in Italy: The Case of Fratelli d'Italia." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 27 (5): 775–794. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2022.2113216>.
- Ekström, M., M. Patrona, and J. Thornborrow. 2020. "The Normalization of the Populist Radical Right in News Interviews: A Study of Journalistic Reporting on the Swedish Democrats." *Social Semiotics* 30 (4): 466–484. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2020.1762984>.
- Fangen, K., and M. Weisskircher. 2024. "Reaching Out Beyond the National Border? How Far-Right Actors in Germany and Norway Evaluate Transnationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 30 (4): 683–699. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13021>.
- Fillieule, O. 2025. "Biographies as Method for Analysing Collective Action." Cosmos Talk, Scuola Normale Superiore. 29 Jan 2025. <https://cosmos.sns.it/>.
- Forza Nuova. n.d. *Chi Siamo*. Forza Nuova. <https://www.forzanuova1997.it/chi-siamo/>.

- Fratelli D'Italia. 2017. "La Tesi Di Trieste." Fratelli D'Italia. Accessed April 30, 2024. <https://www.giorgiameloni.it/tesitrieste/>.
- Froio, C., and B. Ganesh. 2019. "The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter." *European Societies* 21 (4): 513–539. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295>.
- Generazione Identitaria. 2018. *Bruxelles: Generazione Identitaria Intervenuta al Parlamento Europeo*. Generazione Identitaria. <https://generazione-identitaria.com/2018/02/bruxelles-generazione-identitaria-intervenuta-al-parlamento-europeo/>.
- Generazione Identitaria. n.d. *Chi Siamo*. Generazione Identitaria. <https://generazione-identitaria.com/chi-siamo/>.
- Guerra, N. 2023. "The Russia-Ukraine War Has Shattered the Italian Far Right." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 17 (3): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2023.2206468>.
- Heft, A., B. Pfetsch, V. Voskresenskii, and V. Benert. 2023. "Transnational Issue Agendas of the Far Right? Parties' Facebook Campaign Communication in Six Countries During the 2019 European Parliament Election." *European Journal of Communication* 38 (1): 22–42.
- Hochschild, A. R. 2016. "The Ecstatic Edge of Politics: Sociology and Donald Trump." *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 45 (6): 683–689. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306116671947>.
- Hutter, S. 2014. "Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring." In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by D. della Porta, 335–367. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jacquet-Vaillant, M. 2021. "An Identitarian Europe? Successes and Limits of the Diffusion of the French Identitarian Movement." *Illiberalism.org*.
- Jasper, J. 2004. "A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social Movement Choices." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 9 (1): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.9.1.m112677546p63361>.
- Jasper, J. 2019. *The Emotions of Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kallis, A. 2013. "Far-Right Contagion or a Failing Mainstream? How Dangerous Ideas Cross Borders and Blur Boundaries." *Democracy and Security* 9 (3): 221–246. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.792251>.
- Kaltwasser, C. R., and C. Sandoval. 2024. "Diffusion and Global Circulation of Populist Discourse." *Research Handbook on Populism* 540–550.
- Keşkekci, D., and A. Nissen. 2023. "Defend Europe and transnational activism, Global identitarianism." 75–89.
- Kolins Givan, R., K. Roberts, and S. Soule. 2010. "Introduction." In *The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*, edited by R. K. Givan, K. Roberts, and S. Soule, 1–19. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Krzyżanowski, M. 2020. "Discursive Shifts and the Normalisation of Racism: Imaginaries of Immigration, Moral Panics and the Discourse of Contemporary Right-Wing Populism." *Semiotics* 30 (4): 503–527. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2020.1766199>.
- McAdam, D., and D. Rucht. 1993. "The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (1): 56–74.
- McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McDonnell, D., and A. Werner. 2020. *International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McSwiney, J., M. Vaughan, A. Heft, and M. Hoffmann. 2021. "Sharing the Hate? Memes and Transnationality in the Far Right's Digital Visual Culture." *Information Communication & Society* 24 (16): 2502–2521.
- Minkenbergh, M. 2019. "Between Party and Movement: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations of the Radical Right's Organizational Boundaries and Mobilization Processes." *European Societies* 21 (4): 463–486. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494296>.
- Mondon, A., and A. Winter. 2020a. *Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream*. London New York: Verso.
- Monforte, P. 2014. *Europeanizing Contentious Politics: The Protest Against 'Fortress Europe' in France and Germany, Protest, Culture & Society*. Vol. 12. New York Oxford: Berghahn.
- Mudde, C. 2019. *The Far Right Today*. London: John Wiley & Sons.

- Musulino, L. 2017. "Migranti, Defend Europe: "Noi In Mare Per Sorvegliare E Contrastare Le ONG, Ma Se Salveremo Qualcuno Le Chiameremo"." *Il Fatto Quotidiano*. July 22, 2017. <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/07/22/migranti-defend-europe-noi-in-mare-per-sorvegliare-e-contrastare-le-ong-ma-se-salveremo-qualcuno-le-chiameremo/3745933/>.
- Nissen, A. 2022. *Europeanisation of the Contemporary Far Right: Generation Identity and Fortress Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Parks, L. 2015. *Social Movement Campaigns on EU Policy: In the Corridors and in the Streets*. London: Springer.
- Piccolino, G., and L. Puleo. 2022. "Between Far-Right Politics and Pragmatism: Assessing Fratelli d'Italia's Policy Agenda." *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog*. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/10/06/between-far-right-politics-and-pragmatism-assessing-fratelli-ditalias-policy-agenda>.
- Pirro, A. L. P., and P. C. Gattinara. 2018. "Movement Parties of the Far Right: The Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 23 (3): 367–383. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-23-3-367>.
- Savino, G., and M. Laruelle. 2015. "From Evola to Dugin: The Neo-Eurasianist Connection in Italy." *Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe–Russia Relationship*: 97–124.
- Schir, P. 2022. "The French Connections of the Italian Far Right, from the MSI to Fratelli d'Italia." *Illiberalism Studies Program*.
- Selcen, O. 2023. "Mainstreaming and Normalization of the Far-Right: Wind of Change Before the 2024 European Elections?" *Reset Dialogues*. December 19, 2023.
- Sima, K. 2021. "From Identity Politics to the Identitarian Movement." In *National Stereotyping, Identity Politics, European Crises*, edited by J. Barkhoff and J. Leerssen, 1–17. Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.
- Sondel-Cedarmas, J. 2022. "Giorgia Meloni's New Europe: Europe of Sovereign Nations in the Brothers of Italy Party Manifestos."
- Steven, M., and A. Szczesbiak. 2023. "Conservatism and 'Eurorealism' in the European Parliament: The European Conservatives and Reformists Under the Leadership of Poland's Law and Justice." *European Politics and Society* 24 (5): 585–602.
- Tarrow, S. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S. 2011. "Global, Conventional and Warring Movements and the Suppression of Contention. Themes in Contentious Politics Research." *Política & Sociedad* 10 (18): 25.
- Tarrow, S. 2021. *Movements and Parties: Critical Connections in American Political Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilles, D. 2022. ""I'm Andrzej, I'm a Man, a Father, a Catholic": Duda Hails Meloni on Italy Visit." Notes from Poland. October 21, 2022. <https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/10/21/im-andrzej-im-a-man-a-father-a-catholic-duda-hails-meloni-on-italy-visit/>.
- Törnberg, A., and A. Nissen. 2023. "Mobilizing Against Islam on Social Media: Hyperlink Networking Among European Far-Right Extra-Parliamentary Facebook Groups." *Information Communication & Society* 26 (15): 2904–2922. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2022.2118546>.
- Valentim, V. 2021. "Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (14): 2475–2511. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997159>.
- Vampa, D. 2023. *Brothers of Italy: A New Populist Wave in an Unstable Party System*. Springer.
- Van Kessel, S., N. Chelotti, H. Drake, J. Roch, and P. Rodi. 2020. "Eager to Leave? Populist Far Right Parties' Responses to the UK's Brexit Vote." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 22 (1): 65–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148119886213>.
- Volk, S. 2025. "Rallying 'Round the Drag: Anti-Gender Mobilization and the Mainstreaming of the Far Right." *European Societies* 27 (1): 59–82. https://doi.org/10.1162/euso_a_00009.
- Wodak, R. 2020. *The Politics of Fear: The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse*. 2nd ed. London: SAGE.
- Wondreys, J., and C. Mudde. 2022. "Victims of the Pandemic? European Far-Right Parties and COVID-19." *Nationalities Papers* 50 (1): 86–103.