

Oxford Handbooks Online

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation FREE

Manuela Caiani

The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right

Edited by Jens Rydgren

Print Publication Date: Apr 2018 Subject: Sociology, Political Sociology

Online Publication Date: Feb 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.20

Abstract and Keywords

Like many other political actors, the radical right is currently expanding beyond national borders, creating cross-national links and establishing international cooperation. To date, however, in sociology and political science there are few empirical analyses on the topic. This chapter aims to fill this gap by providing an overview of some scholarship (coming from social movement studies, history, sociology, and research on political parties) on the contemporary radical right, looking first of all at the level of contextual macro variables—that is, at the political opportunities European integration provides for the transnationalization of the radical right. Second, it suggests that another important mechanism (at the meso organizational level) for the development of cross-national radical right links and cooperation is the use of frames. Third, it considers the potential role of the Internet for the transnationalization of the current radical right.

Keywords: right-wing movements, international cooperation, European integration, social movement studies, cross-national radical right

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

LIKE many other political actors, the radical right is currently expanding beyond national borders, creating cross-national links and international cooperation (Wright 2009; Europol 2011). To date, however, in sociology and political science there are few empirical analyses on the topic. In fact, although left-wing internationalization is very well known and studied (e.g., Caiani and della Porta 2009), so far there has been scarce scientific attention to the right wing and especially to how the radical right responds to processes of transnationalization (for which European integration can be considered a regional case) (for important exceptions see Mudde 2007; Simmons 2003; Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012). However, there are good reasons to ask how the radical right responds to the challenges of transnational politics, not least since internationalization processes of all kind are contradictory to central myths of the right, namely, ethnonationalism and national identity. Whereas the preservation of national identities might have the least importance for the left, this is a central issue for the radical right (Simmons 2003, 1). Furthermore, internationalization processes are an important explanation for the recent dynamism of right-wing extremism in many West European democracies (e.g., Hermet 2001; Mény and Surel 2000, Kriesi 2008). Betz (1994) interprets contemporary radical-right politics as a “late modern populism,” while Minkenberg (1992, 56–58) sees it as a reaction against post-materialism and Heitmeyer (1992) refers to “anti-modernity/globalization” explanations. In addition, European integration is seen as having restructured social and cultural cleavages, developing an opposition between the positions of trans- and supranational integration and those of national demarcation, with radical right parties and movements supporting “demarcation” through economic and cultural protectionism (Kriesi 2008). In Europe, the (p. 395) dynamics of globalization and economic expansion have led to a rise in unemployment and in anti-immigration sentiment as well as “an increase in the number of racial-nationalist parties and organizations and a rise in anti-Semitism” (Wright 2009, 189). As noted, “racial-nationalist leaders in both North America and Europe are able to exploit the new political conditions and widespread fears to their advantage Advocating white-European privilege and heritage, racial-nationalists can effectively formulate a troubling but potent transnational message” (Wright 2009, 190).

However, the relationship between radical right-wing groups and transnational politics is ambiguous. Despite opposing a supranational system, many radical right movements consider it necessary to engage in politics on a transnational level. Like any other kind of political organization, radical right organizations do not exist in a vacuum, but instead are embedded in a larger context of multilevel governance. In Europe’s electoral arena, there have been many attempts by radical right parties to create a “European” right-wing group within the European Parliament, such as the Independence/Democracy group during the 2004–2009 legislature (Conti 2011). Outside the institutional arena, in recent years a trans-border radical right network has emerged that is made up of “close contacts throughout the EU” and supported by the participation of “like-minded nationals from all around the states at right-wing events, such as White Power Music concerts” (Europol 2011, 29). It has been argued that “transnational processes of exchange and learning play an important role in the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Europe” (Langenbacher and Schellenberg 2011, 22). Confronted with the “global challenges” of the twenty-first century, right-wing extremists seek to create a transnational network based on a “global white identity” (Daniels 2009).

In sum, although the formation of radical right cross-national links and international identities is a scientifically (and socially) relevant issue, scholarly attention has been so far partial and selective, and many important related questions remain unexplored. For example, what do radical right wing parties and movements say and actually do about transnational politics (that is, European integration) and the building of cross-national links and international cooperation? Is the contemporary radical right able to deemphasize the traditional nationalism at the core of its identity (Mudde 2007) and mitigate national differences in order to give birth to a transnational radical right family? What factors favor the transnationalization of the radical right? As Graham (2013, 176) argues, whereas previous studies have focused upon the foreign policy goals of radical right-wing populist and fascist parties, few have explored the nature of transnational networking by the far right within contemporary Europe (for exceptions, see Durham and Power 2010; Mammone 2008).

In this chapter, we aim to fill this gap by providing an overview of some scholarship (coming from social movement studies, history, sociology, and the study of political parties) on the contemporary radical right. We look first of all at the level of contextual macro variables: the political opportunities provided by the process of European integration to the transnationalization of the radical right. We consider the complex interplay among various national actors, linked to each other in cooperative as well as (p. 396) competitive interactions, as they face international institutions. Second, we suggest that another important mechanism for the development of cross-national radical right links and cooperation is the frame, which operates at the meso organizational level (Rydgren 2005). Indeed, it has been argued that frames—common constructions of social and political problems—are at the basis of the formation of collective identities, including transnational ones, and act as a precondition for cooperation (della Porta and Diani 2006). Located somewhat below the level of (broad and fixed) ideology, frame analysis fits our interest in the ways in which organizations bridge different, specific issues and identities across countries. We shall therefore investigate the new tactics and frames of the radical right vis-à-vis an integrated Europe, illustrating the degree and forms of its transnationalization in terms of the scope of mobilization, targets, organizational contacts, action strategies, and issues. Third, and in line with the new turn in social science research toward studying the effects and use of information and communication technologies (e.g., Bennett and Segerberg 2013), we consider the potential role of the Internet in the building of transnational links and international cooperation within the contemporary radical right, a research topic still in its infancy—and one that we argue deserves further attention in future research on the radical right. Differences and similarities between radical right political parties and non-party organizations concerning

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

the formation of cross-national links and international cooperation will be emphasized, as well as historical examples that aim to contextualize current developments on the topic.

Political Opportunities for the Internationalization of the Radical Right

When it comes to right-wing extremist mobilization (including transnational mobilization), economic and social crises have been mentioned as determinants of its emergence and development (Prowe 2004), as have political instability, allies in power (Koopmans 2005), the legacy of an authoritarian past (Koopmans et al. 2005; Mudde 2007, 233–255), youth subcultures and hooliganism (Bjørge 1995), and the diffusion of xenophobic values within society (Rydgren 2005). In addition, disaffection from politics, mistrust of democratic institutions, and anti-establishment sentiments, in particular in the form of opposition toward the European Union, are increasingly considered important (e.g., Mudde 2007). In terms of political opportunities favoring the internationalization of the radical right, scholars agree that European integration can potentially catalyze political dissent, providing radical right parties and groups with a new and powerful issue to compete on (Almeida 2010). The anti-immigrant, anti-minority-rights campaigns are not the only issues that unite the European radical right. The far right is also virulently anti-Brussels. Euroskepticism has been noted to be a common trait of current radical right-wing formations, a stance of both political parties (Vasilopoulou 2011) and (p. 397) non-party organizations (Caiani and Della Porta 2011). According to Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, this negative attitude toward European integration stems from “a series of perceived threats to the national community,” including immigration, multiculturalism, and the loss of national sovereignty and traditional values (2002, 976). These are all core myths of the radical right that are challenged by processes of supranational integration (Bar-On 2011, 217). Moreover, European institutions can provide an institutional arena for radical right organizations to make themselves visible and accountable, to recognize each other, and to establish coordination.

Since the mid-1980s, the European Parliament elections have represented an occasion where West European radical right parties have tried to coordinate among themselves, at least for the political campaign (Almeida 2010, 243). The 2014 elections in particular marked a clear advancement of the nationalist and Euroskeptic radical right actors all over Europe. The French Front National (FN, National Front) and British UK Independence Party (UKIP) performed very strongly, winning respectively twenty-four and twenty-two seats. In Denmark, the radical right Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party) triumphed with 27 percent of the vote, doubling its members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from two to four. In Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ, Freedom Party of Austria) increased its vote tally by 7.2 percent from the previous election, and in Germany even the neo-Nazis of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party) gained one seat in the European Parliament.¹ On this occasion, the attempt by the radical right to form a parliamentary group within the European Parliament almost succeeded in the form of the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), the radical right coalition led by France’s Marine Le Pen. The

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

EAF was a pan-European political party of radical right-wing Euroskeptics founded in 2010 and initially aggregating delegations from the FN, the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom), the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest), the FPÖ, the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS, Slovak National Party), and the Italian Lega Nord (LN, Northern League). The DF, UKIP, and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) refused to join the new alliance, while the more radical and anti-Semitic European nationalist parties such as Germany's NPD, the British National Party (BNP), Greece's Golden Dawn, and Hungary's Jobbik were not permitted to. After the European elections, however, due to internal splintering the proposed EAF group did not achieve the EU requirement of seven member states represented, and their MEPs have continued to sit as *non-inscrits*, that is, not in one of the recognized political groups.

Historical studies note that attempts to establish trans-European institutions were made by the radical right before the Second World War. Italian and British fascists, for instance, attended an International Conference of Fascist Parties in 1932, and representatives from France, Norway, and Ireland attended the 1934 Fascist International Congress in Montreux (Bar-On 2007). During the Spanish Civil War, British and other European sympathizers joined the Friends of National Spain, and members of the Irish Blue Shirt Movement joined the Spanish Foreign Legion to fight against the Republic (p. 398) (Keene 2001, 2-7). However, nothing enduring was created and the Axis alliance was primarily a strategic one (Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins 2012, ch. 20).

Almeida (2010, 244), who studied the various attempts made by the radical right to give birth to a European party since 1979 (when the first elections for the European Parliament were held), uses records of transnational coalition-building and data on legislative activities in the European Parliament to show that efforts, although still limited, have been made to Europeanize radical right parties, using adaptive strategies that would allow them to operate within a multilevel polity. According to Almeida, they have failed to establish themselves as a relevant actor at the European level for two reasons: their non-involvement in European policy making and their inability to engage in durable transnational cooperation because of divergent domestic strategies.

Drawing on empirical evidence from radical party behavior at the European level, three patterns of horizontal interaction between radical right parties in the European Parliament can be identified: institutionalized ties with radical right parties, institutionalized ties with other parties, and isolation. No efforts at establishing ties were effective. In addition, in an attempt to stay within the realm of democratic acceptability, a number of individuals who formerly had been members of radical right parties have opted for membership in a less controversial group. Almeida (2010, 247) believes that constraints operating at the domestic level were the main reason for the repeated inability of the radical right to establish transnational cooperation. A different hypothesis is put forward by other scholars such as Fenneman and Pollmann (1998): that the lack of cohesion between radical right MEPs is a product of ideological heterogeneity.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Beyond institutionalized contacts within the European Parliament, other studies have revealed the presence of cross-national contacts among radical right actors, both parties and non-party organizations (radical right political movements, cultural associations, etc.), in Europe and beyond. For example, one recent work that included fifty-four interviews with representatives of the most important radical right organizations in six European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain) and the United States (Caiani and Kröll 2014) showed that most of the radical right organizations interviewed (71 percent) have frequent transnational contacts, either with right-wing groups in other countries or at the international level with umbrella federations. For instance, the representative of the English Democrats stressed that they “have been approached by several foreign organizations such as the Flemish Nationalist Party and the Austrian FPÖ in order to find topics of common interest and to work on a common platform (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 10). Similarly, the German movement Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National Democrats) declared that it was in regular contact with a variety of youth right-wing organizations in Europe, including the Nordisk Ungdom (Nordic Freedom), and the NPD claimed links with other European radical right parties, such as the Falange Española de las JONS (Spanish Phalanx of the Committees for the National-Syndicalist Offensive), the BNP from the United Kingdom, and Dělnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti (DSSS, Workers’ Party of Social Justice) from the Czech Republic (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 11). The representative of the American Third Position explained that his group had recently had “transoceanic” (p. 399) contacts with the French FN, and other American organizations have had contacts with the BNP (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 12). This high degree of horizontal “transnational embeddedness” may be related to the weak institutionalization of supranational right-wing actors, which pushes national radical right movement organizations to be involved directly at multiple levels. There are, however, some national specificities that emerge from this study: in some countries (including the United States, France, Austria, and Britain) the radical right is more internationally oriented, and in other countries, for instance Italy, the radical right tends to have fewer cross-national linkages. What is more interesting is that regardless of country variations there are important differences in cross-national links depending on the type of radical right organization: cross-national contacts are more typical of the most institutionalized and resourceful organizations (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 10).

In regard to political parties, the interwar fascist movements sought to develop partnerships. The same happened after 1945, as in the case of John Bean and Colin Jordan’s BNP of the very early 1960s, which boasted of its “racial nationalist” credentials and developed organizations such as the Northern European Ring in order to foster international exchanges with fellow “northern Europeans” in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany. In more recent times, John Tyndall and Nick Griffin’s BNP imported ideas from abroad, drawing on continental reference points such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and the *nouvelle droite*, as well as fostering links with America via its American Friends of the BNP organization.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Regarding non-party radical right organizations, the easing of Europe's borders (and the development of information and communications technologies; see below) is affecting the outlook and activities of right-wing extremists (Whine 2012). Within an even more integrated Europe, there can be many manifestations of coordination among radical right nationalists, though these can take a variety of different and not necessarily "political" forms, such as international gatherings, clothing, and music. Pan-European associations promote closer contact around symbolic or expressive events (see also Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012, ch. 5). One example is the case of the European National Front, founded in 1999, which has affiliates in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Spain and in August 2006 mobilized up to ten thousand supporters for the Deutsche Stimme festival in Sachsen, Germany (Whine 2012, 494; see also AIVD 2005). The annual Dresden march commemorating the Allied bombing, organized by the German NPD, attracted more than three thousand people in 2005, six thousand in 2008, and thousands again in 2009.

Finally, the importance of youth structures in socializing far-right activists at a transnational level is underlined by many scholars (e.g., Graham 2013, 191), and Eastern and Central Europe are no exception. Cross-national radical right contacts and links are generated during symbolic events, and the impact of the Western (in particular German, American, and British) radical right on the East and Central European scene has been proven to be strong (Mareš 2012). In the last several years, the scene in Eastern and Central Europe has been increasingly influenced by ideas from the modern Italian non-fascist radical right, such as those promoted by the Zentropa website and the (p. 400) Italian subcultural youth movement CasaPound, which endorse new social approaches to right-wing radicalism, focusing on the protection of European populations from global capitalism. East and Central European radical right youth organizations have copied organizational structures from groups elsewhere, and have established contacts with other organizations (for example, with the German Autonomous Nationalists). Methods they have adopted include occupying abandoned buildings, organizing cultural programs and educational and training activities for sympathizers, offering sympathizers a broad range of leisure-time activities, and engaging with students (Mareš 2012, 10). Regarding political parties, Mareš identifies several attempts at coordination between radical right organizations in Western, Eastern, and Central Europe (Mareš 2012, 1). In 2009 the DSSS, which is the strongest right-wing extremist party in the Czech Republic, initiated intensive relations with the German NPD. In 2011, for example, both parties adopted the Riesa Manifesto on human rights abuses, and their relations and cooperation extend beyond just those two groups to the organizations affiliated with both parties (Mareš 2012, 2-3). Moreover, Central European groups are involved as equal partners in pan-European projects, including pan-European political parties, such as the establishment in 2009 of the Alliance of European Nationalist Movements (AENM), aggregating the Hungarian Jobbik, the BNP, the Italian Fiamma Tricolore, the National Democrats in Sweden, the Finnish National Party, the Belgian National Front, the All-Ukrainian Union Freedom, the Portuguese Partido Nacional Renovador, and the Republican Social Movement from Spain. Also, the Slovenian National Party, the Imperium Europe

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation


movement from Malta, and smaller organizations from Bulgaria and Poland attended events organized by the AENM, including its 2012 meeting in Milan, Italy. We have noticed that despite nationalist tensions running high between some right-wing extremist groups in this region, for example between the Slovak and Hungarian groups, common issues such as an anti-Roma agenda serve as the basis for transnational cooperation, as in the participation of members of the Slovak party Brotherhood in rallies organized by the DSSS in the Czech Republic, or the participation of representatives of the Czech Workers' Party, the Nuova Dreapta (New Right) from Romania, and the Polish organization Falanga in the Nationalist Olympic Games in Slovakia organized by some Slovak radical right parties (Mareš 2012, 6). In fact, despite strong nationalism being one of the core values of the radical right (Mudde 2007), current right-wing organizations, both political parties and movements, appear to have adapted to the transformation of the context in which they mobilize and become more transnational.

An important indicator of the transnationalization of right-wing extremism today concerns the scope of its mobilization, that is, the territorial dimension of the radical right's activity, which can vary from the local level to the international level. According to Caiani and Kröll (2014), although most of these organizations' initiatives appear still mainly focused on the national (in 73 percent of cases) and local levels (in 52 percent of cases), 30 percent of them are active also at the international level, organizing events across national boundaries and at the EU level. These figures are even higher than those that emerged from previous empirical research on left-wing radical social movements.² Such right-wing transnational events include the European campaign to boycott the products of American multinational companies, cultural events such as concerts, and European party meetings and congresses.³ The president of the French organization Bloc Identitaire explained that his group had contacts with some members of the European Parliament, including the Italian deputy Mario Borghezio, from the LN. Similarly, the spokesperson for the British Freedom Party declared that his party spoke with "politicians from the local council level all the way up to MEPs from Britain and other European countries" (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 4).

Researchers are also seeing an increase in the transnationalization of the radical right over time. As Figure 20.1 indicates, the proportion of transnational radical right actors (that is, radical right groups with a presence in more than one country, or Europe-wide federations) at events increased from 2.4 percent in 2005 to 4 percent in 2007, dropping back to 3.2 percent in 2009. For example, the music festival Hammerfest, which took place in the United States in 2005, involved radical right bands from all over the United States and Europe, according to an article in the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution* on October 1 of that year. Similarly, the number of transnational right-wing events as a proportion of all right-wing events also increased slightly (from 3.5 percent of all cases in 2005 to 6.3 percent in 2006, 4.5 percent in 2007, 5.6 percent in 2008, and 4.6 percent in 2009). Furthermore, right-wing initiatives with supranational targets (that is, the EU) rose from 4.5 percent of all initiatives in 2005 to 9.3 percent.⁴ Explained the Italian party

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Forza Nuova in March 2003 about the campaign it organized against the United States and globalization: “We are doing consultations among leaders of nationalist movements in Europe, with the aim of extending the boycott campaign against the USA to a transnational level.”



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 20.1 The Development Across Time of Transnational Radical Right Actors, Events, and Targets (2005–2009, All Countries) (%)

In brief, the main conclusion that we can derive from this section is that despite its traditional association with the national, the modern right is a transnational phenomenon. Whether in its fascist, conservative, or other forms, it organizes across national barriers, linking together

movements in different countries (Durham and Power 2010). Historical analyses like the one conducted by Mammone (2015) on the French and Italian radical right show that transnational tendencies have always existed on the radical right, with movements, activists, and thinkers establishing links and exchanging ideas, personnel, and strategies across national boundaries since 1945, although these processes have been accelerated by the process of European integration.

Internationalization of the Radical Right and “Frames”

Some scholars look at the internationalization of collective actors as diffusion of ideas, norms, and values, and they postulate that processes of diffusion of “frames” are a precondition for the formation of transnational cooperation and identities, which in turn can function as a basis for the development of cross-national linkages (della Porta and Diani 2006). Networking, for the radical right as for any political party, represents an important political activity, particularly on an international level, functioning as a crucible for the exchange of ideas and information on policy and praxis (Graham 2013, 177). This diffusion of shared frames and common “repertoires of protest” also facilitates the further development of “tolerant” support networks for ideologically inspired “intolerant” action; these networks can provide logistical and indeed emotional support to activists who are frequently marginalized within the context of their own domestic politics (della Porta and Tarrow 2004). The diffusion of ideas can be explored by applying frame analysis, focusing on the social construction of problems and solutions and the way organizations spread their vision of society (Johnston and Noakes 2005).

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

In this sense, transnationalism of the radical right has been often explored through studying the movement of ideas—how they transfer from one arena to another. Many historians, such as Roger Griffin, Andrea Mammone, and Claudia Baldoli, to mention a few, have highlighted the mechanisms through which radical right politics has operated across national borders, showing that radical right leaders and groups have drawn on each other's endeavors to develop their activism. For example, the French FN was the driving force behind the development of similar parties in Western Europe, and it became the spearhead of the radical right in Europe (FES 2010, 6). Another example is the case of the BNP in the United Kingdom and the NPD in Germany, which through the sharing of ideas, information, policy, and praxis among their leaders and activists have developed a common ideological “master frame” in order to interpret and explain the impact of global changes to national and local audiences, most obviously through the invocation of populist anti-Muslim nostrums (FES 2010, 177). In particular, both individual networking and party youth structures are an important mode through which certain party cadres are selected for further socialization and radicalization via international activism. Party congresses, festivals, and demonstrations also serve as a (p. 403) focus for such international activities (FES 2010, 194). This type of transnational relationship between the BNP and NPD is just one of a plethora of similar ties, historical and contemporary, political and cultural, that exist across the far right spectrum.

One important indicator of the transnationalization of the radical right is the presence of transnational issues in the public discourses of these organizations, and—most important—“common positions/visions” on them (Ivarsflaten 2007), as a basis for the potential development of cross-national links and international cooperation. A recent study based on systematic content analysis of various documents (party newspapers, magazine, leaflets, online discussion forums) of different types of radical right organizations (political parties, political movements, and subcultural youth groups) in Italy and Germany from 2000 to 2006 (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012) showed that European issues appear in the discourse of the radical right in the two countries (in 11 percent and 5 percent of documents analyzed, respectively, out of a total of 3,700 samples), without significant differences among the different types of groups. This suggests the salience of the issue in the institutional as well as social sectors of these political forces (for instance, in Italy the subject of Europe is discussed in 49 percent of samples taken from political parties, versus in 35 percent of samples from subcultural organizations and 14 percent of samples from political movements) (Caiani 2014, 452). If we consider that in the discourse of the radical right, “Europe” and “European integration” are often associated with “globalization” (a theme that arises in about 20 percent of samples in both Italy and Germany), it is evident that the process of internationalization plays an important role in the rhetoric of this political area (Mudde 2007).

In addition, there is a high degree of convergence in the Euroskeptical discourse of the radical right in the countries analyzed. The way the radical right perceives and (negatively) represents the EU through frames is strikingly similar across countries, despite the fact that these organizations do not really cooperate and in a sense are even

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

in competition with each other. Indeed, according to the Italian and German radical right organizations analyzed, “European integration and globalization of markets has not only economic but also cultural and political consequences.” Globalization not only leads to the “loss of identities of peoples” but also brings about “limitations to the sovereignty of the national states” (to cite a May 2002 example from the Italian group Forza Nuova). Europe is considered a “totalitarian superstate,” a sort of “dictatorship,” an “intrusive body,” a “distant and oppressing power” (a characteristic that is very often mentioned as being in opposition to “the European peoples”), and a “centralizing state.” More specific references to European policies describe a “market-oriented” EU that conditions national political and economic choices, serving the interests of international finance rather than the real interests of the nations. For instance, according to the radical right, at the national level the EU “increases unemployment,” “damages the competitiveness of small businesses,” will “lead to the closure of many domestic businesses” and “to the invasion of foreign goods,” and will “provoke the development of financial crimes” (Caiani 2014, 452–454). Marine Le Pen in France talks in a very similar way of the “catastrophic experiment” of the euro. Her FN, as well as the Dutch PVV, sees European institutions (especially the European Commission) as “centralizing,” and criticizes their (p. 404) weak legitimacy (they are often characterized as “not elected”). They propose instead to give more power to the European Parliament and the council representing national governments. By contrast, the corruption of the European elites has been one of the main topics of the Hungarian Jobbik’s recent electoral campaign.

A somewhat different picture is offered in the analysis conducted by Almeida (2010) on the programmatic responses of radical right parties to European integration, based on electoral manifestos (national and European) from 1983 and 2007. The author stresses that while some of the most prominent members of the radical right party family, such as the FN in France and the FPÖ, have placed their opposition to Europe at the core of their program, the radical right does not constitute a homogeneous and static Euroskeptic bloc, because there are differences in the salience different radical right parties attribute to European issues, as well as differences in the programmatic realignments that have marked their European policies (Almeida 2010, 244).

It is evident that greater coherence in political discourse and action in this area could favor the development of cross-national contacts and increased cooperation among radical right parties (Caiani and Conti 2014). In the end, despite many factors being involved in issue mobilization and the creation of a pro-EU/anti-EU cleavage in many West European countries, the success of this process depends, as Caiani and Conti (2014) suggest, on the ability of radical right organizations to come to terms with their ideological background, give priority to this emerging cleavage, and establish greater synergies with one another.

However, there are also commentators who consider that the most important element in the transnationalization of the radical right involves ideas and frames, and not so much their common opposition toward European integration. Instead, they see Islamophobia as a common ground for building pan-European right-wing unity (see, e.g., Hafez 2014). As

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

noted, there have always been international links between fascist and far-right groups, going as far back as the late 1920s; however, what is new is that international linkages between elements of the far right have recently coalesced around anti-Muslim prejudice—a kind of lowest common denominator that they can all agree on, as opposed to white supremacism, anti-Semitism, parliamentary democracy, and many other traditional ideological features of the radical right (On Religion 2014).

The Internet's Role in Cross-National Links and Cooperation: Missing the Gap?

We cannot neglect the key role played by the Internet in the internationalization of the radical right. As recent studies highlight, both European and American far-right organizations are increasingly active on the Internet, in order to avoid national laws and police investigations (Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler 2011; Caiani and Wagemann 2009; (p. 405) De Koster and Houtman 2008; Ramalingam 2012). The new virtual means of communication offered by the Internet are thought to favor transnational solidarity (Chase-Dunn and Boswell 2004). “The development of information and communication technologies” and the “easing of Europe’s border” are the “new enablers allowing white supremacists and neo-Nazis to connect and cooperate” (Whine 2012, 317). Also, studies on terrorism and political violence stress that isolated individual “consumers” can find a common identity through radical right websites, convincing them that they are not alone but instead are part of a community, albeit a virtual one (Adams and Roscigno 2005; De Koster and Houtman 2008). Furthermore, as scholars of social movements underline, the Internet can play an important role in mobilization by reducing the cost of communication among a large number of individuals (della Porta and Mosca 2006; Whine 2000), by solving the problem of leadership and networking, and by allowing the organization of transnational and even global events (Petit 2004). In addition, in a fashion similar to cybercriminals, right-wing extremists can also use the Internet for illegal or borderline-legal activities, such as hacking, exchange of hidden instructions, mass threat emails, and fraud (Perry and Olsson 2009). Finally, the Internet can be an effective means of realizing the concept of “leaderless resistance” based on a network of “phantom cells,” as some American radical right activists have promoted (Levin 2002).

To date, there are few empirical analyses on the topic. Existing research on the transnationalization of social movements and the role played by the Internet therein has focused primarily on left-wing and/or religious Islamic organizations (Bunts 2003; della Porta and Mosca 2005; Pianta and Silva 2003; Qin et al. 2007). The few studies on the radical right and Internet politics have tended to concentrate on specific country or organization case studies, lacking comparative and transnational dimensions (see, e.g., Atton 2006). Other works addressing the transnationalization of the radical right focus on either the offline transnational activities of these actors (mainly political parties during electoral campaigns; e.g., Vasilopoulou 2011) or the online transnational links between radical right groups, missing the bridge between the online and offline spheres. For example, Burris, Smith, and Strahm (2000), through a social network analysis of websites of eighty white supremacist organizations, showed that more than two-thirds provided links to like-minded organizations in foreign countries. In another study, Gerstenfeld, Grant, and Chiang (2003) found that 51 percent of the 157 English-language right-wing

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

extremist websites surveyed included links to organizations from other countries, and around 26 percent offered non-English content.

Most interestingly, Caiani and Kröll's (2014) study based on fifty-four interviews with representatives of major radical right organizations in Europe and the United States (both political parties and non-party organizations) showed that the Internet has become an essential tool for most of these organizations and their international activities, in terms of both enabling their action and facilitating communication between organizations and individuals. In fact, 81 percent of the interviewed individuals (with no significant differences across countries or types of groups) emphasize that the Internet "helps a lot" in this regard.⁵ Many of the organizations studied by the researchers are wholly Internet-based. This is the case, for example, with the White Voice group, whose (p. 406) spokesperson explained that they are "based on the Internet and have a strong following around the world." And the representative of Vanguard News Network (VNN) stressed that they are "not a true 'organization,' in formal legal terms," but are "websites and forums that do projects and [offline] rallies from time to time" and that they are active supranationally, "since anyone from any country can join [the] forum and post" (Caiani and Kröll 2014). The individuals interviewed emphasized the effectiveness and "security" of cyberspace in facilitating various supranational activities, as did the representative of the U.S. group who declared that his network does not "operate as an organization, but as [a] lone wolf in small cells . . . with the aim of avoiding prosecution by the state" and that "the Internet works quite well in reaching out to like-minded people"; it allows his group to avoid having physical meetings, which "government agencies" and other entities "can infiltrate" (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 5-6). The Internet is also increasingly important for the horizontal transnationalization of the radical right. Many of the radical right representatives who were interviewed explained that "via the Internet, like-minded organizations can be searched, as many of the organizations are represented by their own homepage" and that "networking can be done between rank and file members, and by people who otherwise would never meet or communicate. This exponentially increases and speeds up the dissemination of ideas and activism globally." In this sense, the Internet allows "some kind of exchange with organizations from other countries as they follow one another's reports and sometimes use articles and documents taken from the respective websites" (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 4). An example of this is the European movement and website Stop Islamification of Europe, founded in 2007 in the United Kingdom, which is against the expansion of Islam in Europe; thanks to the Internet, this group is active in several European countries. Other examples of transnational right-wing mobilizations organized and supported through the Internet are political party meetings and congresses, such as the conference "Our Europe: Peoples and Tradition Against Banks and Usury," organized in March 2009 in Milan by the British BNP, the French FN, and the German NPD with the aim of bringing together representatives of the main extreme right parties and followers in Europe (described in, for example, *La Repubblica* on March 25, 2009). Another is the European congress organized by the German party Republikaner in Rosenheim in 2008, involving extreme right parties from all over Europe (reported on in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 19, 2008). Extreme right organizations also

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

make some attempt to promote virtual debates among members and sympathizers on their websites, through forums, and via mailing lists (present in 25 percent of cases analyzed by Caiani and Kröll [2014, 6]), and they endeavor to construct their group identity thorough website sections providing basic information regarding the group (e.g., “About Us,” “Who We are,” etc., in 74 percent of cases) and the group’s goals and mission (e.g., “Statement,” “Constitution,” “Manifesto,” seen in 60 percent of cases). Indeed, many right-wing organizations stress that they are more likely to become known because of the Internet, since “Google and other web robots pick up the website and forum headlines which bring browsers from around the world” (Caiani and Kröll 2014, 7). In sum, information and communication technologies (ICTs) enable right-wing extremists to reach their target audience and attract a wider audience beyond their (p. 407) borders—something that most mainstream mass media outlets seem to deny. Building on this result, we can also note that ICTs may act as a “force multiplier” for these types of groups, by enhancing the power of right-wing extremists and allowing them “to push above their weight” nationally and cross-nationally (Whine 2000).

Conclusion

In this chapter, we started from the observation that an important aspect to be explored in current research on the radical right is whether we are witnessing an internationalization of the radical right, something that social movement scholars acknowledge can be greatly enhanced by the use of new technologies. We therefore illustrated, by relying on several empirical studies coming from history, sociology, and political science and focusing on either macro- or meso-level factors of explanations, the intensity and trends of current radical right cross-national links and cooperation. Today, right-wing extremist organizations across the world, whether parties or non-party organizations, are adapting to transnational politics (in particular the process of European integration) through either political communication or mobilization. Although in general radical right actions and initiatives still take place mainly at the local level (especially in the case of the more informal radical right groups, such as subcultural youth groups), the transnational arena is increasing in importance. As we have seen, the majority of radical right organizations mobilize beyond the national level, target transnational institutions and politicians, and have cross-national contacts with similar organizations in other countries. This suggests that American and European radical right organizations are acquiring a strong “international approach” (Gerstenfeld, Grant, and Chiang 2003, 37). Second, even though radical right groups strongly oppose political globalization and European integration, they become entrepreneurs of a sort of transnationalization of the right-wing movement itself (Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and Vasilopoulou 2012). As Bar-On (2011, 208) notes, “The stances of most of the radical right-wing political parties within the European Union have become identical: support for pan-European unity, and rejection of the contemporary ‘technocratic’ EU.” Far-right movements can be narrowly conceived as nationalist organizations, yet often their

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

ideologies synthesize national and transnational visions. Paradoxically, the unifying feature of this global identity is globalization as a common enemy. The new transnational right-wing extremists can be thus described as “globalized anti-globalists” (Grumke 2013). Finally, some scholars may consider the cyber world to be limited and without connection to the “real” world, but we and many of the authors cited in this chapter have argued that radical right organizations “contribute regularly and with purpose within the online communities they have helped to create and forge within cyberspace” (Bowman-Grieve 2009, 1005). Research indicates that the Internet seems to be a useful tool for this “transnational” activation of the radical right, in terms of increasing its supranational targets, giving it the opportunity for supranational mobilization, and giving birth to supranational organizations.

References

- Adams, J., and V. J. Roscigno. 2005. “White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web.” *Social Forces* 84, no. 2: 759–778.
- AIVD. 2005. “Annual Report 2004: General Intelligence Security Service.” The Hague, June. Available online at <https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/aivd2004-eng.pdf>.
- Almeida, D. 2010. “Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration.” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 11, no. 3: 237–253.
- Atton, C. 2006. “Far-Right Media on the Internet: Culture, Discourse and Power.” *New Media Society* 8, no. 4: 573–587.
- Bar-On, T. 2007. *Where Have All The Fascists Gone?* Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- . 2011. “Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 45, no. 3: 199–223.
- Bartlett, J., J. Birdwell, and M. Littler. 2011. *“The Rise of Populism in Europe Can Be Traced Through Online Behaviour . . .”: The New Face of Digital Populism*. London: Demos.
- Bennett, W. L., and A. Segerberg. 2013. *The Logic of Connective Action. Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Betz, H.-G. 1994. *Extreme Right Wing Populism in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Bjørger, T. 1995. *Terror from the Radical Right*. London: Frank Cass.
- Bowman-Grieve, L. 2009. “Exploring ‘Stormfront’: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 11: 989–1007.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Bunts, G. R. 2003. *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. London: Pluto Press.

(p. 409) Burris, V., E. Smith, and A. Strahm. 2000. "White Supremacist Networks on the Internet." *Sociological Focus* 33, no. 2: 215–235.

Caiani, M. 2014. "Le grandi contraddizioni della destra populista." *Il Mulino* 473 (March): 450–458.

Caiani, M., and N. Conti. 2014. "In the Name of the People: The Euroscepticism of the Italian Radical Right." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 15, no. 2: 183–197.

Caiani, M., and D. della Porta. 2009. *Social Movements and Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caiani, M., D. della Porta, and C. Wagemann. 2012. *Mobilizing on the Radical Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caiani, M., and P. Kröll. 2014. "A Transnational Radical Right? New Right-Wing Tactics and the Use of the Internet." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39, no. 3: 1–21.

Caiani, M., and C. Wagemann. 2009. "Online Networks of the Italian and German Radical Right." *Information, Communication and Society* 12, no. 1: 66–109.

Chase-Dunn, C., and T. Boswell. 2004. "Global Democracy: A World-Systems Perspective." *Protosociology* 20: 15–29.

Conti, N. 2011. *The Radical Right in Europe: Between Slogans and Voting Behavior*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.

Daniels, J. 2009. *Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

De Koster, W., and D. Houtman. 2008. "'Stormfront Is Like a Second Home to Me': On Virtual Community Formation by Right-Wing Extremists." *Information, Communication and Society* 11, no. 8: 1155–1176.

della Porta, D., and M. Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

della Porta, D., and L. Mosca. 2005. "Global-Net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements." *Journal of Public Policy* 25: 165–190.

———. 2006. "Democrazia in rete: stili di comunicazione e movimenti sociali in Europa." *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia* 4: 529–556.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

della Porta, D., and S. Tarrow. 2004. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism. People, Passions, and Power*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Durham, M., and M. Power. 2010. *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right*. London: Palgrave.

Europol. 2011. "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report." TE-SAT 2011. Available online at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/te-sat2011_0.pdf.

Fenneman, M., and C. Pollmann. 1998. "Ideology of Anti-Immigrant Parties in the European Parliament." *Acta Politica* 33, no. 2: 111-138.

FES. 2010. "Is Europe on the 'Right Path'? Right-Wing Extremism in Europe." Summary of a conference held in Berlin, November 30, 2009. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Available online at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07306-20100628.pdf>.

Gerstenfeld, P. B., D. R. Grant, and C. Chiang. 2003. "Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites." *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy* 3, no. 1: 29-44.

Graham, M. 2013. "Transnational Networking on the Far Right: The Case of Britain and Germany." *West European Politics* 36, no. 1: 176-198.

Grumke, T. 2013. "Globalized Anti-Globalists: The Ideological Basis of the Internationalization of Right-Wing Extremism." In *Right-Wing Radicalism Today: Perspectives from Europe and the US*, ed. S. Von Mering and T. W. McCarty, 13-22. London: Routledge

(p. 410) Hafez, F. 2014. "Shifting Borders: Islamophobia as Common Ground for Building Pan-European Right-Wing Unity." *Patterns of Prejudice* 48, no. 2: 479-499.

Halikiopoulou, D., K. Nanou, and S. Vasilopoulou. 2012. "The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism." *European Journal of Political Research* 51, no. 4: 504-539.

Heitmeyer, W. 1992. *Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen*. 4. erg. Auflage. Weinheim: Juventa.

Hermet, G. 2001. *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique. XIXème-XXème siècles*. Paris: Fayard.

Hooghe, L., G. Marks and C. Wilson. 2002. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 965-989.

Imig, D., and S. Tarrow. 2001. *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Ivarsflaten, E. 2007. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases." *Comparative Political Studies* 1, no. 1: 3-23.

Johnston, H., and J. Noakes. 2005. *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Keene, J. 2001. *Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain During the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39*. London: Leicester University Press.

Koopmans, R. 2005. "The Radical Right: Ethnic Competition or Political Space?" In *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, ed. R. Koopmans et al., 180-204. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Koopmans R., et al. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Kriesi, H. 2008. "Political Mobilization, Political Participation and the Power of the Vote." *West European Politics* 31, nos. 1-2: 147-168.

Langenbacher, N., and B. Schellenberg. 2011. *Is Europe on the Right Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Levin, B. 2002. "Cyberhate: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Extremists' use of Computer Networks in America." *American Behavioral Scientist* 45, no. 6: 958-988.

Mammone, A. 2008. "The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-Fascist Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy." *Contemporary European History* 17, no. 2: 213-236.

———. 2015. *Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mammone, A., E. Godin, and B. Jenkins. 2012. *Mapping the Radical Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational*. London: Routledge.

Mareš, M. 2012. "Trans-National Cooperation of Right-Wing Extremists in East-Central Europe." In *Panorama of Global Security Environment 2012*, ed. M. Majer, R. Ondrejčák, and V. Tarasovič, 605-615. Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs. Available online at <http://cenaa.org/analysis/trans-national-cooperation-of-right-wing-extremists-in-east-central-europe>.

Mény, Y., and Y. Surel. 2000. *Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les démocraties*. Paris: Fayard.

Minkenberg, Michael. 1992. "The New Right in Germany: The Transformation of Conservatism and the Extreme Right." *European Journal of Political Research* 22: 55-81.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

(p. 411) Mudde, C. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2014. "The Le Pen-Wilders Alliance and the European Parliament: Plus Ça Change, Plus La Meme Chose." *Washington Post*, February 11.

On Religion. 2014. "Expert Interview: The Far-Right." *On Religion*, April. Available online at <http://www.onreligion.co.uk/expert-interview-the-far-right>.

Perry, B., and P. Olsson. 2009. "Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate." *Information and Communications Technology Law* 18, no. 2: 185-199.

Petit, C. 2004. "Social Movements Networks in Internet Discourse." IROWS Working Paper 25. Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside. Available online at <http://irows.ucr.edu/paper/irows25/irows25.htm>.

Pianta, M., and F. Silva. 2003. "Parallel Summits of Global Civil Society: An Update." In *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003*, ed. H. Anheier, M. Glasius, and M. Caldor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prowe, D. 2004. "The Fascist Phantom and Anti-immigrant Violence." In *Fascism and Neofascism*, ed. E. Weitz and A. Fenner, 125-40. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Qin, J., Y. Zhou, E. Reid, G. Lai, and H. Chen, H. 2007. "Analyzing Terror Campaigns on the Internet: Technical Sophistication, Content Richness, and Web Interactivity." *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* 65, no. 1: 71-84.

Ramalingam, V. 2012. "Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention." Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available online at http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf.

Rydgren, J. 2005. "Is Radical Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family." *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 413-37.

Simmons, H. G. 2003. "The French and European Radical Right and Globalization." Paper presented at the international seminar "Challenges to the New World Order: Anti-Globalism and Counter-Globalism," May 30-31, Amsterdam.

Vasilopoulou, S. 2011. "European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition." *Government and Opposition* 46, no. 2: 223-244.

Whine, M. 2000. "Far Right Extremists on the Internet." In *Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information Age*, ed. D. Thomas and B. D. Loader, 234-251. London: Routledge.

———. 2012. "Trans-European Trends in Right-Wing Extremism." In *Mapping the Radical Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational*, ed. A. Mammone, E. Godin, and B. Jenkins, 317-333. London: Routledge.

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

Wright, Stuart A. 2009. "Strategic Framing of Racial-Nationalism in North America and Europe: An Analysis of a Burgeoning Transnational Network." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21: 189-210.

Notes:

- (1.) Successes were also achieved by the Dutch PVV (15 percent), the Hungarian Jobbik (13 percent), the Greek Golden Dawn (9 percent), and the Sweden Democrats (7 percent).
- (2.) The interview question concerning the scope of the mobilization (Caiani and Kröll 2014) allowed more than one choice (5-point scale: from district level to European/transnational level). Research on protest events collected from newspaper sources and focusing on left-wing movements has stressed the paucity of protests directly targeting supranational European institutions (e.g., Della Porta and Caiani 2009; Imig and Tarrow 2001).
- (3.) For example, the Spanish party Falange Española demonstrated against approval of the European Constitution in 2005 (discussed in the newspaper *El País* on May 20, 2005).
- (4.) The notion of "scope of the actor" refers to the organizational extension of the organization and/or institution. In our coding scheme, the categories for the scope of the actor that initiates the event and the scope of the actor-target of the mobilization vary from local to international. The notion of "scope of the event/action" refers to the scope of mobilization. That is, if an article mentions "radical right organizations from different member states," the scope is "European Union." The category "multilateral" refers to "actors involved from two or more countries."
- (5.) Examples of transnational right-wing action launched and sustained through the Web are the Spanish online forum Europeans.org, where xenophobic ideas are discussed, and the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist campaign launched by the French movement Bloc Identitaire from its website.

Manuela Caiani

Manuela Caiani is Associate Professor at the Institute of Scienze Umane e Sociali at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence. Her research interests focus on Populism, Europeanization and social movements, the radical right in Europe and the United States, political mobilization and the Internet, qualitative methods of social research, and political violence and terrorism. She has been involved in several international comparative research projects and coordinated research units for individual projects and grants. She has participated as panel organizer or paper presenter at several national and international conferences. She has published in, among others, the following journals: *Mobilization*, *Acta Politica*, *European Union Politics*, *South*

Radical Right Cross-National Links and International Cooperation

European Society and Politics, and RISP, and for the following publishers: Oxford University Press, Ashgate, and Palgrave.

